Searle's Regimen for Rediscovering the Mind

Dialogue ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Hershfield
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
John Searle ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Mind

Like Wittgenstein, John Searle believes that much of analytic philosophy—especially the philosophy of mind—is founded on confusion and falsehood. Unlike Wittgenstein, he does not consider this condition to be endemic to philosophy. As a result, Searle's dual goals inThe Rediscovery of the Mindare to rid the philosophy of mind of the fundamental confusions that plague it, and to set the field on the path toward genuine progress. Thus, the book opens with a chapter entitled “What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?” and closes with “The Proper Study.” The text is a blend of old and new: Searle introduces several new ideas, the most important of which is his thesis of the unconscious, and incorporates them into theses that have figured prominently in his previous works. Even for those who will find little to agree with in this book,The Rediscovery of the Mindserves as a testament to the sheer scope and iconoclasm of Searle's work.

scholarly journals On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind

2018 ◽  
pp. 130-142
Author(s):  
G. A. Zolotkov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.

scholarly journals Um argumento contra a tese da subjetividade ontológica da consciência no naturalismo biológico de John Searle

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-311
Author(s):  
Tárik De Athayde Prata
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
John Searle ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind

John Searle claims that consciousness is ontologically subjective, since conscious mental phenomena only exist as long as they are experienced. Therefore, mental phenomena are essentially conscious, insofar as their mental character depends on their connection with consciousness. However, to align (a) the acceptance of unconscious mental phenomena with (b) his Cartesian view of consciousness (as the essence of the mind), Searle defends (c) adispositional account of the unconscious. The problem is that some cases of unconscious mental causation require that certain decisive mental properties (sensorial and intentional properties) exist in an occurrent way, and not merely as dispositions. By accepting unconscious mental causation, Searle (inadvertedly) commits himself to a mental existence that isindependent from consciousness. Such unconscious existence implies that certain mental phenomena are ontologically objective, and not subjective as he claims, because they exist without being experienced.Keywords: Ontological subjectivity, unconscious, disposition, mental causation, objectivity.

O naturalismo biológico em John Searle: A objetividade epistêmica e a subjetividade ontológica como artífices da consciência

ENDOXA ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 229
Author(s):  
Edimar Brígido ◽  
Fátima Szinwelski ◽  
Felipe Godoi
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
The Mind

Or present article salient to the theme of consciousness, as a crucial fator we are mindful, based on a historical retake, encompassing the principalities that justify and conceive this phenomenon. Initially, discussed in the "mind-brain" problem, a conscience is given to the leading role of Philosophy of Mind, alicerçada em duas great corntes: monista and dualista. Both, theoretically, from the ramifications of Cartesian thought, which divides the mind and mind into these dichotomous substances or as reduced to pure materialism, discarding subjectivities. Searle, based on his Biological Naturalism, stands out as an innovative thinker, who unleashes the current theories, proposed to analyze two states as a result of epistemic objectivity together with no ontological subjectivity. 

Cognitivism and Explanantory Relativity

1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-526
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Hershfield
Keyword(s):  
Computer Model ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
The Mind

In much of his writing in the philosophy of mind, John Searle has been highly critical of what N. Block refers to as ‘The Computer Model of the Mind’ — the approach that treats the mind as a symbol-manipulating device akin in spirit, if not detail, to the modem computer. Searle refers to this philosophical approach as ‘cognitivism.’ The extent of his skepticism and animus toward the computer model of the mind is plainly apparent in the following quotation from Searle: ‘I used to believe that as a causal account, the cognitivist's theory was at least false, but I am now having difficulty formulating a version of it that is coherent even to the point where it could be an empirical thesis at all’ (The Rediscovery of the Mind [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1992], 215). In what follows, I shall attempt to show that this charge of incoherence is unfounded.

scholarly journals The Necessity of History for Philosophy – Even Analytic Philosophy

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Redding
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Human Activities ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Normative Considerations

Abstract Analytic philosophers are often said to be indifferent or even hostile to the history of philosophy – that is, not to the idea of history of philosophy as such, but regarded as a species of the genus philosophy rather than the genus history. Here it is argued that such an attitude is actually inconsistent with approaches within the philosophies of mind that are typical within analytic philosophy. It is suggested that the common “argument rather than pedigree” claim – that is, that claim that philosophical ideas should be evaluated only in the context of the reasons for or against them, and not in terms of historical conditions that brought them about – presupposes an early modern “egological” conception of the mind as normatively autonomous, and that such a view is in contradiction with the deeply held naturalistic predispositions of most contemporary philosophers of mind. Using the example of Wilfrid Sellars, who attempted to combine “naturalist” and “normative” considerations in his philosophy of mind, it is argued that only by treating the mind as having an artifactual dimension can these opposing considerations be accommodated. And, if the mind is at least partly understood as artifactual, then, to that extent, like all artifacts, it is to be understood via a narrative about the particular human activities in which those artifacts are produced and in which they function.

