John Redmond and federalism in 1910

2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (127) ◽  
pp. 343-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wheatley

In early August 1910 readers of Reynolds’s Newspaper, a radical weekly journal noted as much for its detailed coverage of divorce court proceedings as for its political radicalism (and in 1911 one of the ‘immoral’ English Sunday papers targeted by Irish ‘vigilance committees’), may have perused the weekly political column written by T.P. O’Connor. ‘T.P.’, the M.P. for Liverpool Scotland, was anything but a disinterested columnist, and with John Redmond, John Dillon and Joseph Devlin formed the inner leadership of the Irish Parliamentary Party and Ireland’s nationalist movement.Throughout the political crisis of early 1910 O’Connor had been the main London-based conduit for communications between the Irish Party and Asquith’s cabinet, and in particular Lloyd George and the Liberal chief whip, the Master of Elibank. The outcome of the January 1910 general election, which had given the balance of power in the House of Commons to the Irish nationalists, and John Redmond’s use of that power to force Asquith to act to end the veto powers of the House of Lords over parliamentary legislation, had enhanced both Redmond’s status in Ireland and the importance of home rule as an issue that had to be resolved.

1960 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-95
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. McCaffrey

The formation of the Irish Home Rule movement was a significant factor in influencing subsequent Irish and British history. Irish Federalism produced a political party that often controlled the balance of power in the House of Commons; split the Liberal party on the question of Irish self-government, a prelude to its eventual collapse; secured extensive agrarian reform for Irish tenant farmers, the first serious blow to traditional property rights in the British Isles; and was instrumental in destroying the political power of the House of Lords.


1963 ◽  
Vol 13 (52) ◽  
pp. 316-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.W. McCready

Gladstone’s dramatic commitment of the liberal party to a policy of home rule for Ireland in 1886 was followed by the Grand Old Man’s two attempts at turning his policy into legislation. The first home rule bill, that of 1886, was defeated in the house of commons and then in a general election: the second, that of 1893, was overwhelmed in the house of lords and then dropped by Gladstone’s fourth government. Though the Gladstonian commitment remained and the liberal party continued to be a home rule party — and though the pros and cons of the union of 1800 remained the major structural feature of British party politics — it was not until 1912 that the liberals did anything further about their major Irish policy. For most of the period 1893-1912 they were, of course, impotent in opposition and consequently in no position to take the initiative on home rule. In 1906, however, they won a landslide victory over their unionist opponents and it is striking that this electoral victory and the great impulse it gave to one of the most dynamic governments in the whole history of British liberalism was not followed, as had the last two liberal victories under Gladstone, by the introduction of a third home rule bill. Had the liberal landslide of 1906 been put behind another home rule measure the whole history of the matter would certainly have been radically different. The house of lords would have been easily overwhelmed; the great advance in constitutional reform for Ireland would have been carried in a spirit of liberal reform rather than of political surrender; the development of Sinn Fein would have been frustrated or at least diverted. But the liberal victory of 1906 was not so used. Home rule was postponed and sidetracked and was taken up again only when the liberal party once more desperately needed Irish votes in the budget election which followed the rejection of Lloyd George’s financial measures by the lords in November 1909. The home rule banner was hoisted afresh by Asquith, the prime minister, in his Albert Hall speechof 10 December 1909 and the third home rule bill appeared in due course in 1912 in direct — and significant — succession to the budget and the parliament act for both of which the Asquith government needed Irish support in the commons.


2021 ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Peter John

This chapter discusses what makes British politics distinctive and recognizable: its parliamentary democracy, uncodified constitution, and pattern of party government. It begins by outlining some recent events that have made British or UK politics so fascinating and controversial. The chapter then describes the political system, particularly the institutional rules that affect what happens and govern how politics takes place. Parliament, composed of the House of Commons, House of Lords, and the Crown, is the supreme legal authority in the UK. The chapter also provides a summary of the British constitution. It places the UK in a comparative context, to be studied alongside other nation states. Finally, the chapter sets out the information and concepts that help in understanding the nature of and limits to British democracy.


Author(s):  
Meg Russell ◽  
Maria Sciara

Since its reform in 1999, no political party commands an overall majority in the House of Lords. The chamber appears to feel more confident, and government defeats there are common. Earlier studies have shown why the government faces defeats in the Lords, concluding that it is usually the Liberal Democrats that hold the balance of power. Here we analyse the lasting policy impact of Lords defeats. We find that far from being routinely reversed in the House of Commons, many Lords defeats are substantially accepted. Furthermore, many of these are on key policy issues. We also examine which factors are associated with a Lords ‘win’ on legislation, finding that obvious factors such as the size of the majority against the government are not significant. We conclude that the Lords is an important policy actor and should be taken more seriously, but that its ability to make policy gains remains unpredictable.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 125-136
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Liżyńska ◽  
Anna Płońska

The authoritarian ideology that guided the authorities of the communist Polish state did not remain indifferent to the emerging model of jurisprudence in petty offence cases. Eliminating the possibility of court proceedings, the location of adjudicating boards in petty offence cases at national councils, the introduction of collegial jurisprudence exercised by the social factor, giving the jurisprudence an educational character, and abandoning it in favour of severe penalties implemented for hooligan petty offences — these are just some of the features that distinguish the jurisprudence model in petty offence cases in the People’s Republic of Poland. The pursuit of the authorities to subordinate the individuals by, on the one hand, handing over the jurisprudence in petty offence cases into the hands of the people, and, on the other hand, filling the adjudication boards with members subordinate to the authority, did not bring independence in the decisions issued. It is evidenced, for example, by the excessive repressive adjudication boards judgments issued against participants of the political crisis of March 1968. The Authors present the development of the model of jurisprudence in petty offence cases in the controversial period of the communist regime.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-74
Author(s):  
Freddy Pignon

