scholarly journals STEPHEN GWYNN AND THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM IN IRELAND, 1919–1921

2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-745
Author(s):  
COLIN REID

ABSTRACTThe Irish Party, the organization which represented the constitutional nationalist demand for home rule for almost fifty years in Westminster, was the most notable victim of the revolution in Ireland, c. 1916–23. Most of the last generation of Westminster-centred home rule MPs played little part in public life following the party's electoral destruction in 1918. This article probes the political thought and actions of one of the most prominent constitutional nationalists who did seek to alter Ireland's direction during the critical years of the war of independence. Stephen Gwynn was a guiding figure behind a number of initiatives to ‘save’ Ireland from the excesses of revolution. Gwynn established the Irish Centre Party in 1919, which later merged with the Irish Dominion League. From the end of 1919, Gwynn became a leading advocate of the Government of Ireland Bill, the legislation that partitioned the island. Revolutionary idealism – and, more concretely, violence – did much to render his reconciliatory efforts impotent. Gwynn's experiences between 1919 and 1921 also, however, reveal the paralysing divisions within constitutional nationalism, which did much to demoralize moderate sentiment further.

2019 ◽  
pp. 361-374
Author(s):  
Marco Antonio Landavazo

In the Mexican war of independence, patriot’s armies famously repeated, “Long live the king and down with the bad government!”, a political slogan related to the spanish populist doctrines and to what we could call the monarchical tradition of good government. The cry of disdain toward the viceregal government and of acceptance of the king indicates not only obedience to him but it appeals to him: it is a call to an arbitrator who can intervene in the political and social games and force one of their adversaries, in this case the government of New Spain, to act according to the established rules—those of a good government. This paper focuses on the way this rebellious rhetoric shows us how age-old political and ideological traditions stemming from Europe, and the American reproduction of them, saw their expiration date when the leader of the good government Fernando VII, in the eyes of the Mexican patriots, had become a tyrant


1983 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Weston

The political legacy of Lázaro Cárdenas is marked by a striking paradox. On the one hand, Cárdenas as president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940 presided over the most radical phase of the Mexican Revolution or what some historians call the “Second Revolution.” He was instrumental in organizing industrial workers and peasants at the national level and incorporating both groups into the reorganized government party, the Partido de la Revolutión Mexicana (PRM), that had as its declared purpose the establishment of a “workers' democracy” in Mexico. Under his leadership the government supported the demands of industrial workers for higher wages and improved working conditions, greatly expanded the distribution of land to the peasantry, established new welfare programs, nationalized the railroad and petroleum industries and inaugurated a program of socialist education in the public schools. The prestige of Cárdenas as the foremost leader of the radical phase of the Revolution was enhanced by the fact that he, unlike many of his contemporaries, never attempted to use political office for personal financial gain; he was not a rich man when he completed his term of office as president. At the time of his death in 1970, Cárdenas was eulogized as “the greatest figure produced by the Revolution… an authentic revolutionary who aspired to the greatness of his country, not personal aggrandizement.” On the other hand, Cárdenas was the architect of the corporatist system of interest representation, including labor, peasant and business organizations, that provided the institutional framework of what Crane Brinton has called the “Thermidor,” i.e., the conservative reaction to the radical phase of the revolutionary process, that began in Mexico in approximately 1940. The institutions developed by Cárdenas were utilized by his successors to curtail the very reforms, such as agrarian and labor reform and socialist education, that had been central to his reform program. Moreover Cárdenas facilitated the transition to a more conservative era by naming as his successor Manuel Ávila Camacho, who was known to favor a moderation of the reform process, rather than Francisco Múgica, the preferred candidate of the radicals in the government. In short, Cárdenas played a decisive role both in presiding over the radical phase of the Revolution and in launching and shaping the relatively conservative post-1940 era. The paradox of the political legacy of Cárdenas is that though the seemingly radical reforms he carried out had a lasting impact upon Mexican politics, the impact was predominantly conservative rather than radical. This essay will endeavor to explain the paradoxical political legacy of Lázaro Cárdenas by focusing upon his ideology, the institutional reforms he carried out while president, and the impact of those reforms after 1940.


2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (4I) ◽  
pp. 333-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anwar Shah

Globalisation and the information revolution are profoundly influencing the division of power within, across, and beyond nation-states. Within nations, this mega change has led to a diminished economic relevance of the intermediate order of government (states and provinces) and an enhanced need for home rule (empowered local governments) in both unitary and federal countries. Considerations of peace, order, and good government further warrant that intermediate orders of governments must assume a relatively less prominent role in multi-order governance. The recent fiscal crisis and the ever-growing concern about corruption have further heightened the need to the get the government right, thereby creating additional pressures to limit the size of the government by possibly downsizing the role of the states/provinces and reconstituting these as provincial councils of local governments to perform inter-local functions and coordination. These economic imperatives, calling for an hourglass model of federalism, are at odds with the political realties in countries conforming to the traditional dual federalism model, i.e., federalism of the provinces model of economic governance as prevalent in Australia, India, Mexico, and Pakistan, among others. The political order in these latter countries has blocked local governments from assuming their due role as the primary agents of the people providing oversight on the shared rule and as facilitators for network governance to improve the economic and social outcomes. Such a role of local government is also critical to international competitiveness and growth as demonstrated by the experiences of China, Japan, Korea, and the Nordic countries. This paper outlines reform options for multi-order governance to conform with the new world economic order. The paper elaborates the role of local governments under ‘glocalised governance’—the new vision of multi-order governance—and argues that growth and economic prosperity of nations in the coming decades would critically depend on how quickly political and institutional impediments to the new (or the oldest?) paradigm of local governance are overcome. The paper concludes that path dependency makes such radical reforms infeasible in countries with strong provincial governments run by feudal, military, and industrial elites.


