Measuring the Influence of Political Actors on the Federal Budget

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 603-608
Author(s):  
BEN HAMMOND ◽  
LEAH ROSENSTIEL

When estimating the political determinants of the federal budget, scholars face a choice between using measures of funding and measures of spending as their outcome of interest. We examine the consequences of this choice. In particular, we argue that spending outcomes may serve as a poor test of the research questions scholars seek to answer, since spending data conflate competing budgetary influences, are downstream measures of the appropriations that originated them, and induce measurement error. To test our claim, we compare the spending data used in a recent study (Berry and Fowler 2016: American Journal of Political Science 60 (3): 692–708) with an original data set of military construction appropriations. While an analysis of the spending data produces a null result, the same analysis using the appropriations data provides strong evidence that legislators use their committee positions to distribute pork. Our findings have broad implications for studies that use measures of spending in the congressional and presidency literatures.

Author(s):  
Wendy J. Schiller ◽  
Charles Stewart III

From 1789 to 1913, U.S. senators were not directly elected by the people—instead the Constitution mandated that they be chosen by state legislators. This radically changed in 1913, when the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, giving the public a direct vote. This book investigates the electoral connections among constituents, state legislators, political parties, and U.S. senators during the age of indirect elections. The book finds that even though parties controlled the partisan affiliation of the winning candidate for Senate, they had much less control over the universe of candidates who competed for votes in Senate elections and the parties did not always succeed in resolving internal conflict among their rank and file. Party politics, money, and personal ambition dominated the election process, in a system originally designed to insulate the Senate from public pressure. The book uses an original data set of all the roll call votes cast by state legislators for U.S. senators from 1871 to 1913 and all state legislators who served during this time. Newspaper and biographical accounts uncover vivid stories of the political maneuvering, corruption, and partisanship—played out by elite political actors, from elected officials, to party machine bosses, to wealthy business owners—that dominated the indirect Senate elections process. The book raises important questions about the effectiveness of Constitutional reforms, such as the Seventeenth Amendment, that promised to produce a more responsive and accountable government.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Rebessi ◽  
Francesco Zucchini

AbstractIf we examine the current literature, no study on policy agenda has so far addressed the agenda of a Constitutional Court in a country that has recently experienced crucial changes in its political system. The present contribution on the Italian Constitutional Court seeks to bridge this gap. We aim at assessing the role the Italian Court plays in the policy process in both the First and the Second Republic by answering two research questions: (1) in its decisions does the Court accommodate themes that are neglected in the parliamentary legislative process? (2) Does the Court (and if so, how often) represent interests and values in opposition to the interests and values supporting the current legislative majorities? By employing an original data set that puts together all decisions of constitutional illegitimacy under incidental review between the years 1983 and 2013, we found that in both Republics Court’s agenda is significantly more concentrated than Parliament’s agenda, and it does not broadly offer an alternative access point to the policy-making for new or neglected issues. However, at the same time, the alternational system of the Second Republic seems to trigger more immediate and ‘salient’ reactions from the Constitutional Court, which in that period becomes more prone to sanction recent legislation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Rodden ◽  
Erik Wibbels

Recent research on federalism is extremely divided. While some tout the benefits of “market-preserving” federalism, others point to the fragmentation and incoherence of policy in federal states. This research bridges the divide by analyzing the political andfiscalstructures that are likely to account for the highly divergent economic experiences of federal systems around die world. To test these propositions, the authors use an original data set to conduct analyses of budget balance and inflation infifteenfederationsaround the world from 1978 through 1996. The empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal decentralization, the nature of intergovernmental finance, and vertical partisan relations all influence macroeconomic outcomes. The find- ings have broad implications for the widespread move toward greater decentralization and for the theoretical literatures on federalism and macroeconomics.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH SCHEVE ◽  
DAVID STASAVAGE

In this article we use an original data set to provide the first empirical analysis of the political economy of inherited wealth taxation that covers a significant number of countries and a long time frame (1816–2000). Our goal is to understand why, if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes, the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon. We hypothesize alternatively that significant taxation of inherited wealth depended on (1) the extension of the suffrage and (2) political conditions created by mass mobilization for war. Using a difference-in-differences framework for identification, we find little evidence for the suffrage hypothesis but very strong evidence for the mass mobilization hypothesis. Our study has implications for understanding the evolution of wealth inequality and the political conditions under which countries are likely to implement policies that significantly redistribute wealth and income.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel P. Teodoro ◽  
M. Anne Pitcher

AbstractThis study investigates the effects of formal bureaucratic independence under varying democratic conditions. Conventional accounts predict that greater formal independence of technocratic agencies facilitates policy implementation, but those claims rest on observations of industrialised, high-income countries that are also established democracies. On the basis of research in developing countries, we argue that the effects of agency independence depend on the political context in which the agency operates. Our empirical subjects are privatisation agencies and their efforts to privatise state-owned enterprises in Africa. We predict that greater independence leads to more thorough privatisation under authoritarian regimes, but that the effect of independence declines as a country becomes more democratic. Using an original data set, we examine the relationship between formal agency independence and privatisation in Africa from 1990 to 2007. Our results modify the conventional wisdom on bureaucratic independence and culminate in a more nuanced theory of “contingent technocracy”.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Kowalczyk ◽  
Mila Versteeg

