Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. McDonald

AbstractThis paper blends recent research on hierarchy and democratization to examine the theoretical and empirical costs of treating regime type exogenously in the literature most identified with studying its impact on international politics. It argues that the apparent peace among democratic states that emerges in the aftermath of World War I is not caused by domestic institutional attributes normally associated with democracy. Instead, this peace is an artifact of historically specific great power settlements. These settlements shape subsequent aggregate patterns of military conflict by altering the organizational configuration of the system in three critical ways—by creating new states, by altering hierarchical orders, and by influencing regime type in states. These claims are defended with a series of tests that show first how the statistical relationship between democracy and peace has exhibited substantial variation across great power orders; second, that this statistical relationship breaks down with theoretically motivated research design changes; and third, that great powers foster peace and similar regime types within their hierarchical orders. In short, the relationship between democracy and peace is spurious. The international political order is still built and managed by great powers.

2020 ◽  
pp. 54-79
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
Daniel Nexon

This chapter identifies three drivers of hegemonic unraveling and transformation in international orders: great-power contestation and alternative order building; how the dominant power’s loss of its “patronage monopoly” enhances the bargaining leverage of weaker states; and the rise of counter-order movements, especially transnational ones, that weaken support for existing international arrangements—sometimes within the leading power itself. Because analysts tend to focus their attention on the relationship between power transitions and great-power wars, they have only recently begun to appreciate the significance of these three processes. This chapter shows that these challenges—from above, below, and within—played a key role in past power transitions and transformations in international order, including the decline of Spanish hegemony, challenges to British hegemony before World War I, the rise of fascism and Bolshevism during the interwar period, decolonization, and the collapse of the Soviet system.


Author(s):  
Rosemary A. Kelanic

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the relationship between oil and great power politics. For over a hundred years, oil has been ubiquitous as both an object of political intrigue and a feature of everyday life, yet its effects on the behavior of major powers remain poorly understood. This book focuses on one particular aspect of oil: its coercive potential. Across time and space, great powers have feared that dependence on imported petroleum might make them vulnerable to coercion by hostile actors. They worry that an enemy could cut off oil to weaken them militarily or punish them economically, and then use this threat as a basis for political blackmail. Oil is so essential to great powers that taking a state's imports hostage could give an enemy significant leverage in a dispute. The book presents the first systematic framework to understand how fears of oil coercion shape international affairs. Great powers counter prospective threats with costly and risky policies that lessen vulnerability, ideally, before the country can be targeted. These measures, which can be called “anticipatory strategies,” vary enormously, from self-sufficiency efforts to actions as extreme as launching wars.


2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDRE DEBS ◽  
H.E. GOEMANS

We propose and test a formal model of war and domestic politics, building on recent evidence on the relationship between regime type, the effect of war on the probability of losing office, and the consequences of losing office. The less the outcome of international interaction affects a leader's tenure and the less punitive are the consequences of losing office, the more a leader is willing to make concessions to strike a peaceful bargain. We demonstrate that our theory successfully predicts war involvement among nondemocratic regime types. Moreover, our theory offers an intuitive explanation for the democratic peace. Compared to nondemocratic leaders, the tenure of democratic leaders depends relatively little on the war outcome, and democratic leaders fare relatively well after losing office. Thus, democratic leaders should be more willing and able to avoid war, especially with other democrats.


Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

When a great power declines, what strategies do rising states adopt? Rising great powers are often expected to prey upon and challenge declining states as power shifts in their favor. In practice, however, rising state strategies vary. Some rising states, at some times, indeed prey upon decliners. Nevertheless, rising states states can also support declining states, as well as prey upon or support decliners with greater or lesser intensity. This book develops an argument rooted in realist international relations theory to explain the predatory or supportive nature of rising state strategy. It argues that rising states pursue predatory or supportive strategies depending on (1) a declining state’s ability to assist a rising state against other great power challengers, and (2) the threat a declining state poses to a rising state in the process. Drawing on extensive primary source research into great power reactions to the declines of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, alongside an examination of rise and decline dynamics in pre-World War I Europe, the project shows that the argument explains rising state strategy across a wide swath of diplomatic history. The results carry implications for theory, history, and policy debates.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
John M. Schuessler ◽  
Joshua Shifrinson ◽  
David Blagden

