Buddhist Teaching about Illusion

1971 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Hudson

Buddhist teaching about illusion is, I think, generally considered difficult to understand. What I wish to do is to try to indicate some of its more general and prevalent features with the further aim of using them to throw some light on typical Buddhist method and procedure. I shall be concerned mainly with some of the teachings to be found in the Mahayana and will try to be as untechnical as possible. This latter is sure to be displeasing to some, but I have no wish to induce intellectual paralysis either in the reader or myself by a parade of technicalities most of which are not properly translatable into English. A great deal of scholarly and technical work has already been done and now it seems to me important to try as much as possible to express the general sense or pattern or at least some of its features in terms of our own more natural modes of thought and speech. This is what I have tried to do. I should point out that when dealing with the teaching about illusion we are concerned with only the more austere intellectual side of Buddhism. Nevertheless the religious philosophising which we encounter is as much a part of religious practice as meditation and expressing reverence and respect for the Buddha. I have confined myself throughout to exposition and have not attempted discussion and evaluation. References given are to books which are for the most part easily available in English. I will begin with three quotations.

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-36
Author(s):  
Richard Payne

Institute of Buddhist Studies at the Graduate Theological UnionThe Indian religious traditions, including Buddhism, are generally characterised by an understanding of the problematic character of the human condition as ignorance (avidya) instead of sin, as in Christianity.1 The centrality of ignorance in defining the problematic character of the human condition creates a dramatically different religious dynamic—a religious dynamic that is fundamentally concerned with epistemological issues rather than with moral ones. In Indian discussions of the limits of religious knowledge, the shared intellectual framework was the idea of means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). While other religio-philosophic traditions in India accepted testimony (śabda) as an autonomous (i.e., irreducible) means of valid knowledge, Buddhist epistemologists rejected it. Having rejected the idea that testimony is an autonomous means of valid knowledge (śabdapramāṇa), an alternative explanation for the authority of the Buddha had to be created. Against this background of epistemological discussion, particular attention is given here to Dharmakīrti’s views on the authority of the Buddha as a means of valid knowledge regarding the ground of human existence, the path of religious practice, and the goal of awakening.


Buddhism ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie Roebuck

The Buddhist texts known as Dhammapada (Pali) or Dharmapada (Sanskrit and other Indic languages), “Words/Verses of the Teaching,” are collections of wisdom verses, regarded as having been spoken by the Buddha himself. Their equivalents in Mahayanist literature are often called Udānavarga, “Collection of Inspired Utterances [of the Buddha],” effectively a synonymous term. From the large number of versions that are now known, it appears likely that each of the early Buddhist sects had a Dharmapada among its canonical texts. However these different versions are not variations of one original: “Dhammapada” or “Udānavarga” seems to have been more of an idea or template than a single text. Certain characteristics are common to all known versions: the verses are arranged in chapters, each with a key word as title, such as “Pairs,” “Flowers,” or “The Brahmin.” However, they are not necessarily the same chapters, and even when the same titles are used they are not in the same order. Versions vary widely in length, and although there is generally a great deal of overlap in their content, there are many verses that do not occur in every version, or are placed in different chapters in different versions. Some verses or sequences are shared with other canonical Buddhist texts, and indeed with Hindu and Jain texts. Although the various known versions would have belonged to different early Buddhist schools, the differences between them do not seem to reflect doctrinal disagreements. In fact, few of the verses would be controversial to any Buddhist, concerned as they are with the basics of Buddhist teaching. The style is generally simple and straightforward, and clearly aimed at a lay audience as much as at monks and nuns.