scholarly journals Metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-42
Author(s):  
Alexey S. Pavlov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Demarcation Criterion ◽  
Cognitive Closure ◽  
Cognitive Limitations ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Performative Contradiction

This article is dedicated to the metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn. McGinn is known as a main proponent of “new mysterianism” in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. According to mysterianism, we can’t solve the mind-body problem because of the natural cognitive limitations on our side. McGinn’s view on the nature of philosophy is the component of this conception. In general, mysterian metaphilosophy didn’t get enough coverage in the research literature but it deserves a bigger interest. McGinn argues that philosophy is actually a combination of unsolvable problems. He identifies the scientific/philosophical demarcation criterion as the potential solvability for the human mind. However, this metaphilosophical position faces serious difficulties. At first, if the objections of U. Kriegel and D. Dennett are right and the mysterian cognitive closure thesis is not sufficiently proved, then the termination of research on a number of philosophical issues may also be an unreasoned decision. Secondly, there is a threat of performative contradiction. But we could try to explain this contradiction by considering the style of analytic philosophy itself which is characterized by dialogical form and free dealing with the ideas considered as possible options. In the article, the standard methods of historicophilosophical investigation are used including the comparative analysis and the principle of objective analysis of a text in the work with sources.

Psycho-Physical Union: The Problem of the Person in Descartes

Dialogue ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Murray Lewis Miles
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Nature ◽  
Literal Sense ◽  
Point Of Intersection ◽  
The Mind

The problem of the person may be described as the crux of Descartes' philosophy in the fairly obvious literal sense that it is the point of intersection of the two chief axes of the system, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind. The actual, if not professed aim of the former is the ousting of the occult powers and faculties of Scholastic-Aristotelian physics by the mechanical concept of force or action-by-contact. The chief tenet of the latter is that mind, whose essence is thinking, is clearly and distinctly conceivable apart from matter, the essence of which is extension. From this, by an illicit inference which need not concern us further, Descartes concludes that the mind is “really distinct” from matter, that is, a substance capable of existing apart from body in its own right. Where these two lines of thought meet, the problem of the person constitutes itself in the following manner.

The Fragmented Mind

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Implicit Attitudes ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. Roughly, this means that an agent’s overall belief state is divided into several sub-states—fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and deductively closed belief system. The thesis of mental fragmentation became popular through the work of philosophers like Christopher Cherniak, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker in the 1980s. Recently, it has attracted great attention again. This volume is the first collection of essays devoted to the topic of mental fragmentation. It features important new contributions by leading experts in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Opening with an accessible Introduction providing a systematic overview of the current debate, the fourteen essays cover a wide range of issues: foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation, the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation, fragmentation’s role in language, the relationship between fragmentation and mental files, and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.

Development of an Integrated Approach to Virtual Mind-Mapping: Methodology and Applied Experiences to Enhance Qualitative Health Research

2021 ◽  
pp. 104973232110581
Author(s):  
Shahmir H. Ali ◽  
Alexis A. Merdjanoff ◽  
Niyati Parekh ◽  
Ralph J. DiClemente
Keyword(s):  
Data Collection ◽  
Eating Behaviors ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Mind Mapping ◽  
Qualitative Health Research ◽  
Data Collection And Analysis ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
Visual Learners ◽  
Mind Maps ◽  
The Mind

There is a growing need to better capture comprehensive, nuanced, and multi-faceted qualitative data while also better engaging with participants in data collection, especially in virtual environments. This study describes the development of a novel 3-step approach to virtual mind-mapping that involves (1) ranked free-listing, (2) respondent-driven mind-mapping, and (3) interviewing to enhance both data collection and analysis of complex health behaviors. The method was employed in 32 virtual interviews as part of a study on eating behaviors among second-generation South Asian Americans. Participants noted the mind-mapping experience to be (1) helpful for visual learners, (2) helpful in elucidating new ideas and to structure thoughts, as well as (3) novel and interesting. They also noted some suggestions that included improving interpretability of visual data and avoiding repetition of certain discussion points. Data collection revealed the adaptability of the method, and the power of mind-maps to guide targeted, comprehensive discussions with participants.

Еnactivist Criticism of the Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 76-80
Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Science Methods ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
Concept Of Information ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Person Experience

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.

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