The limitations of “structural” theories of commercial policy

1986 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy J. McKeown

If a “structural” theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers, then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not “structural.” Most microeconomic theory is structural; so are most balance-of-power theories. In the realm of theories of commercial policy, hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description. In the latter category Judith Goldstein's work, which attempts to account for American commercial policy in terms of the ideology of American central decision makers, and Charles Kindleberger's ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th-century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies.

1989 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott C. James ◽  
David A. Lake

One challenge facing hegemonic stability theory is to specify the processes by which hegemonic countries construct and maintain a liberal international economic order. Earlier studies have focused on direct coercion or ideological manipulation by the hegemon as a principal technique for manipulating the trade policies of other countries. This article explores a different “face” of hegemony. Specifically, we contend that by altering relative prices through the exercise of their international market power, hegemonic leaders influence the trade policy preferences of their foreign trading partners. We examine this argument in the case of the American Walker Tariff of 1846. American tariff liberalization was intimately related to Britain's repeal of its Corn Laws. In the antebellum United States, Northern protectionist and Southern free trade proclivities were fixed; Western grain growers held the balance of power. By allowing access to its lucrative grain market, Britain altered the economic and political incentives of Western agriculturalists and facilitated the emergence of the free trade coalition essential to the passage of the Walker Tariff.


Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
TV Paul

This article addresses the research question: how have most small states of South Asian region managed to acquire substantial amount of investment from China and India without falling into the strategic orbit of either power? This is an anomaly because most structural theories, in particular neorealism, would expect small states not to have much power and influence on their own in their relationship with powerful states. I answer this puzzle by arguing that the limited competition between China and India in an era of intensified economic globalization has provided a window of opportunity to small states to maximize their returns from the two without upsetting their relationship with either in a big way. This short-term bargaining window has been facilitated by the managed rivalry and economic interdependence between China and India which is yet to become an intense strategic rivalry. The article cautions that as the Chinese and Indian ambitions in the Indo-Pacific collide, the smaller states may be asked to make choices akin to bandwagoning with either one, in particular by offering military bases and naval facilities. This development, if it occurs, will drastically affect the bargaining power of the smaller states.


Author(s):  
Julieta Suarez-Cao

Intergovernmental relations in Latin America present a varied sample of both institutional determinants and actual dynamics. Constitutional structures regulate whether countries have a federal or a unitary system of territorial distribution of power and stipulate the territorial levels of government. Thus, constitutions structure the number of vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations. Actual dynamics, however, depend on policy prerogatives that establish subnational authority vis-à-vis the national administration. These prerogatives, usually understood in terms of power, responsibilities, and resources, shape the territorial balance of power within a country. Power, responsibilities, and resources can be combined to apprehend the degree of authority in the hands of regional governments. Such authority is analytically organized into two dimensions: the regional power of self-rule and the power to share rule with national decision makers. This distinction helps to explain that the trend toward increasing regional authority is mostly a product of decentralization and devolution politics that have enhanced self-rule, rather than reforms that advance the shared rule dimension. Nevertheless, neither constitutional structures nor new regional policy prerogatives are the only determinants of the dynamics of intergovernmental relations. Informal institutions, such as subnational coalitions and local political clientelism, are particularly relevant to understanding the actual balance of power between national and subnational governments and among subnational arenas.


1996 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helga Drummond

The term ‘risk management’ implies that risk is something which can be quantified, predicted and controlled. This paper seeks to demonstrate the limits of this assumption where complex projects are involved. The argument is based upon a case study of a failed £80 million IT venture known as Taurus. Analysis focuses upon the relationship between politics and the assumption of risk. Acceptance of risk, it is argued, is ultimately determined by the balance of power between decision makers. Moreover, risk analysis and other techniques of management may actually compound the difficulties by fostering an illusion of control and escalation. The implications for project management are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-152
Author(s):  
Dogachan Dagi

AbstractThe Ottoman alliance politics before the Great War has not been explored for theorizing alliance politics though it presents a unique example of alliance formation under external threat. Thus, in this article, a neo-realist balance of threat theory is utilized to examine the Ottoman decision to align with Germany in the Great War. Unlike a historical account as to why the Ottomans sided with the German-Austrian alliance, this article develops a theoretical approach that takes insights from ‘alliance theories’ to explain the Ottomans’ fateful alignment. Such an alliance theory approach underlines the dilemmas of the Ottoman decision makers and demonstrates ‘rational’ elements of their strategy of balancing the main source of the threat. By bringing alliance theories and Ottoman historiography together it is argued that the Ottomans, in their search for an alliance before the Great War, sought a “balance of threat” politics rather than a “balance of power” politics.