What is the relationship between insularity—a state’s separation from other states via large bodies of water—and expansion? The received wisdom, prominent in (though not exclusive to) realist theories, holds that insularity constrains expansion by making conquest difficult. We contend, by contrast, that this received wisdom faces important limits. Focusing on U.S. expansion via means short of conquest, we interrogate the underlying theoretical logics to demonstrate that insular powers enjoy two distinct advantages when it comes to expansion. First, insularity translates into a “freedom to roam”: because insular powers are less threatened at home, they can project more power and influence abroad. Second, insularity “sterilizes” power, which explains why insular powers are seen as attractive security providers and why we do not see more counterbalancing against them. On net, existing scholarship is correct to argue that insularity impedes conquest between great powers. Still, it has missed the ways that insularity abets expansion via spheres of influence abroad. One consequence is an under-appreciation for the role of geography writ large and insularity in particular in shaping contemporary great power behavior.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-32
Author(s):  
Steven Bernstein

Great powers routinely face demands to take on special responsibilities to address major concerns in global affairs, and often gain special rights for doing so. These areas include peace and security, global economic management, development, and egregious violations of human rights. Despite the rise in the importance and centrality of global environmental concerns, especially climate change and issues covered by the new Sustainable Development Goals, norms or institutions that demand or recognize great power responsibility are notably absent. This absence is puzzling given expectations in several major strands of International Relations theory, including the English School, realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Drawing on the reasoning behind these expectations, the absence of great power responsibility can be explained by a lack of congruence between systemic and environmental “great powers,” weak empirical links between action on the environment and the maintenance of international order, and no link to special rights. Instead, the institutionalized distribution of environmental responsibilities arose out of North–South conflict and has eroded over time, becoming more diffuse and decentered from ideas of state responsibility. These findings suggest a need to rethink the relationship among great powers and special rights and responsibilities regarding the environment, as well as other new issues of systemic importance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-112
Author(s):  
Klaus Ziemer

Abstract After World War I, many borders in Europe were redrawn, especially in the northeast and southeast of Germany. Almost all political forces in Germany strived to restore the prewar German borders, especially towards Poland. Even Poland’s very existence was denied by many German political forces. The Baltic States were less important for Germany in this respect. Here the relationship with the Baltic Germans and trade relations prevailed. The independence of these states was in the eyes of German elite subordinated to the relations with Russia. The article presents this pattern of German policy until the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 372-396
Author(s):  
Maja Spanu

International Relations scholarship disconnects the history of the so-called expansion of international society from the presence of hierarchies within it. In contrast, this article argues that these developments may in fact be premised on hierarchical arrangements whereby new states are subject to international tutelage as the price of acceptance to international society. It shows that hierarchies within international society are deeply entrenched with the politics of self-determination as international society expands. I substantiate this argument with primary and secondary material on the Minority Treaty provisions imposed on the new states in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe admitted to the League of Nations after World War I. The implications of this claim for International Relations scholarship are twofold. First, my argument contributes to debates on the making of the international system of states by showing that the process of expansion of international society is premised on hierarchy, among and within states. Second, it speaks to the growing body of scholarship on hierarchy in world politics by historicising where hierarchies come from, examining how diverse hierarchies are nested and intersect, and revealing how different actors navigate these hierarchies.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-39
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN E. GOLDSMITH

Previous research (e.g., Horiuchi, Goldsmith, and Inoguchi, 2005) has shown some intriguing patterns of effects of several variables on international public opinion about US foreign policy. But results for the theoretically appealing effects of regime type and post-materialist values have been weak or inconsistent. This paper takes a closer look at the relationship between these two variables and international public opinion about US foreign policy. In particular, international reaction to the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) are examined using two major multinational surveys. The conclusions of previous research are largely reinforced: neither regime type nor post-materialist values appears to robustly influence global opinion on these events. Rather, some central interests, including levels of trade with the US and NATO membership, and key socialized factors, including a Muslim population, experience with terrorism, and the exceptional experiences of two states (Israel, Albania) emerge as the most important factors in the models. There is also a consistent backlash effect of security cooperation with the US outside of NATO. A discussion of these preliminary results points to their theoretical implications and their significance for further investigation into the transnational dynamics of public opinion and foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield

This chapter surveys the empirical literature on the effects of foreign trade on political-military conflict. There have been three “waves” of work on this topic since 1980. It is argued that the most recent wave differs from earlier waves in various important respects. First, it has made significant headway in addressing the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between trade and conflict. Second, this wave has addressed a wider variety of aspects of trade, including trade policy and trade agreements. Third, a variety of recent studies have shed new light on the effects of trade on the outbreak of war, as well as the effects of war on the trade ties of combatants. Finally, the third wave of research on trade and conflict has addressed whether the effects of trade stem from market capitalism more generally and whether a simultaneous relationship exists between trade and conflict.


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