Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Pp. xvi+332. ISBN 978-0-230-23067-5. £65.00 (hardback).

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-311
Author(s):  
Melissa Smith
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States

Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Nation States

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Lundestad
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
The West ◽  
Economic Modernization

There are no laws in history. Realists, liberals, and others are both right and wrong. Although no one can be certain that military incidents may not happen, for the foreseeable future China and the United States are unlikely to favor major war. They have cooperated well for almost four decades now. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic modernization. It has far to go to measure up to the West. The American-Chinese economies are still complementary. A conflict with the United States or even with China’s neighbors would have damaging repercussions for China’s economic goals. The United States is so strong that it would make little sense for China to take it on militarily. There are also other deterrents against war, from nuclear weapons to emerging norms about international relations. It is anybody’s guess what will happen after the next few decades. History indicates anything is possible.

Nuclear Guarantees and Nonproliferation

1971 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 836-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph I. Coffey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The United Kingdom

On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect, having been ratified by 47 states including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty legally bars these three nuclear powers from transferring atomic weapons to nonnuclear states and formally pledges those nonnuclear states signing the treaty to refrain from developing such weapons or acquiring them from other powers. It thus caps a long effort by the United States to inhibit—so long as it could not preclude—the spread of nuclear weapons and to avoid the potential instabilities associated with that spread.

scholarly journals Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: The Major Implications of Nuclear Iran for the Middle East

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. p50
Author(s):  
Sayed Reza Hussaini
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Cascade Effect ◽  
The Face ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Socioeconomic Consequences

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defenceumbrella”. HhhhjkhggHowever, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the United Statesor would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige.

The Making of the Western Defense System: France, the United States, and MC 48

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Defense System ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
History Of ◽  
Military Strength ◽  
The Military

This chapter focuses on a document formally adopted by the NATO Council in December 1954, called MC 48, a report by the Alliance's Military Committee on “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.” In approving this document, the Council authorized the military authorities of the Alliance to “plan and make preparations on the assumption that atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be used in defense from the outset.” One very important consequence of the new strategy from the European point of view had to do with what was called “nuclear sharing”—that is, with the provision of American nuclear weapons to the NATO allies. This policy of nuclear sharing was one of the key elements in the history of this period.

Semi-Formal Diplomacy

2021 ◽  
pp. 530-542
Author(s):  
Nigel Inkster
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Broad Spectrum ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Academic Conferences

This chapter assesses semi-official diplomacy in the cyber domain. It begins by describing Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy. Track 2 diplomacy consists of a broad spectrum of activities ranging from academic conferences designed to address specific conflict-related diplomatic issues to much more generic people-to-people contacts designed to create a climate of greater mutual understanding. Meanwhile, Track 1.5 diplomacy seeks to leverage the strengths of both Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy. It became clear from an early stage that the United States, Russia, and China were in a position to determine the strategic evolution of the cyber domain due to their status as global geo-political actors, their advanced cyber capabilities, their possession of nuclear weapons, and their differences in values and ideology. Russia was the first to make a move towards semi-official diplomacy. Whereas Russia has taken a leading role in international negotiations on cyber governance and cybersecurity, China has arguably become more consequential in terms of how its relationship with the United States will shape the normative culture of the cyber domain. The chapter then considers other examples of semi-official diplomacy as well as prospects for further semi-official diplomacy in the cyber domain.

Iraq versus the United States

Tempting Fate ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 40-62
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civil Defense ◽  
Military Action ◽  
The Us ◽  
Saddam Hussein ◽  
Political Dispute

This chapter provides a background for Iraqi behavior during the period of American nuclear monopoly beginning in 1979 when Saddam Hussein was officially Iraqi president, focusing most heavily on events in 1989–1991. In an intense political dispute, Iraqi leadership took actions they believed would fall below the threshold of nuclear use. Most of the limitations that Iraq exhibited were due to its own weakness; it could do little more. For Iraq as a weak actor, war with the United States was possible precisely because it would pose such a low danger to the United States. Even then, Iraqi leadership incorporated the US nuclear arsenal into their decision making in 1990–1991. That confrontation is the most important to examine because it involved Iraqi military action that Iraqi leaders believed would invite some form of US response, and US compellent demands did not center on Iraqi regime change. In 1990, Saddam and his lieutenants held their own unconventional weapons in reserve and discounted an American nuclear strike because of the high strategic costs that such a strike would impose on the United States. They also undertook various civil defense measures to minimize losses from nuclear strikes. Fortunately, the Americans had little intention of using nuclear weapons and did not face a need to resort to nuclear use.

The Iranian Nuclear Program (1974–2015)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Iranian Revolution ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Credible Threat

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.

The Pakistani Nuclear Program (1972–1987)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Soviet Invasion

This chapter examines US nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Although Pakistan started its nuclear weapons program prior to the development of a US sanctions policy, and thus underestimated the odds of facing sanctions, it nevertheless went on to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States was unable to halt the Pakistani program for two reasons. First, when it initially threatened and imposed sanctions on Pakistan in the late 1970s, Pakistan was not highly dependent on the United States and therefore had little to lose. Second, once Pakistan became dependent on the United States in the 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased need for aid, the United States undermined the credibility of its nonproliferation policy by waiving sanctions and only credibly threatening to cut off aid in response to a nuclear test.

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