Author(s):  
D.H. Robinson

This chapter looks at the theories of geopolitics, political economy, and constitutional order that accompanied post-war visions of British hegemony, and how the patriot movement came to repurpose these ideas as an argument for American independence. Throughout the imperial crisis, colonists discussed imperial commercial policy in the context of geopolitics, and these discussions bore fruit in the conception of an empire not as a proto-federation but as an unequal league, in which trade and diplomacy were governed from the metropole. The leading voices of the patriot movement would endorse this vision of British power until—and in some cases beyond—the threshold of armed conflict. When the turn to revolution and secession finally came, it too was mediated by ideas about the balance of power, the geopolitics of empire, and the future shape of the international system that lay deep in the colonial past.


2022 ◽  
pp. 205556362110616
Author(s):  
Katri Nousiainen

We need law and economics to do the scientific measurement necessary for legal design to be seen as on the stage of science. Law and economics—which is the application of economic theory, especially microeconomic theory, to the analysis and the practice of law--is a valid tool and approach to reflect on what should be empirically investigated in the practice of legal design. The neoclassical (mainstream) theoretical foundation of economic analysis of law is, however, at times far from reality as it often predicts uncooperative and even selfish behaviour. In real life people do cooperate, have empathy, emotions and even behave in an altruistic way. For those reasons, behavioural law and economics and conventional wisdom are needed to complement the teachings from standard theory in the field of commercial contracting.


2019 ◽  
pp. 85-115
Author(s):  
Madison Powers

This chapter examines what makes a theory of justice a structural theory. Four key features of structural theories are surveyed in order to show what is distinctive about our theory. First, structural theories differ in their inventory of unjust impacts traceable to structural influences. Second, they vary in their understanding of the primary structural components having the relevant impact. Third, they diverge in the social groups selected for special scrutiny. Fourth, they differ in background assumptions regarding the circumstances to which they apply. Our theory applies to social arrangements that have a profound, pervasive, asymmetric, and near-inescapable impact on core elements of well-being of social groups. Social groups are defined by their relative position within the nexus of power and advantage. This nexus occurs in circumstances involving identifiable agents of injustice whose wrongful conduct is manifested in their roles in creating or sustaining injustices.


Author(s):  
Akan Malici

Henry Kissinger once remarked, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make.” It is common sense that a state’s foreign policy cannot be explained without reference to the beliefs of such leaders as Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, or Kim Jong Un, to name a few. It is, therefore, ironic that leaders have mattered little for much of the international relations discipline’s history. Structural approaches with foci on the distribution of power, international institutions and domestic politics have been dominant. To be sure, scholarship on belief systems has been present since the 1950s. Early key concepts included the decision maker’s “definition of the situation,” the “ecological environment,” and the “attitudinal prism.” This scholarship laid an important foundation; however, at the time, it did not generate competitive research programs. Agent-centered approaches remained secondary and beliefs were seen as residual variables. They were also seen as “unobservable”—difficult to assess and operationalize. Indeed, rigorous methods that would enable the scientific study of belief systems have long been absent. Over time such challenges were addressed successfully, and these efforts were catalyzed by scholarly advances and also by real-world developments. In the real world, it was mainly the end of the Cold War that illustrated the insufficiency of structural theories. Under Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviet Union took a fundamentally new course, and it gave up power. The dominant structural theories did neither predict the ensuing events nor could they explain them. They were “caught flat-footed,” as one scholar wrote. What really mattered, it seemed, was what these theories did not pay much attention to: namely decision makers’ belief-systems. Of particular relevance are decision makers’ operational code beliefs. Along with the general literature on belief systems, the operational code research program began in the 1950s. It gained still more prominence with the work of Alexander George and Ole Holsti in the 1960s and 1970s. A decision maker’s operational code is constituted by his answers to questions such as: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? What is the best approach for selecting goals for political action? The most significant advances in the operational code research program were then made in the 1980s and beyond by Stephen Walker and his students. The progress occurred on the theoretical, methodological, and empirical plane, and through their work the research program has become, (and continues to be) a mainstay in contemporary international relations scholarship.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 1340004 ◽  
Author(s):  
PISEK GERDSRI ◽  
DUNDAR F. KOCAOGLU

This research demonstrates a systematic approach to evaluate nanotechnologies. A case study of applying nanotechnologies to the development of Thailand's agriculture industry is given as an example. A hierarchical decision model is built and qualified expert opinions are used as measurements. There are four levels in the hierarchy: mission, objectives, technological goals and research strategies. Three panels are formed based on their background and expertise in order to minimize and balance any possible biases among the members. The research results provide decision makers with a ranking of technological goals and research strategies in terms of their support for specific goals. The outcome of this research should help technology policy makers to evaluate technologies and research strategies on the basis of their contributions to the national mission.


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