The Reputations Legislators Build: With Whom Should Representatives Collaborate?

2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN F. CRISP ◽  
KRISTIN KANTHAK ◽  
JENNY LEIJONHUFVUD
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Institutional Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Bill Cosponsorship

How do legislators build the reputations they use in bids for reelection? Do they use their personal reputations or associate with other legislators? And how do parties, coalitions, and institutions affect these decisions? Research on how electoral systems affect parties in legislatures frequently focuses on the extent to which electoral rules make legislators more or less ideologically convergent with respect to other members of the chamber—copartisan and not. However, finding equilibrium strategies is often possible only under restrictive institutional and spatial assumptions. Instead of viewing ideology spatially, we conceive of ideological reputations as currencies, used to purchase electoral support in transactions we liken to auctions. In our test of the model, we use bill cosponsorship patterns as an indicator of the reputations incumbents use to purchase electoral support. We show that under relatively common institutional conditions, legislators may have strong incentives to cultivate reputations they must share with their toughest electoral competitors.

Ballot spoilage as a response to limitations on choice and influence

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882199025
Author(s):  
Patrick Cunha Silva ◽  
Brian F Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
Reasoning Systems

Electoral systems vary in terms of the choice and influence they offer voters. Beyond selecting between parties, preferential systems allow for choices within parties. More proportional systems make it likely that influence over who determines the assembly’s majority will be distributed across relatively more voters. In response to systems that limit choice and influence, we hypothesize that voters will cast more blank, null, or spoiled ballots on purpose. We use a regression discontinuity opportunity in French municipal elections to test this hypothesis. An exogenously chosen and arbitrary cutpoint is used to determine the electoral rules municipalities use to select their assemblies. We find support for our reasoning—systems that do not allow intraparty preference votes and that lead to disproportional outcomes provoke vote spoilage. Rates of vote spoilage are frequently sufficient to change control over the assembly if those votes had instead been cast validly for the second-place party.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Electoral Systems and the Substantive Representation of Marginalized Groups: Evidence from Women’s Issue Bills in South Korea

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110282
Author(s):  
Yesola Kweon ◽  
Josh M. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Substantive Representation ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
The Relationship

How do electoral rules shape the substantive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups? Using an original dataset of introduced and passed bills in the Korean National Assembly, which has both single-member districts and proportional representation, we examine the extent to which institutions condition the relationship between lawmaker gender and the substantive representation of women. While women lawmakers engage in higher levels of substantive representation of women, proportional representation allows both women and men to introduce more women’s issue bills than their counterparts elected through single-member districts. Furthermore, legislators elected through proportional representation are more effective at achieving passage of women’s issue legislation when compared with those elected in single-member districts, and this effect is especially pronounced for men. Our findings show that electoral systems matter for the representation of marginalized groups and that proportional representation systems allow both female and male politicians to increase their substantive representation of women.

Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Geographic Dispersion ◽  
Proportional Systems

There is general agreement that democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives to cater to certain constituencies, but which electoral system causes politicians to be most responsive to narrow interests is still debateable. Some argue that plurality electoral rules provide the greatest incentives for politicians to cater to the interests of a few; others say proportional systems prompt politicians to be relatively more prone to narrow interests. This study suggests that both positions can be correct under different conditions. Politicians competing in plurality systems privilege voters with a shared narrow interest when such voters are geographically concentrated, but when they are geographically diffuse, such voters have greater political influence in proportional electoral systems. Government spending on subsidies in fourteen developed countries provides empirical support for this argument.

The Effect of District Magnitude on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments in Argentina

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 557-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Effect ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Natural Experiments ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Effective Number Of Parties ◽  
Number Of Parties

How does district magnitude affect electoral outcomes? This article addresses this question by exploiting a combination of two natural experiments in Argentina between 1985 and 2015. Argentine provinces elect half of their congressional delegation every two years, and thus districts with an odd number of representatives have varying magnitudes in different election years. Furthermore, whether a province elects more representatives in midterm or concurrent years was decided by lottery in 1983. I find that district magnitude (a) increases electoral support for small parties, (b) increases the (effective) number of parties that gain seats and (c) reduces electoral disproportionality. The last two results are driven by the mechanical rather than the psychological effect of electoral rules.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAE-WON JUN ◽  
SIMON HIX
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Career Paths ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
National Assembly

AbstractA growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 920-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Allen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems and Legislative Organization

2017 ◽  
pp. 302-320
Author(s):  
Shane Martin
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Legislatures are a cornerstone of representative democracy at the local, subnational, national, and even supra-national levels. Electoral systems determine how votes are transformed into legislative seats. Because of this, what legislators must do to get re-elected is shaped by electoral rules. The impact of electoral incentives goes beyond behavior, potentially shaping the rules and procedures of the legislature itself. This chapter analyzes theories and evidence that link legislative organization to members’ electoral incentives. However, not all legislative structures have a clear electoral basis. As this chapter suggests, the relationship between electoral systems and how a legislature chooses to organize itself is a conditional one.

Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 987-1000
Author(s):  
Brendan J Connell
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Foreign Credit

Abstract Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are dependent on how the borrowing state's electoral system aggregates competing domestic economic interests. Internationally oriented economic interests prefer to minimize creditor losses since sizeable debt reductions are more likely to compromise access to foreign credit. Conversely, workers and domestic-oriented economic interests prefer to maximize losses faced by foreign creditors in order to ease the costs of austerity at home. By shaping the political incentives of policymakers, I argue that democracies with candidate-centric electoral systems should be associated with sovereign defaults that are less costly for foreign creditors. Under these electoral systems, governments hold incentives to cater primarily to internationally oriented economic interests that are best able to overcome the costs of collective action. Statistical evidence from 53 sovereign debt restructurings between 1978 and 2012 supports the main argument.

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