Author(s):  
Dan Lusthaus

Yogācāra is one of the two schools of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Its founding is ascribed to two brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, but its basic tenets and doctrines were already in circulation for at least a century before the brothers lived. In order to overcome the ignorance that prevented one from attaining liberation from the karmic rounds of birth and death, Yogācāra focused on the processes involved in cognition. Their sustained attention to issues such as cognition, consciousness, perception and epistemology, coupled with claims such as ‘external objects do not exist’ has led some to misinterpret Yogācāra as a form of metaphysical idealism. They did not focus on consciousness to assert it as ultimately real (Yogācāra claims consciousness is only conventionally real), but rather because it is the cause of the karmic problem they are seeking to eliminate. Yogācāra introduced several important new doctrines to Buddhism, including vijñaptimātra, three self-natures, three turnings of the dharma-wheel and a system of eight consciousnesses. Their close scrutiny of cognition spawned two important developments: an elaborate psychological therapeutic system mapping out the problems in cognition with antidotes to correct them and an earnest epistemological endeavour that led to some of the most sophisticated work on perception and logic ever engaged in by Buddhists or Indians. Although the founding of Yogācāra is traditionally ascribed to two half-brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (fourth–fifth century bc), most of its fundamental doctrines had already appeared in a number of scriptures a century or more earlier, most notably the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Elucidating the Hidden Connections) (third–fourth century bc). Among the key Yogācāra concepts introduced in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra are the notions of ’only-cognition’ (vijñaptimātra), three self-natures (trisvabhāva), warehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna), overturning the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) and the theory of eight consciousnesses. The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra proclaimed its teachings to be the third turning of the wheel of dharma. Buddha lived around sixth–fifth century bc, but Mahāyāna Sūtra did not begin to appear probably until five hundred years later. New Mahāyāna Sūtra continued to be composed for many centuries. Indian Mahāyānists treated these Sūtras as documents which recorded actual discourses of the Buddha. By the third or fourth century a wide and sometimes incommensurate range of Buddhist doctrines had emerged, but whichever doctrines appeared in Sūtras could be ascribed to the authority of Buddha himself. According to the earliest Pāli Sutta, when Buddha became enlightened he turned the wheel of dharma, that is, began to teach the path to enlightenment. While Buddhists had always maintained that Buddha had geared specific teachings to the specific capacities of specific audiences, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra established the idea that Buddha had taught significantly different doctrines to different audiences according to their levels of understanding; and that these different doctrines led from provisional antidotes (pratipakṣa) for certain wrong views up to a comprehensive teaching that finally made explicit what was only implicit in the earlier teachings. In its view, the first two turnings of the wheel – the teachings of the Four Noble Truths in Nikāya and Abhidharma Buddhism and the teachings of the Madhyamaka school, respectively – had expressed the dharma through incomplete formulations that required further elucidation (neyārtha) to be properly understood and thus effective. The first turning, by emphasizing entities (such as dharmas and aggregates) while ’hiding’ emptiness, might lead one to hold a substantialistic view; the second turning, by emphasizing negation while ’hiding’ the positive qualities of the dharma, might be misconstrued as nihilism. The third turning was a middle way between these extremes that finally made everything explicit and definitive (nīthartha). In order to leave nothing hidden, the Yogācārins embarked on a massive, systematic synthesis of all the Buddhist teachings that had preceded them, scrutinizing and evaluating them down to the most trivial details in an attempt to formulate the definitive Buddhist teaching. Stated another way, to be effective all of Buddhism required a Yogācārin reinterpretation. Innovations in abhidharma analysis, logic, cosmology, meditation methods, psychology, philosophy and ethics are among their most important contributions. Asaṅga’s magnum opus, the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), is a comprehensive encyclopedia of Buddhist terms and models, mapped out according to his Yogācārin view of how one progresses along the stages of the path to enlightenment.


Author(s):  
Collett Cox

During the first centuries after the Buddha, with the development of a settled life of scholarly study and religious practice, distinct schools began to emerge within the Buddhist community. In their efforts to organize and understand the Buddha’s traditional teachings, these schools developed a new genre of text, called ‘Abhidharma’, to express their doctrinal interpretations. More importantly, the term ‘Abhidharma’ was also used to refer to the discriminating insight that was not only requisite for the elucidation of doctrine but also indispensable for religious practice: only insight allows one to isolate and remove the causes of suffering. Abhidharma analysis is innovative in both form and content. While earlier Buddhist discourses were colloquial, using simile and anecdotes, Abhidharma texts were in a highly regimented style, using technical language, intricate definitions and complex classifications. The Abhidharma genre also promoted a method of textual exegesis combining scriptural citation and reasoned arguments. In content, the hallmark of Abhidharma is its exhaustive classification of all factors that were thought to constitute experience. Different schools proposed different classifications; for example, one school proposed a system of seventy-five distinct factors classified into five groups, including material form, the mind, mental factors, factors dissociated from material form and mind, and unconditioned factors. These differences led to heated doctrinal debates, the most serious of which concerned the manner of existence of the individual factors and the modes of their conditioning interaction. For example, do the factors actually exist as real entities or do they exist merely as provisional designations? Is conditioning interaction always successive or can cause and effect be simultaneous in the same moment? Other major topics of debate included differing models for mental processes, especially perception.


