Electoral Surprise and the Midterm Loss in US Congressional Elections

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH SCHEVE ◽  
MICHAEL TOMZ

Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal argue that surprise about the outcomes of US presidential elections accounts for two important features of the American political economy: the regular loss of votes experienced by the president's party in midterm congressional elections, and the systematic relationship between the party of the incoming president and macroeconomic performance. Scholars recently have begun conducting rigorous tests of the relationship between surprise and economic performance, but no similar empirical work exists on how surprise affects midterm elections. In this article, we offer the first direct test of the proposition that electoral surprise drives the midterm loss. Our analysis shows that the more surprised moderate voters are about the outcome of a presidential election, the lower the probability that they will support the president's party in the following midterm contest.

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-97
Author(s):  
Pankaj Sinha ◽  
Aastha Sharma Aastha Sharma ◽  
Harsh Vardhan Singh

This paper investigates the factors responsible for predicting 2012 U.S. Presidential election. Though contemporary discussions on Presidential election mention that unemployment rate will be a deciding factor in this election, it is found that unemployment rate is not significant for predicting the forthcoming Presidential election. Except GDP growth rate, various other economic factors like interest rate, inflation, public debt, change in oil and gold prices, budget deficit/surplus and exchange rate are also not significant for predicting the U.S. Presidential election outcome. Lewis-Beck and Rice (1982) proposed Gallup rating, obtained in June of the election year, as a significant indicator for forecasting the Presidential election. However, the present study finds that even though there exists a relationship between June Gallup rating and incumbent vote share in the Presidential election, the Gallup rating cannot be used as the sole indicator of the Presidential elections. Various other non-economic factors like scandals linked to the incumbent President and the performance of the two parties in the midterm elections are found to be significant. We study the influence of the above economic and non-economic variables on voting behavior in U.S. Presidential elections and develop a suitable regression model for predicting the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. The emergence of new non-economic factors reflects the changing dynamics of U.S. Presidential election outcomes. The proposed model forecasts that the Democrat candidate Mr. Barack Obama is likely to get a vote percentage between 51.818 % - 54.239 %, with 95% confidence interval.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Alesina ◽  
Howard Rosenthal

In the postwar United States the president's party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election. Republican administrations exhibit below-average, and Democratic administrations above-average, economic growth in the first half of each term, whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth. Our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities. In presidential elections, voters choose between two polarized candidates. They then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president's policies by strengthening the opposition in Congress. Since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies, our model predicts a (spurious) correlation between the state of the economy and elections. Our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models, in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election. Our model performs empirically at least as well as, and often better than, alternative models.


Author(s):  
Tom W.G. van der Meer

The relationships among objective macroeconomic outcomes, subjective evaluations, and political trust are widely studied. Yet, these relationships are not as straightforward as they might seem. This chapter first provides an overview of the main theoretical propositions in the literature as well as their critiques. Next, the chapter analyzes empirical analyses of the relationship between economic performance and political trust. While subjective evaluations of the economy are consistently related to political trust across the globe, the effect of objective macroeconomic performance depends on theoretical and methodological specifications. Objective performance indicators determine political trust in longitudinal rather than in cross-sectional analyses, suggesting that citizens’ historical rather than cross-national comparison of the state of their economy lies at the basis of this effect.


The Forum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-545
Author(s):  
Anne M. Cizmar ◽  
John McTague

Abstract This paper examines the role of authoritarianism in the 2018 US congressional elections. In particular, we assess whether the issues that have historically been central to the authoritarian divide in the American electorate were salient in the campaigns of several important Senate races. We demonstrate that authoritarian attitudes played a consistent, significant role on presidential vote choice, party identification, and numerous policy areas in the 2016 presidential election using data from the American National Election Studies. Using case studies of six Senate races in the 2018 midterm elections, we find that authoritarianism was more muted than in 2016, and that the role of authoritarianism varied considerably depending upon the race. States with stronger Trump support in 2016 featured authoritarianism more heavily than states with less Trump support in 2016, but authoritarianism overall was not as prominent in 2018 as in 2016. Overall, Senate candidates relied on traditional campaign messages related to candidate qualifications, personal attacks, the economy, and other messages less central to authoritarianism.


