Energy versus safety: unilateral action, voter welfare, and executive accountability

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Benjamin S. Noble
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Signaling Model ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Change Policy

Abstract Does increasing executive power necessarily decrease accountability? To answer this question, I develop a two-period signaling model comparing voter welfare in two separation-of-powers settings. In one, the executive works with a median legislator to change policy; in the other, the executive chooses between legislation or unilateral action. Both politicians may have preferences that diverge from the voter's, yet I find that increasing executive power may increase accountability and welfare, even in some cases when the legislator is more likely to share the voter's preferences than the executive. Unilateral power allows a congruent executive to overcome gridlock, implement the voter's preferred policy, and reveal information about the politicians’ types—which can outweigh the risks of a divergent executive wielding power for partisan ends.

scholarly journals El gobierno del poder judicial y la separación de poderes en la nueva constitución británica = Government of the judiciary and separation of powers in the new U.K. Constitution

2014 ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
David Giménez Gluck
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Lord Chancellor

Este artículo analiza la reforma constitucional promovida en Gran Bretaña en 2005, que cambia la relación del Poder Judicial con el resto de los poderes, a través de la actualización de instituciones históricas como el Lord Chancellor y la Comisión de Apelación de la Cámara de los Lores, que pasa a ser el Tribunal Supremo de Gran Bretaña, y la sustracción al Poder Ejecutivo de algunas funciones de gobierno del Poder Judicial, como los nombramientos judiciales o el régimen disciplinario, que pasa a compartir con agencias independientes.This article analyses the constitutional reform passed in Britain in 2005, which changes the relations between the judiciary and the other powers of the State, updating historic institutions as Lord Chancellor or the Appellate Committee of The House of Lords -that became the U.K. Supreme Court-, and passing functions, as judicial appointments or judicial discipline, from the Executive Power to independent Agencies.

Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional Office

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (01) ◽  
pp. 17-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Great Care ◽  
World War ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Constitutional System

From World War II to the present, prominent scholars placed their hopes in the presidency to protect the nation from outside threats and deal effectively with domestic crises. Their theories weakened the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances by reviving an outsized trust in executive power (especially over external affairs) that William Blackstone and others promoted in eighteenth-century England. The American framers of the Constitution studied those models with great care and fully rejected those precedents when they declared their independence from England.

scholarly journals Returning Separation of Powers Analysis to its Normative Roots: The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Private Suits to Enforce Civil Penalties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Categorical Approach ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
The Status ◽  
Citizen Suits ◽  
As If

This paper examines the status of debates concerning the constitutionality of private suits to enforce civil fines in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, as well as a pending Fifth Circuit decision in United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital. The two Supreme Court opinions have upheld qui tam and citizen suits against standing challenges, but have reserved the question of their constitutionality under Article II. The Riley panel opinion held qui tam actions to be unconstitutional under Article II, but the Fifth Circuit took the matter en banc on its own motion on the very day the opinion was published. (Subsequent to the publication of this article, the Fifth Circuit overturned the panel opinion and upheld the constitutionality of qui tam actions, Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001).) In the author's judgment, all such private suits to enforce civil fines are plainly constitutional under both Article II and Article III. That such suits appear to raise constitutional doubts is the consequence of missteps in the Supreme Court's implementation of separation of powers principles. The Court, led chiefly in this respect by Justice Scalia, has written often as if constitutionally vested executive authority guarantees the President plenary policy control over all federal civil administration, and as if the purpose of standing doctrine were largely to protect such executive authority from judicial interference. The author believes that the vesting of executive power is better understood as an effort to remove Congress from the business of administration. Standing rules, for their part, ought chiefly to be understood as protecting the judiciary from the dilution of judicial power that would come from the resolution of abstract or collusive litigation. The author explains why the Court should go back to requiring no more as a matter of standing doctrine than that a case be presented in an adversary context and in a manner historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. The Court's injury, causality, and redressability inquiries should be abandoned in favor of a more straightforward questioning whether plaintiffs in federal lawsuits have constitutional or statutory causes of action to support their complaints. In Article II cases, the Court should adhere to the analytic framework of Morrison v. Olson, and abandon the more wooden and categorical approach to interpreting executive power that informs Justice Scalia's Morrison dissent and his alternative holding in Printz v. United States.