Author(s):  
John Powers

Buddhist discussions of the body, particularly in South Asia, encode a number of ambiguities and conceptual tensions. A pervasive trope in this literature characterizes bodies as foul, oozing fluids, prone to offensive smells, decaying and causing pain, and as containing a range of disgusting substances within a bag of skin, including urine, feces, mucus, and bile. People are warned of the dangers of emotional investment in their bodies because this leads to inevitable suffering and loss. On the other hand, beautiful bodies are proof of past or present moral cultivation and of success in religious practice. The most exalted bodies—surpassing those of all other beings, even gods—are those of buddhas, and their perfect physiques proclaim their supreme attainments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (7) ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Yan Kuan ◽  

In the historical context of the total disintegration that occurred in Europe between 1920 and 1940, the Russian community abroad was particularly interested in Buddhism and the Buddhist worldview. This is connected with the general pessimistic atmosphere among Russian emigrants. Because of their disillusionment with harsh reality, many of them find consolation in Eastern religion to escape from the whirlwind of earthly existence. Such an unusual phenomenon wasnoticed by the young writer Gaito Gazdanov. The writer described this psychological phenomenon in his fiction. The main purpose of this article is to discover in Gazdanov's characters a psychological mindset closely linked to Buddhism. Accordingly, the aim of the study is to highlight the main characteristics of the Buddhist worldview in Gazdanov's characters, analyse the writer's perception of some Buddhist concepts and examine Gazdanov's attitude to the Buddhist teaching on life and superrealism. The material for the study is the novels An Evening at Clare's and The Return of the Buddha, meaningful in the early and mature periods of the writer's work. The analysis of the «Buddhist text» in Gazdanov's novels reveals a number of psychological traits in the characters that are similar to the category of Buddhism, such as detachment from the major history, deliberate alienation from the real world and dreamlike meditation as the main way of perceiving the world. At the same time, a number of Buddhist concepts, such as metempsychosis and nirvana, become the theme of the writer's work as well. This shows the mystical side of Gazdanov's work. However, the article concludes that the writer also warns of the danger and harm of the nihilism and indifference to life inherent in this Eastern religion, which eventually leads to the disappearance of the personality


Author(s):  
Jørn Borup

Asceticism is a central concept in Buddhism. It is both a constituent ideal and a practice needing to be tamed by institutional religion. This article analyzes Buddhist asceticism as textual ideal and religious practice from an understanding of asceticism as both renunciation (Gavin Flood), and training (Peter Sloterdijk). Influenced by Mary Douglas' group/grid model, a typology is suggested in which both the Buddha legend, historical Buddhism in its various expressions and modern Japanese shugyō and Western mindfulness are placed. It is the article's claim that asceticism is a foundational Buddhist ideal and a practice with significance for the development and societal integration of the religion.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
Nicholas Logan

In this paper, I provide an account of the way in which practices of punitive justice in the United States permanently foreclose the possibility of an open future for the punished. I argue that participation in a system where those forms of punishment are utilized is an act of bad faith because it involves the denial of the existential freedom of others as well as our own. Using Hannah Arendt’s account of Adolf Eichmann I show how such acts of bad faith are both natural modes of thought as well as inherently dangerous. Finally, I demonstrate that existentialism provides us with the ability to recreate our relationship to others and resist acts of bad faith, especially when it comes to crime and punishment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-226
Author(s):  
Guang Xing

AbstractBuddhist scholars like Kenneth Ch'en have argued that the teaching of filial piety was a special feature of Chinese Buddhism as a response to the Chinese culture. Others, among them John Strong and Gregory Schopen, have shown that filial piety was also important in Indian Buddhism, but Strong does not consider it integral to the belief system and Schopen did not find evidence of it in early writings he examined. In this article, through an analysis of early Buddhist resources, the Nikāyas and Āgamas, I demonstrate that the practice of filial piety has been the chief good karma in the Buddhist moral teaching since its inception, although it is not as foundational for Buddhist ethics as it is for Confucian ethics. The Buddha advised people to honor parents as the Brahmā, the supreme god and the creator of human beings in Hinduism, as parents have done much for their children. Hence, Buddhism teaches its followers to pay their debts to parents by supporting and respecting them, actions that are considered the first of all meritorious deeds, or good karma, in Buddhist moral teachings. Moreover, according to the Buddhist teaching of karma, matricide and patricide are considered two of the five gravest bad deeds, and the consequence is immediate rebirth in hell. Mahāyāna Buddhism developed the idea of filial piety further and formulated the four debts to four groups of people—parents, sentient beings, rulers, and Buddhism—a teaching that became very popular in Chinese Buddhism and spread to other East Asian countries.


Author(s):  
John W.M. Krummel

This chapter explicates the philosophy of the body of sixth-century Buddhist thinker Kūkai. Kūkai brings together what initially seem to be opposing concepts: body and emptiness. He does this in the context of formulating a system of cosmology inseparable from religious practice. We interact with the rest of the cosmos through our body. Kūkai characterizes the cosmos in turn as the body of the Buddha, who personifies the embodiment of the dharma. This cosmic body is comprised of myriad bodies through their interactivities, in which we ourselves partake. The interdependence obtains both horizontally (among microcosmic bodies) and vertically (between macrocosm and microcosm). But this interdependent nature of bodies also means emptiness. All bodies are empty of substantiality. Enlightenment is to realize this emptiness of all. An additional factor is language because Kūkai conceives the body as the linguistic medium for communicating that dharma of emptiness.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document