Author(s):  
Pat McCarthy

This chapter discusses the experiences of loyalists in Waterford during the revolutionary decade. Though small in number, about 5% of the population, they were very influential economically and socially. Unlike in many other southern counties, they mobilised and demonstrated against Home Rule in 1912. Like other loyalist communities they rallied to the flag in 1914 and many of them were killed in battle. The survivors came home to a changed Ireland. They felt abandoned by the Ulster Unionists and that some form of Home Rule was now inevitable. They chose to keep a low profile during the War of Independence. There is no evidence of discrimination or violence against them during that phase of the revolution but in 1922 and 1923 members of the loyalist community were subject to opportunistic violence, often carried out in the name of the IRA. Some chose to leave the country, but most took their lead from Sir John Keane and played their part in building the new state, responding to the call of their newspaper, the Waterford Standard: ‘There is much that we can contribute to the building up of the new Ireland. We will give it in full measure.’


1981 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 338
Author(s):  
Andrew G. Walder ◽  
John Bryan Starr

1990 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 484-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Almond

THE VIOLENCE WHICH MARKED THE OVERTHROW OF Nicolae Ceaugescu's regime at Christmas 1989, and the recurrent disorders, especially in Bucharest, which have punctuated developments over the last nine months, have made Romania's experience of anti-Communist revolution strikingly different from that of its neighbours to the north and to the west. Whatever the political and social tensions emerging in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland (and whatever may be the GDR's legacy to a reunified Germany), it is unlikely that the charge of neo-communism will be central to their political debate. It is precisely that charge levelled against the government party (National Salvation Front/FSN) and against the person of Ion Ilescu by various opposition groups, and former prominent dissidents under Ceaugescu, which remains the most emotive issue in Romanian politics. The question of whether the revolution which overthrew Nicolae Ceauyescu and led to the dissolution of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was the result of a popular uprising or a coup d'état planned by Party members has haunted Romanian politics through the first nine months of the post-Ceauqescu period.


Author(s):  
J.G.A. Pocock ◽  
Richard Whatmore

This chapter studies the era bracketed within the half-century following the Revolution of 1688, in which political thought became engrossed with the conscious recognition of change in the economic and social foundations of politics and the political personality, so that the zōon politikon took on their modern character of participant observer in processes of material and historical change fundamentally affecting their nature. This chapter shows that these changes in perception came about through the development of a neo-Machiavellian, as well as neo-Harringtonian, style in the theory of political economy, in response to England's emergence as Britain—a major commercial, military, and imperial power.


Author(s):  
Anissa Daoudi

While the literature on the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) is extensive, studies on the armed conflict between the Algerian military and the armed Islamic groups, which cost the lives of more than 200,000 remain insignificant. The complex intersections between the political, social, and economic factors leading to the war in the 1990s show that the critical junctures began after independence in 1962. These junctures continued through the 1970s (Arabization movement) and 1980s (1988 Berber Spring), which together can help in contextualizing the Algerian Civil War. These different periods reveal the history of the National Liberation Front (FLN) as a one-party rule and contextualize its historical strong relationship with the Algerian National Army, revealing the power dynamics between the two and the roots of the struggle over the country’s sovereignty. Furthermore, the 1980s were marked by the youth riots in 1988 (Berber Spring) and their crucial role in what president Chadli Benjedid presented as a political reform program, including a new constitution, which ended the political monopoly of the FLN and saw the emergence of more than thirty new political parties. In January 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) overwhelmingly won the municipal elections, with a much larger number of votes than the ruling FLN in the first round. However, instead of accepting the Islamists’ victory, the military promptly stepped in and cancelled parliamentary elections, banned the FIS, and arrested its leaders. After President Mohamed Boudiaf’s assassination, the government imposed a national state of emergency and used a combination of strategies including economic reforms as well tough laws to repress the Islamic armed groups and control the situation. The idea that the armed Islamic groups started after the official ban of the FIS has been contested. Two parallel strategies were adopted by the successive governments of the 1990s: one was based on the repression of the FIS, who in turn retaliated with car bombs and assassinations of women, intellectuals, police, and military forces; and the other was based on the introduction of social and economic reforms. The country went into cycles of extreme violence for more than a decade, in which the negotiations between the Islamists and the military were not interrupted. President Liamine Zaroual’s amnesty initiative, Rahma, was unsuccessful, yet it was the basis upon which his successor, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, proposed his project of amnesty, known as the Civil Concord, in 1999, later replaced by the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation in 2005. Bouteflika resigned on April 2, 2019, after months of mass protest called the Revolution of Smiles, which started on February 22, 2019, against his candidacy to the presidency for a fifth mandate.


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