Iraq versus the United States

Tempting Fate ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 40-62
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

This chapter provides a background for Iraqi behavior during the period of American nuclear monopoly beginning in 1979 when Saddam Hussein was officially Iraqi president, focusing most heavily on events in 1989–1991. In an intense political dispute, Iraqi leadership took actions they believed would fall below the threshold of nuclear use. Most of the limitations that Iraq exhibited were due to its own weakness; it could do little more. For Iraq as a weak actor, war with the United States was possible precisely because it would pose such a low danger to the United States. Even then, Iraqi leadership incorporated the US nuclear arsenal into their decision making in 1990–1991. That confrontation is the most important to examine because it involved Iraqi military action that Iraqi leaders believed would invite some form of US response, and US compellent demands did not center on Iraqi regime change. In 1990, Saddam and his lieutenants held their own unconventional weapons in reserve and discounted an American nuclear strike because of the high strategic costs that such a strike would impose on the United States. They also undertook various civil defense measures to minimize losses from nuclear strikes. Fortunately, the Americans had little intention of using nuclear weapons and did not face a need to resort to nuclear use.

Tempting Fate ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 63-87
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

This chapter focuses on the Egyptian–Israeli dispute following the 1967 Six Day War. Egypt had an intense political dispute with Israel centering on the Sinai Peninsula that Israel captured during the 1967 Six Day War. Egyptian leaders settled on force when diplomatic and military trends seemed to make recovering the Sinai less likely. Conversely, when the diplomatic situation improved after 1973, particularly with more direct American involvement, Egypt avoided military action. Egypt's strong interests, rooted in recovering territory, did not cause its leaders to ignore the Israeli nuclear arsenal. They believed that so long as they executed only limited campaigns, the benefits to Israeli of using its nuclear weapons would be low. At the same time, Cairo sought to raise the costs of Israeli nuclear use by developing its own unconventional weapons and relying on the superpowers, in particular the United States, to constrain Israel. Thus, while the Israeli nuclear arsenal did not deter a conventional attack, it is not the case that Egyptian leaders ignored the Israeli nuclear arsenal in 1973.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


Author(s):  
Carter Malkasian

The American War in Afghanistan is a full history of the war in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2020. It covers political, cultural, strategic, and tactical aspects of the war and details the actions and decision-making of the United States, Afghan government, and Taliban. The work follows a narrative format to go through the 2001 US invasion, the state-building of 2002–2005, the Taliban offensive of 2006, the US surge of 2009–2011, the subsequent drawdown, and the peace talks of 2019–2020. The focus is on the overarching questions of the war: Why did the United States fail? What opportunities existed to reach a better outcome? Why did the United States not withdraw from the war?


Significance These have caused the United States to begin the process of shuttering its Baghdad embassy -- while signalling that it could reverse the process if the government moves more aggressively against pro-Iran groups within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) that are blamed for the strikes. Impacts Groups will step up attacks designed to lever the US-led coalition out of Iraq, while seeking to mask their identity. The United States will have greater latitude for military action to weaken Tehran in November or December, if it closes the embassy. Japanese, Saudi, Emirati and some European embassies relying on US evacuation and warning services might also be forced out. Washington might opt instead to downsize the embassy, which cannot operate normally due to COVID-19 and security threats. Even if the US embassy closed, some coalition military sites and the US consulate in the Kurdistan region would remain open.


Author(s):  
Sergey Rogov

In his presentation, the speaker focuses on the problems in relations between the United States and its European NATO allies. Firstly, he talks about the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, that Sergey M. Rogov considers the first serious defeat of the Western countries since the foundation of NATO. At the same time, he notes the significant military and economic contribution of the U.S. allies to the operation in Afghanistan, and the fact that the US did not take into account the opinion of its allies as well as the issues that may await European countries and the alliance as a whole in this regard. Second, the speaker notes the huge difference in military spending and military capabilities between the United States and the European allies, and concludes that NATO countries will continue to be militarily dependent on the United States. In nuclear sphere, despite the approval of the START III extension by the Biden administration, European countries did not actively resist the collapse of the INF Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. The forthcoming deployment of American missiles in Poland and the Baltic states will further exacerbate of the NATO-Russia crisis. J. Biden's support for the sole purpose concept, which to certain extent implies no first use of nuclear weapons, jeopardizes the U.S. security obligations towards its European allies. Fourth, there is the problem of "new" NATO members, which make minimal contribution to common security, but require economic support and protection from possible Russian aggression. In conclusion, the problem of the U.S.-China confrontation is considered, where the US is actively seeking to involve European countries.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoshuang Liu ◽  
Xiao Xu ◽  
Guanqiao Li ◽  
Xian Xu ◽  
Yuyao Sun ◽  
...  

