The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism: Reputations, Policy Transparency, and Electoral Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Livio Di Lonardo
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
The Public ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Important Concern ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Counterterrorism Policy

The prevention of terrorist attacks is an important concern for many governments. In democracies, officials also fear the electoral consequences of successful attacks. As a result, counterterrorism policy-making and electoral concerns are tightly intertwined. To understand the implications of this link, I develop a game-theoretic model and show that left-wing incumbents respond to terror threats more aggressively than their right-wing counterparts in order to convince voters that they can be trusted in fighting terrorism. Terrorist attacks improve right-wing incumbents’ reputation, while they worsen the reputation of left-wing incumbents. When the terrorist threat is high, voters ignore right-wing incumbents’ reputation, reelecting them independently of their performance. Finally, I consider the strategic consequences of maintaining counterterrorism policies hidden from the public eye.

scholarly journals Policy Change and Partisan Politics: Understanding Family Policy Differentiation in Two Similar Countries

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita León ◽  
Emmanuele Pavolini ◽  
Joan Miró ◽  
Antonino Sorrenti
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Family Policy ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Traditional Norms ◽  
Case Design

Abstract This article looks at how different electoral competition dynamics can result in differentiated party positioning on childcare and family policy. Italy and Spain are compared using a most similar case design. The presence of women in politics, the socioeconomic profiles of the voters of the two main left-wing and right-wing Italian and Spanish parties, and opinions on traditional norms of motherhood explain different policy trajectories and higher incentives for the conservative party in Spain to converge toward the social democratic party in more progressive views of family policy.

The Problem of Clean Hands

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-113
Author(s):  
Eric Barnes ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Democratic Elections

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates.

scholarly journals Making the Public Distribution System Work

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Debarshi Das
Keyword(s):  
Distribution System ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
High Food ◽  
Fair Price ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Distribution System ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Delivery Mechanism ◽  
Food Inflation

Drawing on empirical observations of operation of public distribution system in different states of India, the paper constructs a preliminary game theoretic model. It argues that an effective public distribution must be as universal as possible, delivery mechanism of fair price shops should be re-formed, they should be make them commercially viable and that special attention should be paid to PDS at times of high food inflation.

Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 727-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERGIO J. ASCENCIO ◽  
MIGUEL R. RUEDA
Keyword(s):  
Protective Role ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives’ presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party’s vote share. The evidence suggests that this correlation can be attributed to party representatives influencing the electoral results. We also formulate a game theoretic model of the levels of representation chosen by parties in a given precinct and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that parties send their representatives where they expect their opponents to send their own. The finding suggests representatives play a primarily protective role, even when they are often involved in irregularities themselves.

scholarly journals You are fake news: political bias in perceptions of fake news

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sander van der Linden ◽  
Costas Panagopoulos ◽  
Jon Roozenbeek
Keyword(s):  
News Media ◽  
National Sample ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Fake News ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mainstream Media ◽  
Fox News ◽  
The Us ◽  
News Effect

Although the rise of fake news is posing an increasing threat to societies worldwide, little is known about what associations the term ‘fake news’ activates in the public mind. Here, we report a psychological bias that we describe as the ‘fake news effect’: the tendency for partisans to use the term ‘fake news’ to discount and discredit ideologically uncongenial media sources. In a national sample of the US population ( N = 1000), we elicited top-of-mind associations with the term ‘fake news’. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence that both liberals and conservatives freely associate traditionally left-wing (e.g. CNN) and right-wing (e.g. Fox News) media sources with the term fake news. Moreover, conservatives are especially likely to associate the mainstream media with the term fake news and these perceptions are generally linked to lower trust in media, voting for Trump, and higher belief in conspiracy theories.

Democratic Like Us? Political Orientation and the Effect of Making Democracy Salient on Anti-Israel Attitude

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-107
Author(s):  
Yphtach Lelkes ◽  
Ariel Malka ◽  
Penelope Sheets
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
The Public ◽  
Western Democracy ◽  
Arab Muslim ◽  
The Right

AbstractIsrael is viewed unfavorably among wide segments of the public within several European democracies, despite being regarded itself as a Western democracy. Does drawing attention to Israel's democratic attributes improve views toward Israel? In two surveys with Dutch national samples, anti-Semitic affect, low anti-Arab/Muslim affect, and left-wing political orientation independently predicted anti-Israel sentiment. However, in experiments embedded within the surveys, making salient Israel's democratic attributes had opposite effects on Israel attitude across those on the right and the left – slightly decreasing anti-Israel sentiment among those with a right-wing orientation but slightly increasing anti-Israel sentiment among those with a left-wing orientation. We discuss potential explanations grounded in social psychological theory as well as implications for the strategic communication efforts of groups seeking to influence attitudes toward Israel.

Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political Instability

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 810-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEONARD WANTCHEKON
Keyword(s):  
El Salvador ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Political Campaign ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
National Liberation Front ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Poll Data

This article presents a game theoretic model to explain the broad electoral support for the extreme right-wing party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), in the 1994 elections in El Salvador. Making use of poll data, the author shows that the deciding factor in this electoral outcome was not the procedural defects, the apathy of the electorate, or the disorganization of the opposition parties but, instead, uncertainty about the peace process. The model helps to explain why during the political campaign, ARENA played the “fear card” and why the peasants voted in such great numbers for a party opposed to the land reform that would greatly benefit them. The author argues that the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) participated in the election not just to win but more to provide legitimacy for the new democratic process. The article concludes by discussing implications of the findings for the prospects for democratic consolidation in El Salvador.

scholarly journals Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1251-1277 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Hollyer ◽  
B. Peter Rosendorff ◽  
James Raymond Vreeland
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Satisfaction With Democracy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Democratic Stability ◽  
Rules Of The Game

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.

scholarly journals Antisocial rewarding in structured populations

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel dos Santos ◽  
Jorge Peña
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Weak Selection ◽  
The Public ◽  
Spatially Structured Populations ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACTCooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators(prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves(antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its evolution from rare, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas.

scholarly journals Adjusting to austerity: the public spending responses of regional governments to the budget constraint in Spain and Italy

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Simon Toubeau ◽  
Davide Vampa
Keyword(s):  
Health Sector ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Regional Office ◽  
The Public ◽  
Important Variation ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Regional Deficits ◽  
Regional Governments

Abstract What are the effects of fiscal imbalances, and austerity, on regional-level spending? To answer this question, we examine an original dataset of yearly spending decisions of regional governments in Italy and Spain between 2003 and 2015. We find that the rise in regional deficits has an important negative effect on regional governments’ spending. The strength of this effect is, however, mitigated by the presence of a left-wing party in regional office. In addition, we uncover an important variation in the extent of cutbacks across policy sectors: regional governments tend to protect the health sector and focus their retrenchment efforts on social assistance and running of public institutions. Partisanship matters here too, as left-wing parties tend to protect healthcare more than their right-wing rivals. These findings bear relevance for understanding the role of partisanship and policy sector in the process of public retrenchment in multi-level states.

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