102 Cornell L. Rev. 1219 (2017)The issues of mass migrations, displaced persons, and refugees from war-torn countries are not new, but they have become particularly prominent and contentious in recent years and will garner even more attention as climate change refugees begin to cross borders seeking new homes in foreign countries. Academics and policy-makers have jointly turned to international law to remind states of their international legal obligations toward refugees; yet they are also quick to point out the inadequacies of the international legal framework. At the same time, efforts to address these inadequacies and to lay down general legal standards and policies to manage the growing migration flows have faltered. Surprisingly, in light of the mounting crisis, it has largely escaped the attention of commentators that a substantial number of countries provide a right to asylum in their constitutions. Remarkably, constitutional asylum provisions often go beyond states’ international legal obligations and establish permanent legal solutions for those seeking sanctuary. In addition, constitutional provisions are insulated from changing political tides and encourage governments to honor their commitments even when doing so lacks popular support. These constitutional provisions thus hold substantial promise to address some of the most pressing legal problems of our time. This Article offers the first systematic exploration of constitutional asylum provisions. It presents an original data set on right to asylum provisions in all national constitutions written since 1789, explores the first instances of adoption, and traces the right’s development over time. The data reveals that, currently, approximately thirty-five percent of all countries have constitutionalized the right to asylum. Drawing on both real-world examples and regression analysis, we find that constitutional asylum provisions serve a complicated purpose. Some constitutions frame asylum as a right for all those in need, thus, seemingly serving a true humanitarian purpose. Other states, however, use the right as an instrument to broadcast their doctrines and to cast judgment on the views of other countries by granting asylum only to those that share the ideology of the host nation. This latter version of the right to asylum is particularly prominent in authoritarian and socialist constitutions. Thus, asylum provisions can serve as both a humanitarian tool for providing state-sponsored sanctuary to persecuted persons and an overt instrument of foreign policy deployed to achieve the political objectives of the host nation.We further find that the adoption of asylum provisions can be motivated by self-interest. Even when framed as a universal right, asylum might be a useful tool to condemn the human rights records of foreign countries. Moreover, we find that countries with net refugee outflows, such as some of the smallest and poorest African states, as well as nations with aging and declining populations, such as Germany, more readily entrench the right to asylum in their constitutions. We conclude that these apparently self-serving motivations for constitutionalizing asylum rights are not necessarily detrimental for asylum-seekers, nor do they necessarily undermine the right: appealing to self-interest, rather than self-sacrifice or humanitarian ideals, might actually prove more effective in motivating states to ensure adequate protection of human rights, including the right to asylum.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Arel-Bundock

Many large-N cross-national studies claim to show that political institutions and phenomena determine where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In this article, I argue that these studies tend to overemphasize statistical significance and often neglect to assess the explanatory or predictive power of their theories. To illustrate the problem, I estimate variations of a statistical model published in an influential article on “Political Risk, Institutions, and FDI.” I find that none of the political variables that the authors consider accounts for much of the variation in aggregate FDI inflows. To ensure that this underwhelming result is not driven by misspecification or measurement error, I leverage a large firm-level data set on the investment location decisions of thousands of multinational firms. Using nonparametric machine-learning techniques and out-of-sample tests, I show that gravity variables can help us develop very accurate expectations about firm behavior but that none of the 31 “political determinants” of FDI that I consider can do much to improve our expectations. These findings have important implications because they suggest that governments retain some room to move in the face of economic globalization.


2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis ◽  
Yuki Shirato

What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude toward WTO adjudication by Japan's largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan's diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Paasha Mahdavi ◽  
Jessica Green ◽  
Jennifer Hadden ◽  
Thomas Hale

Abstract The role that private actors play in accelerating or preventing progressive climate policy and true decarbonization is a core research interest of global environmental politics. Yet scholars have struggled to measure the political behavior of multinational firms due to lack of transparency about their activities and inconsistency in reporting requirements across jurisdictions. In this research note, we present a new data source—firms’ earnings calls—that scholars might use to better understand the political behavior of major multinational polluters. To illustrate the value of earnings calls as a data source, we construct an original data set of all earnings calls made between 2005 and 2019 by major oil and gas firms. We then code these transcripts, demonstrating that although firms can be classified as more or less pro-climate, there is little evidence of the industry’s public acceptance of decarbonization. These unique data could permit researchers to explore important questions about climate politics, the evolution of private governance, and the relationship between policy and firms’ political behavior. Moreover, we suggest extensions of our approach, including other multinational industries that are amenable to this type of analysis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-825
Author(s):  
Brandon Rottinghaus ◽  
Philip D. Waggoner

Executive-legislative interactions operate with cost-benefit trade-offs. Presidents possess several material options in granting Congressional requests to leverage Congressional support but must also marshal these scarce resources. We argue presidents should strategically grant requests from members of Congress for a range of executive actions based upon the cost of the request and the political context. Using an original data set of nearly 4,000 internal Congressional requests made during the Eisenhower, Ford, and H. W. Bush administrations, we find that presidents are strategic in granting requests, where the cost of the request is an important consideration when deciding whether or not to approve a legislator request, especially on executive appointments but not on legislative matters. Ideological proximity to the president matters more than partisanship in granting requests. Presidents are sensitive to cost when ideology is concerned but less so when granting requests to committee chairs. We conclude by highlighting the implications for interbranch bargaining.


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