Abstract Background: The widespread pandemic of novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) poses an unprecedented global health crisis. In the United States (US), different state governments have adopted various combinations of non-pharmaceutical public health interventions (NPIs), such as non-essential business closures and gathering bans, to mitigate the epidemic from February to April, 2020. Quantitative assessment on the effectiveness of NPIs is greatly needed to assist in guiding individualized decision making for adjustment of interventions in the US and around the world. However, the impacts of these approaches remain uncertain.Methods: Based on the reported cases, the effective reproduction number (Rt) of COVID-19 epidemic for 50 states in the US was estimated. Measurements on the effectiveness of nine different NPIs were conducted by assessing risk ratios (RRs) between R t and NPIs through a generalized linear model (GLM). Results: Different NPIs were found to have led to different levels of reduction in Rt. Stay-at-home contributed approximately 51% (95% CI 46%-57%), wearing (face) masks 29% (15%-42%), gathering ban (more than 10 people) 19% (14%-24%), non-essential business closure 16% (10%-21%), declaration of emergency 13% (8%-17%), interstate travel restriction 11% (5%-16%), school closure 10% (7%-14%), initial business closure 10% (6%-14%), and gathering ban (more than 50 people) 7% (2%-11%).Conclusions: This retrospective assessment of NPIs on Rt has shown that NPIs played critical roles on epidemic control in the US in the past several months. The quantitative results could guide individualized decision making for future adjustment of NPIs in the US and other countries for COVID-19 and other similar infectious diseases.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoshuang Liu ◽  
Xiao Xu ◽  
Guanqiao Li ◽  
Xian Xu ◽  
Yuyao Sun ◽  
...  

Abstract The widespread pandemic of novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) poses an unprecedented global health crisis. In the United States (US), different state governments have adopted various combinations of non-pharmaceutical public health interventions (NPIs) to mitigate the epidemic from February to April, 2020. Quantitative assessment on the effectiveness of NPIs is in great need to assist in guiding the individualized decision making for adjustment of interventions in the US and around the world. However, the impact of these approaches remain uncertain. Based on the reported cases, the effective reproduction number of COVID-19 epidemic for 50 states in the US was estimated. The measurement on the effectiveness of eight different NPIs was conducted by assessing risk ratios (RRs) between and NPIs through a generalized linear model (GLM). Different NPIs were found to have led to different levels of reduction in. Stay-at-home contributed approximately 51% (95% CI 46%-57%), gathering ban (more than 10 people) 19% (14%-24%), non-essential business closure 16% (10%-21%), declaration of emergency 13% (8%-17%), interstate travel restriction 11% (5%-16%), school closure 10% (7%-13%), initial business closure 10% (6%-14%), and gathering ban (more than 50 people) 6% (2%-11%). This retrospective assessment of NPIs on has shown that NPIs played critical roles on epidemic control in the US in the past several months. The quantitative results could guide individualized decision making for future adjustment of NPIs in the US and other countries for COVID-19 and other similar infectious diseases.


2018 ◽  
pp. 79-109
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

Many scholars would hold that a robust military alliance as well as strong anti-nuclear norms in domestic society would make any nuclear proliferation-related behaviour unlikely on the part of Japan. This chapter challenges such arguments, showing that the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit Japan’s nuclear ambitions since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the late 1960. Indeed, Japan’s nuclear interest piqued amid concerns that the military alliance was weakening. Moreover, although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weapons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. Domestic politics and—to a lesser extent—prestige considerations were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear decision-making in the 1970s than alliance-related ones.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

The United States response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was encouraging for those who worry about a tendency towards unilateralism on the part of the single super-power. The US deliberately engaged a number of international organisations and built an extensive coalition of supporting States before engaging in military action.


Author(s):  
Marinko Bobić

This chapter traces the military confrontation between Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the United States backed by the international community, known as the Gulf War. To understand Saddam's decision to militarily engage the US, one must go back to his rise in power, his beliefs, and consequences of the Iraq-Iran war, as well as the invasion of Kuwait. The simplified explanation is that Saddam found himself in a difficult domestic situation. He had to maintain an extensive system of control, partially dependent on coercion, and partially dependent on incentives and rewards. This system was shaken by the Iraq-Iran war. While such domestic crisis alone might not have induced Saddam to fight a losing war, his anomalous beliefs ensured that he thought he could win by seeing the US as unable to stomach another war. In a way, such a belief could be interpreted as a wrongly-perceived window of opportunity. The counter-factual assessment provides additional evidence that a change in these conditions would likely have led to a different outcome.


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