scholarly journals Some changes in the field of civil law

2006 ◽  
Vol 78 (9) ◽  
pp. 395-412
Author(s):  
Dušan Nikolić
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Social Value ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Benefit ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

In the first part of the paper, the author has outlined some changes that have happened in the field of civil law during the history, and in the second part of the paper, the author has paid attention to the modern trends, produced by the process of globalization. By analyzing certain sectors, the author has come to the conclusion that ownership title and public office are being slightly shifted from state to non-state authorities. On the other hand, this trend of the global (re)privatization has contributed to the change of attitude toward the title. The owner is expected to ewoy his title both for his own and for the public benefit. One of the most recent judgments of the European Court of Justice speaks in favor of this and it has been mentioned in this paper. This judgment supports the view that the property is not absolute and that it has a social value. The special attention is paid to the so called new institutionalism and need to question the concept of separation of powers within the European Union.

scholarly journals SEPARAÇÃO DOS PODERES E A EVOLUÇÃO DO ENTENDIMENTO DO STF SOBRE O MANDADO DE INJUNÇÃO

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 556
Author(s):  
Vidal Serrano NUNES JUNIOR ◽  
Marcio Ortiz MEINBERG
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Normative Function ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Analytical Dimension

RESUMOTrata-se de artigo cujo objetivo é identificar o entendimento do Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF sobre a Separação dos Poderes no que se refere à natureza do Mandado de Injunção, um remédio constitucional a ser concedido em caso de omissão do Poder Público em editar norma regulamentadora necessária para viabilizar o exercício dos direitos e liberdades constitucionais e das prerrogativas inerentes à nacionalidade, à soberania e à cidadania. O entendimento histórico do STF sobre o tema não é consensual e são percebidas ao menos duas grandes correntes às quais se afiliaram os ministros: Teoria Concretista e Teoria Não-Concretista (além de suas subdivisões). As duas grandes correntes diferenciam-se radicalmente, tanto no que se refere ao relacionamento entre o Judiciário e os demais Poderes, quanto aos efeitos do Mandado de Injunção. Além disso, o entendimento do STF evoluiu historicamente, não apenas quanto ao posicionamento majoritária da Corte em torno de alguma das teorias, mas também quanto ao desenvolvimento de cada uma delas. A partir da análise das principais decisões do STF sobre o tema, sistematizaremos as características centrais de cada uma das correntes (e como se diferenciam), bem como suas fundamentações e evolução. A metodologia adotada é a Dogmática Jurídica (cf. Alexy e Dreier), com foco nas dimensões empírica (pela análise das decisões do STF) e analítica (estabelecendo definições e sistematizando os conceitos utilizados pelos ministros do STF). Como conclusão, apresentaremos as características centrais de cada uma das teorias adotadas pelo STF no que se refere ao tema Separação dos Poderes.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Separação dos Poderes; Mandado de Injunção; Função Normativa. ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to identify how Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF (Brazilian’s Supreme Court) sees the Separation of Powers related to the nature of the Writ of Injunction, a constitutional remedy (relief) to be granted in case of Public Power’s omission in enacting a regulatory norm needed to enable the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms and the prerogatives inherent in nationality, sovereignty and citizenship. The historical opinion of the STF on this subject is not consensual, and there is at least two major currents in which the ministers-judges have joined: Concretist Theory and Non-Concretist Theory (and its subdivisions). The two major currents differ radically, either about the relationship between the Judiciary and the other Powers, as about the effects of the Writ of Injunction. Besides, the STF’s opinion has evolved historically, not only regards the majority position of the Court around one of the theories, but also as to the development of each of them. After analysing the main STF’s decisions on the subject, we systematize the central characteristics of each of the currents (and how they differ from each other), as well as their foundations and evolution. The methodology is the Legal Dogmatic (according Alexy and Dreier), with focus on the empirical dimension (the analysis of STF’s decisions) and analytical dimension (the establishment of definitions and the systematization the concepts used by the STF’s ministers-judges). In conclusion, we present the central characteristics related to Separation of Powers of each one the theories adopted by the STF.KEYWORDS: Separation of Powers; Writ of Injunction; Normative Function.

