Did Japan Ever Suffer From a Shortage of Natural Resources Before World War II?

1996 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasukichi Yasuba

Until the end of the nineteenth century, Japan raised its per capita income, starting from a low level, by exporting primary commodities and importing manufactured goods. Around the turn of the century, Japan became a net importer of natural resources. Yet it is doubtful that Japan ever suffered severely from a shortage of natural resources before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. It was the military expansion in the 1930s that created an artificial shortage of mineral resources, the wholesale exodus of population, and a lowering in the standard of living of the general public.

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 567-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson

This analysis demonstrates that the relative growth of per capita income change is an important determinant of post-World War II presidential election outcomes. Per capita income change is even a better predictor of presidential election outcomes than the electorate's relative attraction to the Democratic and Republican candidates as calibrated in National Election Study surveys. The significance of this finding is discussed.


1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Allman

Is there indeed a new or renewed demographic transition? The evidence suggests that there is. A rapidly growing number of countries of diverse cultural background have entered the natality transition since World War II and after a 25-year lapse in such entries. In these countries the transition is moving much faster than it did in Europe. This is probably related to the fact that progress in general is moving much faster in such matters as urbanization, education, health, communication, and often per capita income.


2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Almeida Fonseca ◽  
José Luís Oreiro

O artigo pretende analisar em que medida os modelos neoclássicos de crescimento econômico – mais especificamente, o modelo de Solow (1956, 1957), o modelo de Mankiw, Romer e Weill (1992) e o modelo de Romer (1990) – são capazes de explicar a divergência global nos níveis de renda per capita nos últimos dois séculos e a convergência nos níveis de renda per capita e o catch-up ocorridos entre Europa e Estados Unidos no período do Pós Segunda Guerra Mundial. Com efeito, trata-se de uma confrontação entre teoria e prática, de modo a analisar de que forma tais modelos explicam (ou não) os fatos supramencionados. No trabalho, demonstra-se que a ocorrência dos fatos anteriormente mencionados deveu-se fundamentalmente às diferenças do progresso técnico existente entre as economias (no caso da divergência) e à redução de tais disparidades entre os Estados Unidos e a Europa no período de tempo imediatamente após a 2.a Guerra Mundial (no caso da convergência e do catch-up). Na verdade, tenta-se demonstrar que os modelos apresentados não conseguem explicar satisfatoriamente os fatos ocorridos, sendo válidos apenas em casos específicos. O que o artigo se propõe a expor é que a realidade do crescimento econômico mundial é bastante diferente das conclusões dos modelos neoclássicos considerados. Abstract This work intends to analyze in which way the neoclassical growth models – more specifically, Solow (1956, 1957), Mankiw, Romer and Weill (1992) and Romer (1990) – are capable to explain the global divergence on the levels of per capita income over the last two centuries and the convergence on the levels of per capita income and the catch-up occurred between Europe and the United States after World War II. In fact, it is a confrontation between theory and practice, in order to view in which way these models explain (or not) the above-mentioned facts. During the present work, we demonstrate that the occurrence of these facts were mainly caused by differences on technological progress between economies (case of divergence) and the reduction of such disparities between the United States and Europe on the period of time immediately after World War II (case of convergence and catch-up). In fact, we try to demonstrate that these models are incapable to give a satisfactory explanation to the occurred facts, being only valid on specific cases. The work tries to propose that the reality of global economic growth differs considerably from the conclusions of the considered neoclassical growth models.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Şevket Pamuk

This introductory chapter demonstrates how Turkey's performance in economic growth and human development has been a little above but close to developing-country and world averages. Turkey's political system was opened to greater participation and competition after World War II with the transition to a multiparty system which gave greater voice and power to average citizens. Turkey's formal economic institutions and economic policies also experienced a great deal of change during the last two centuries. The chapter shows that many of these institutional changes were designed to and did lead to increases in per capita income and improvements in human development. The latter part of the chapter provides an overview of the book.