When Michael Cusack founded the Gaelic Athletic Association in 1884, the political debate in Ireland was dominated by Home Rule. The creation of the GAA may have found inspiration in the growing nationalist movement led by Charles Stewart Parnell, but the Irish Parliamentary Party may also have been bolstered by the sporting organisation’s ideal of reviving the national identity through the preservation of its traditional games. The GAA undoubtedly conferred legitimacy on the political movement which peaked in December 1885 with a wide electoral success and then with the introduction of the first Home Rule Bill. But Home Rule did not exactly mean the same in sport as in politics. Even though Michael Cusack was not hostile to power sharing with the unionist leaders of existing athletic associations, the failure of his first attempts to democratise Irish sport led him to defend a more radical position implying total separation from his counterparts under British supervision. The Home Rule movement certainly benefited from the GAA’s nationalist and cultural stance to develop Irish consciousness. But the likelihood of self-government was compromised by the own image of the GAA’s administration whose sectarianism and internal disputes over its political nature could hardly convince unionists of their interest to agree with the principle of Home Rule.


1974 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 123-140
Author(s):  
F. S. L. Lyons

The Home Rule crisis of 1885–86 is generally held to mark a water-shed in the history of Anglo-Irish relations. This it undoubtedly does, though not necessarily for the reasons commonly advanced. The crisis was certainly important in the sense that it obliged the Liberal and Conservative parties to define their attitudes towards Irish self-government and thus to demonstrate to the Irish nationalist party in the House of Commons that their main hope for the future lay with Mr Gladstone and those Liberals who had remained faithful to him after his declaration in favour of Home Rule. But the course of events during 1886 demonstrated just how far the Irish demand still was from being met. The inadequacies of the Home Rule Bill itself, the split in the Liberal party, the firm negative of the Conservatives, the violence of the Ulster Protestant reaction, the veto of the House of Lords which had not even to be deployed in 1886 but was there for future use when necessary—all these things suggested that Home Rule, if it came at all, would not happen overnight at the waving of any Parnellite wand, but would require years, perhaps decades, of labour before it came within sight of achievement.


1975 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Fair

The Reform Bill of 1867 inaugurated a new era in the political history of Great Britain. By enlarging the electorate and increasing the possibilities for party organisation this Act brought to a close that period of the mid-nineteenth century when parties were in a state of flux. This was manifested in Parliament by a growing disparity between the popularly elected House of Commons and the hereditary based House of Lords. In 1868 and 1869 these bodies converged in a constitutional struggle over the disestablishment of the Irish Church. By toppling Disraeli from the premiership and acquiring a clear mandate from the electorate for a change in the status of the Irish Church Gladstone was able to make an irrefutable case for disestablishment. When Gladstone placed his bill before Parliament opposition developed in the first instance, as expected, from churchmen and Tories in the House of Lords who feared that the passage of disestablishment would admit a host of further changes in the constitution. Through the efforts of archbishop Tait, however, and other moderates the upper house wisely passed the principle of the bill. But opposition to the measure was based not so much on upholding the principle of establishment in Ireland, which was indefensible, but on a disagreement with the substance, or the details by which the Irish Church was to be disendowed. During the committee stage the House of Lords precipitated a crisis by so amending the bill as to maintain the financial security of the Irish Church. For the purpose of reaching a compromise on the disendowment clauses of the bill a conference of party leaders was summoned. To this end the mediation efforts of the queen were directed. But any settlement of the crisis depended in the final analysis on the extent of Conservative opposition and the ease with which party divisions could be bridged.


Author(s):  
Marc Geddes ◽  
Jessica Mulley

This chapter examines the way the UK Parliament is administered and organized in terms of the support offered by the institution to Members of Parliament (MPs) and peers to fulfil their parliamentary, political, and policy functions. The House of Commons employs roughly 2,500 and the House of Lords around 500 members of staff, in addition to staff in the bicameral Parliamentary Digital Service. These staff provide invaluable and impartial support to Parliament. This chapter considers the political and non-political sources of support provided to MPs and peers in carrying out their role and how the resources available to parliamentarians have increased over the past two decades through a range of parliamentary reforms. It also discusses key issues and debates arising from the support given to MPs and peers, including the issue over whether staff exist to serve the institution of Parliament or to support parliamentarians.


2021 ◽  
pp. 63-97
Author(s):  
Peter John

This chapter evaluates the institution of the UK Parliament, where parliamentarians have a chance to debate issues of the day and to make laws. It reviews classic arguments about the power of Parliament in relation to the executive, before looking at the role of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The account is still influenced by the Westminster system of government, whereby the executive in the form of the government is sustained in power by having a majority in the House of Commons. The chapter then considers what Members of Parliament (MPs) and other representatives do in office, and how their behaviour links to other features of the political process, such as public opinion and constituency interests. It also compares other legislatures, such as the Scottish Parliament, with the UK Parliament.


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