Separation of Powers and the Strategic Constraint

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Law

Justices have considerable latitude to pursue either their personal preferences or their personal visions of the law. The danger is that the Court gets so far out of line from the rest of the political system that we see fundamental institutional showdowns that threaten the independence of the judiciary, such as the Court-packing controversy in the 1930s. If the elected branches influence justices, however, they can keep the Court in check, thereby attenuating such risks. This chapter tests whether the Court systematically yields to the elected branches. In particular, it examines whether individual justices vote differently when the constraints imposed by the executive and legislative branches are likely to be at their strongest. It focuses on the two versions in the literature: one in which the Court is constrained only on statutory cases and the other in which the constraint extends to all cases, including constitutional cases.

Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance

2021 ◽  
pp. 46-89
Author(s):  
Paul Craig
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
Single European Act ◽  
Rule Making ◽  
Secondary Rule

Institutional balance, as opposed to strict separation of powers, characterized the disposition of legislative and executive power in the EEC from the outset. The chapter is divided into four temporal periods. The initial period runs between the Rome Treaty and the Single European Act 1986 (SEA). The discussion begins with the initial disposition of institutional power in the Rome Treaty, and charts the way in which this shifted during the first thirty years. The second section covers the period between the SEA and the Nice Treaty, in which there was growing consensus in normative terms as to the appropriate disposition of primary legislative power, but continuing contestation as to power over secondary rule-making and the locus of executive authority. These tensions were readily apparent in the third period, which covers the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The fourth period runs from the advent of the Lisbon Treaty to the present. The EU has been beset by a series of crises, which had implications for the powers of the respective EU institutions and the institutional balance between them.

Appraisal and Review

2020 ◽  
pp. 255-276
Author(s):  
Mike McConville ◽  
Luke Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Home Office ◽  
Final Destination ◽  
The Common ◽  
Future Direction

The concluding Chapter scrutinises the validity and relevance of the book’s hitherto unseen archival files, from which its account stems. In pulling together its main themes concerning the role of civil servants, the Executive and the Judiciary in administering criminal justice, it retraces the trajectory of suspects’ rights in the late nineteenth century, from their seemingly ‘bedrock’ foundation within the common law to their rough distillation (at home and abroad) through various iterations of Judges’ ‘Rules’, themselves of dubious pedigree. In documenting this journey, this Chapter underscores how Senior Judges, confronted by Executive power impinging upon the future direction of system protections, enfeebled themselves, allowing ‘police interests’ to prevail. With Parliament kept in the dark as to the ongoing subterfuge; and the integrity of the Home Office, as an institution, long dissolved, ‘Executive interests’ took the reins of a system within which much mileage for ‘culture change’ lay ahead. This Chapter helps chart their final destination; ultimately, one where new Rules (the CrimPR) replace those exposed as failures, leading to governmental success of a distinct kind: traditional understandings of ‘rights’ belonging to suspects and defendants subverted into ‘obligations’ owing to the Court and an adversarial process underpinning determinations of guilt long-disbanded in the quest for so-called ‘efficiency’. In explaining the implications of the events discussed in this book for the issue of ‘Judicial Independence’ and the ‘Separation of Powers’, this Chapter offers a theoretical framework that illuminates the role and practices of the Senior Judiciary in criminal justice policy today.

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