1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bent Hansen

The attempt to estimate per capita income for Egypt from 1886/1887 to 1937, presented in this paper, is part of an effort to evaluate British colonial economic policyduring the period of the British occupation of Egypt. For such an evaluation national income estimates covering the whole period would be very helpful. National income estimates worth the name, however, go back only to 1935–1939, and for years earlier than the 1950s they are of very poor quality. Compared with so many other lessdeveloped countries, Egypt has relatively rich statistics extending backward to the decades before World War I; but they do not really suffice for building up a national income series from either the production or the expenditure side, and from the income side there is hardly any information. In this situation, which both development economists and economic historians know only too well, the problem is how to make maximal use of existing production and expenditure indicators in order to come out with some idea of what per capita income developments may have looked like. Apart from gauging per capita income in Egypt during half a century before World War II, the paper serves more generally to illustrate a methodology that may find application for other countries.


Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex examines how the American military has used cinema and related visual, sonic, and mobile technologies to further its varied aims. The essays in this book address the way cinema was put to work for purposes of training, orientation, record keeping, internal and external communication, propaganda, research and development, tactical analysis, surveillance, physical and mental health, recreation, and morale. The contributors examine the technologies and types of films that were produced and used in collaboration among the military, film industry, and technology manufacturers. The essays also explore the goals of the American state, which deployed the military and its unique modes of filmmaking, film exhibition, and film viewing to various ends. Together, the essays reveal the military’s deep investment in cinema, which began around World War I, expanded during World War II, continued during the Cold War (including wars in Korea and Vietnam), and still continues in the ongoing War on Terror.


1982 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald C. Newton

Between 1933 and the end of World War II, Argentina became the home of some 43,000 Jewish refugees from Nazism, almost all of them of German, Austrian, or West European origin. Measured against the country's total population, 13 million in 1931, 16 million according to the 1947 census, Argentina received more Jewish refugees per capita than any other country in the world except Palestine (Wasserstein, 1979: 7,45). This did not occur by design of the Argentine government; on the contrary, its immigration policies became interestingly restrictive as the years of the world crisis wore on.In practice, however, Argentina was unable to patrol effectively its long borders with the neighboring republics of Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. The overseas consuls of these nations, especially the first three, did a brisk and lucrative trade in visas and entry permits for persons desperate to escape the Nazi terror.


2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Cooper ◽  
R. K. Blashfield

The DSM-I is currently viewed as a psychoanalytic classification, and therefore unimportant. There are four reasons to challenge the belief that DSM-I was a psychoanalytic system. First, psychoanalysts were a minority on the committee that created DSM-I. Second, psychoanalysts of the time did not use DSM-I. Third, DSM-I was as infused with Kraepelinian concepts as it was with psychoanalytic concepts. Fourth, contemporary writers who commented on DSM-I did not perceive it as psychoanalytic. The first edition of the DSM arose from a blending of concepts from the Statistical Manual for the Use of Hospitals of Mental Diseases, the military psychiatric classifications developed during World War II, and the International Classification of Diseases (6th edition). As a consensual, clinically oriented classification, DSM-I was popular, leading to 20 printings and international recognition. From the perspective inherent in this paper, the continuities between classifications from the first half of the 20th century and the systems developed in the second half (e.g. DSM-III to DSM-5) become more visible.


2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1074-1115 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. Huff

This article links the terms of trade, money supply, labor market, and money and credit markets to explore a puzzle in Malayan economic history: why, despite rapid growth and high per capita income, did pre–World War II Malaya industrialize so little? A range of data is drawn together to show how for Malayan manufacturers economic boom was accompanied by precipitate deterioration in the real exchange rate, while in a slump credit contracted sharply and with it the size of the Malayan market for manufactures. Analysis of Malayan experience may be relevant for understanding slight industrialization elsewhere in Southeast Asia.


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