1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul R. Abramson ◽  
John H. Aldrich

Since 1960 turnout has declined in presidential elections, and since 1966 it has declined in off-year congressional elections. These declines occurred despite several major trends that could have increased electoral participation. An analysis of the eight SRC-CPS presidential election surveys conducted between 1952 and 1980 and of the six SRC-CPS congressional election surveys conducted between 1958 and 1978 suggests that these declines may result largely from the combined impact of two attitudinal trends: the weakening of party identification and declining beliefs about government responsiveness, that is, lowered feelings of “external” political efficacy. Between two-thirds and seven-tenths of the decline in presidential turnout between 1960 and 1980 appears to result from the combined impact of these trends. Data limitations hinder our efforts to study the decline of congressional turnout, but approximately two-fifths to one-half of the decline between 1966 and 1978 appears to result from the combined impact of these attitudinal trends.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (304) ◽  
pp. 72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisangela Araujo ◽  
Eliane Araújo ◽  
Fernando Ferrari Filho

<p><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p><p><strong></strong>This study analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between monetary institutions and macroeconomic performance in Brazil, in the period after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime (ITR), in 1999. The hypothesis is that the monetary institutions inhibited economic growth, rather than being effective at controlling inflation, whose main causes are related to structural and institutional factors, indexation process and domestic and external shocks. The main results of the ITR, embodied in the highly restrictive monetary policy, are the following negative effects: A reduction in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates, a rise in the stock of public debt and an appreciation of the domestic currency. Likewise, the itr has not been successful in maintaining inflation rate below its target. In this respect, revisions in the Brazilian monetary institutions would be essential to improve the results of the ITR, both in terms of actual inflation and economic performance. <br /><br /></p><p><strong>DESEMPEÑO MACROECONÓMICO EN BRASIL DESPUÉS DEL RÉGIMEN DE METAS DE INFLACIÓN</strong></p><p><strong></strong><strong>RESUMEN</strong></p><p><strong></strong>Este estudio analiza teórica y empíricamente la relación entre las instituciones monetarias y el desempeño macroeconómico en Brasil en el periodo posterior a la adopción del régimen de metas de inflación (RMI) en 1999. La hipótesis es que las instituciones monetarias impidieron el crecimiento económico, más que controlar efectivamente la inflación, cuyas causas principales están relacionadas con factores estructurales e institucionales, procesos de indexación y choques internos y externos. Los principales resultados del RMI, consustanciados en la política monetaria altamente restrictiva, son los siguientes efectos negativos: una reducción de las tasas de crecimiento del producto interno bruto (PIB), un aumento del stock de deuda pública y una apreciación de la moneda nacional. Asimismo, el RMI no logró mantener la tasa de inflación por debajo de su meta. A este respecto, revisiones en las instituciones monetarias brasileñas serían esenciales para mejorar los resultados del rmi, tanto en términos de inflación como de desempeño económico.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-255
Author(s):  
Steven Rogers

ABSTRACTMore than 60 years ago, Angus Campbell offered an explanation for why the president’s party regularly loses congressional seats in midterm elections. He argued that peripheral voters “surge” to the polls in presidential elections and support the president’s congressional co-partisans but “decline” to turn out in the midterm. In his turnout-based explanation for midterm loss, Campbell speculated that “bad weather or an epidemic may affect the vote” but largely dismissed weather’s utility to test his theory (Campbell 1960, 399). I revisit Campbell’s speculation and employ a new identification strategy to investigate the “surge and decline” account of midterm loss. I show that as the costs of voting increase—due to above-average rainfall on Election Day—the strength of the relationship between presidential and congressional voting weakens.


2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mercedes Bernal Lloréns

Financial crises have had a decisive influence on banking regulations in Spain. During the mid-19th century the publication of the financial statements of banks was considered key to the stability of the financial system. All new joint stock banking companies were to publish their statements in the Madrid Gazette in return for the privilege of limited liability. Similar obligations were placed on issuing banks. The copious publication of financial statements coincided with a period of financial prosperity. However, the crises that followed from 1864 to 1868 led to a reduction in the official publication of statements. This paper is concerned with an early response to crises in financial reporting. The study focuses on the relationship between the publication of accounting statements by banks and the GDP in Spain during the mid-19th century. The results suggest that the frequency of publication of financial statements may be an indicator of economic performance.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (04) ◽  
pp. 635-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Hibbs

According to the Bread and Peace Model postwar, American presidential elections should be interpreted as a sequence of referendums on the incumbent party's record during its four-year mandate period. In fact postwar aggregate votes for president are well explained by just two objectively measured fundamental determinants: (1) weighted-average growth of per capita real disposable personal income over the term, and (2) cumulative US military fatalities due to unprovoked, hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign wars. No other outside variable systematically affects postwar aggregate votes for president.


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