scholarly journals Political Membership in the Contractarian Defense of Cosmopolitanism

2008 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lea Ypi
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Social ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
Sense Of Justice ◽  
Political Membership

AbstractThis article assesses the recent use of contractarian strategies for the justification of cosmopolitan distributive principles. It deals in particular with the cosmopolitan critique of political membership and tries to reject the claim that political communities are arbitrary for the scope of global justice. By focusing on the circumstances of justice, the nature of the parties, the veil of ignorance, and the sense of justice, the article tries to show that the cosmopolitan critique of political membership modifies the contractarian premises in a way that is both unwarranted and unnecessary. While failing to establish principles of global distributive justice, existing cosmopolitan adaptations of the social contract device simply weaken the method's justificatory potential.

BUCHANAN’S NON-COERCIVE ECONOMICS FOR SELF-INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS: ETHICS, SMALL GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Marciano
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Small Groups ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Veil ◽  
State Interventions ◽  
Pro Social Behavior

Market failures, which are usually viewed as a consequence of self-interest, are also supposed to be a major justification for coercive state interventions. This was the view of, among others, Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson, but not of James Buchanan. The latter certainly admitted that individuals are self-interested, that markets fail to allocate resources efficiently, but did not believe in the need for coercion. In this paper, we show that, to Buchanan, coercion can be unnecessary if certain post-constitutional conditions are satisfied. We show that he believed that self-interested individuals voluntarily adopt pro-social behavior in small groups. Small groups or small numbers represent a post-constitutional alternative to the veil of ignorance.

Global (Distributive) Justice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siba Harb
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Domestic Sphere ◽  
Fundamental Interest ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
The Right ◽  
Institutional Order

Most philosophers agree that it is unjust for one’s life prospects to be determined by one’s race, gender, or social class. And most think that there are demanding duties on members of the same political community (co-citizens) to reduce inequalities that track these features of individuals. But philosophers strongly disagree about how to evaluate inequalities that track the country one is born in. Are global inequalities (inequalities among individuals living in different countries) as problematic and for the same reasons as domestic inequalities (inequalities among co-citizens)? The question of whether egalitarian principles of distributive justice extend globally, beyond the domestic sphere, has been the central question in the debate on global distributive justice. Statists argue that there is something normatively significant about the state, but not the global institutional order, which grounds one’s concerns with domestic inequalities, but not global inequalities. Global egalitarians argue that global inequalities are as unjust to the same extent and for the same reasons as domestic inequalities. The disagreement between both camps can be traced back to different normative, empirical, and methodological assumptions. Statists and global egalitarians can, however, converge on a number of important issues, and the debate can be advanced beyond the stalemate it has reached by investigating these issues of convergence. Significantly, statists can agree with global egalitarians that global justice requires equality of concern (the requirement that interests of all individuals have equal weight), and global egalitarians have reasons to take states seriously to the extent that having a world of states (or multiple political communities) can be shown to be compatible with the requirement of equal concern. Thus, it is important to work out whether individuals have a fundamental interest in being members of political communities, how that interest compares to their interests in opportunities, income, and wealth, and which institutional arraignments can advance these interests according to the right balance.

Decent Reasoning

2020 ◽  
pp. 213-234
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Relative Deprivation ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Social Contract Theory ◽  
Empirical Method ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Professional Career ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Set Up

For much of his professional career, Barry was not a contract theorist, and he relies on a number of elements from Scanlon’s construction. His general approach is built on a distinction he sees in theories of justice between those that rely on the idea that justice is agreement to mutual advantage and those that rely on the idea that justice is a matter of impartiality. His own theory is impartialist, but dispenses with the device of the veil of ignorance. Instead the contracting parties are assumed to reason with one another about the constitutional terms of their association, and all are allowed to veto proposals if those proposals and unreasonable. Unreasonable proposals are those that fail the test of avoiding absolute deprivation, relative deprivation, or failing to make provision for public goods. His anticipated theory of economic justice never materialized, and his derivation of a Rawlsian difference principle is only partially successful. However, it is possible to use the practical syllogism in a Barry set-up to derive a case for social insurance. More importantly, his principle contribution to social contract theory is his sketch of the empirical method, a method on which the future of social contract theory can be built.

Justice Across Borders

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Blake
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Arena ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines how philosophical concepts of distributive justice ought to be applied at the global level. There has been a great deal of philosophical interest in this topic in recent years, and the field has quickly grown to include some sophisticated analyses of how we might think about global distributive justice. This chapter examines this field, and argues that it must become more sophisticated still in order to adequately deal with the complexities of the global arena. In particular, the article argues that we have reason to examine more precisely the nature of global institutions—what powers they actually have, and what it is that they might plausibly hope to become—as a key focus of our philosophical analysis. The relationship between political and distributive justice, in particular, ought to be made a particular focus in our efforts to understand the nature of global justice.

scholarly journals A Boundedly Rational Analysis of Global Distributive Justice

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Alexandru Volacu ◽  
Iris-Patricia Golopenta
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Identification Problem ◽  
Rational Analysis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Complete Failure ◽  
Justice Theories ◽  
National Governments

In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.

Neoliberalism versus distributional autonomy: the skipped step in rawls’s the law of peoples

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Matthew R. Schrepfer
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Minimum Degree ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
The Law

AbstractDebates about global distributive justice focus on the gulf between the wealthy North and the impoverished South, rather than on issues arising between liberal democracies. A review of John Rawls’s approach to international justice discloses a step Rawls skipped in his extension of his original-position procedure. The skipped step is where a need for the distributional autonomy of sovereign liberal states reveals itself. Neoliberalism denies the possibility and the desirability of distributional autonomy. A complete Rawlsian account of global justice shows the necessity and possibility of a charter between liberal states, assuring each a proper minimum degree of distributional autonomy

Global Distributive Justice: An Egalitarian Perspective

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Basic Needs ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Thomas Pogge ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
National Boundaries

A good deal of political theory over the last fifteen years or so has been shaped by the realization that one cannot, and ought not, consider the distribution of resources within a country in isolation from the distribution of resources between countries. Thus, thinkers such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge advocate extensive global distributive policies; others, such as Charles Jones and David Miller, explicitly reject the view that egalitarian principles of justice should apply globally and claim that national communities have only duties to help other countries be viable economically and meet the basic needs of their members. In the global justice debate, pretty much all parties acknowledge that we have obligations of distributive justice to for-eigners. The question is how strong those obligations are, and in particular whether national boundaries can make any difference to the distribution of resources between members of different countries.

The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayelet Shachar
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Intergenerational Transmission ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Place Of Birth ◽  
Birthright Citizenship ◽  
Gate Keeping ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
Political Membership

In today’s world, one’s place of birth and one’s parentage are — by law — relevant to, and often conclusive of, one’s access to membership in a particular political community. Birthright citizenship largely shapes the allocation of membership entitlement itself (the "gate-keeping" or demos-demarcation function of citizenship). But no less significantly, it also distributes opportunity unequally (the "wealthpreserving" function of citizenship). This makes citizenship a matter of inherited entitlement. In a world in which membership in different political communities translates into very different starting points in life, upholding this legal connection between birth, political membership, and life opportunities raises important questions of distributive justice. These questions are particularly pressing given that the vast majority of the world’s population — 97 out of every 100 people — acquire political membership via circumstances beyond their control, that is, according to where and to whom they were born. While we find vibrant debates in the literature about the legitimacy of citizenship’s demos-demarcation function, the perpetuation of unequal starting points through intergenerational transmission of membership has largely escaped scrutiny. It is this omission that this Article aims to address.

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