Innocent Passage in the Arctic

Author(s):  
A. Donat Pharand

The Arctic Regions have been a fascinating subject of study for a long time, mainly because of man’s strong desire to conquer the unknown. The military interest in those regions did not develop until recent years. With the straining of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II, the strategic significance of the Arctic soon became very real. This significance was appreciably diminished with the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles but the more recent development of the nuclear missile-launching submarine has given the Arctic waters a new military importance. Of course, nuclear submarines could also be of considerable commercial interest. By borrowing the Arctic Ocean, merchant submarines could drastically shorten some of the present maritime trading routes. The exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic regions is already in process of giving new commercial meaning to the old Northwest and Northeast Passages. In the circumstances, an inquiry into the legal regime of the Arctic waters is timely. Two basic principles of the law of the sea are involved: the right of innocent passage, and the freedom of the seas. The present study will concentrate on the right of innocent passage. An investigation will be made into the legal status of the Arctic waters constituting what is commonly known as the Northwest Passage, on the North American side of the Pole, and the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route on the Soviet side. The basic question is whether or not the right of free and innocent passage in favour of foreign ships applies to those waters.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon C. Halaychik

The Russian Federations drive to reestablish itself as a global power has severe security implications for the United States, its Arctic neighbors, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole. The former Commander of United States Naval Forces Europe Admiral Mark Ferguson noted that the re-militarization of Russian security policy in the Arctic is one of the most significant developments in the twenty-first century adding that Russia is creating an “Arc of steel from the Arctic to the Mediterranean” (Herbst 2016, 166). Although the Russian Federation postulates its expansion into the Arctic is for purely economic means, the reality of the military hardware being placed in the region by the Russians tells otherwise. Implementation of military hardware such as anti-air defenses is contrary to the stipulated purposes of the Russian Government in the region. Therefore is the Russian Federation building strategic military bases in the Arctic to challenge the United States hegemony due to the mistreatment against the Russians by the United States and NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Marina Minina ◽  

The similarity of the regions of the Russian Arctic and the state of Alaska in the United States in the climate, geographical and geopolitical terms is obvious. However, at the same time there are many differences, in many ways determining the level and quality of life of the population of these territories. The historical retrospective of the development of Siberian and northern lands development by the Russian people, who reached the strait between Asia and America and colonized part of the territory of North America, about the successful beginning and end of this "company" stretching for two centuries, some understanding of the need to develop new lands for the Russian man individually and the state as a whole, the article refers. Considering the situation of modern Russia and the United States of America in terms of the sustainable development of the northern, Arctic regions of both countries, an attempt is made to find possible ways to improve the financial situation of the indigenous peoples of the North and the non-native inhabitants of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation by comparing constitutional approaches to socio-economic development and the area of environmental management of the Russian and American Arctic.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 165-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew E. Harrod

Austria emerged in 1955 from a ten-year occupation administered by the four major powers of the successful anti-Third Reich coalition of World War II—France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as a united, independent state. The 15 May 1955 State Treaty signed by these countries and Austria spared Austria the fate of Cold War division suffered by Austria's neighbor to the north (in the ultimate East-West breakdown of Germany's parallel postwar quadripartite occupation). Paving the way for Austria's good fortune was a political quid pro quo agreed between Austrian leaders and their Soviet counterparts in Moscow the previous April. In the 15 April 1955 Moscow Memorandum, Austria consented to becoming a permanently neutral state modeled on Switzerland. This neutrality precluded a possible Austrian membership in NATO in exchange for a long-delayed Soviet assent to an end of Austria's occupation regime with a concomitant abandonment of the Soviet occupation zone and the withdrawal of all occupation troops. After the completion of this withdrawal, a fully sovereign Austria made good on its pledge with the passage on 26 October 1955 of a constitutional law declaring Austria to be “permanently neutral” and foreswearing all military alliances.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 688-700
Author(s):  
Dr. Maitham Abdul Kuder Jabbar

Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the island of Malta has represented one of the most important countries and islands allied to Britain in the Mediterranean basin, after it extended its influence to it, and made it one of the strategic military bases in its expansionist policy and for many centuries, and after World War II and the emergence of the so-called socialist and capitalist camps or It is also expressed in the eastern camp represented by the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union, and the western camp represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization led by the United States of America and its ally Britain, and with the increase in the importance of the Middle East region, and the flow of oil in it in commercial quantities, the importance of the island of Malta for Britain has increased, so it sought with all its diplomatic efforts To conclude a set of military agreements, alliances and treaties, and as a result of the importance of these agreements in directing the compass of Britain’s foreign policy, we had the desire to discuss the topic (British-Maltese relations in light of the bilateral military agreement 1971). The subject of the research was divided into an introduction and two sections. In the introduction, we discussed briefly the British control of the important sea lanes, which represented one of its strategic goals, and how it imposed its control over those lanes for many centuries. As for the first topic, it was due to the research necessity of several axes. The first axis was discussed The most important reasons that prompted the Maltese government to sign the bilateral military agreement with Britain, and one of the most prominent of those reasons was the political and social role of the Roman Catholic Church, and then economic factors and their impact on the signing of the agreement, and with regard to the second axis, it was about the signing of the bilateral military agreement in July 1971. The third axis discussed the terms of the agreement, which were in its entirety in the interest of the Maltese government, and the second topic talked about the position of the NATO countries on that agreement, especially the British government and the American administration.


Author(s):  
James I. Matray

On June 25, 1950, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea ignited a conventional war that had origins dating from at least the end of World War II. In April 1945, President Harry S. Truman abandoned a trusteeship plan for postwar Korea in favor of seeking unilateral U.S. occupation of the peninsula after an atomic attack forced Japan’s prompt surrender. Soviet entry into the Pacific war led to a last minute agreement dividing Korea at the 38th parallel into zones of occupation. Two Koreas emerged after Soviet-American negotiations failed to agree on a plan to end the division. Kim Il Sung in the north and Syngman Rhee in the south both were determined to reunite Korea, instigating major military clashes at the parallel in the summer of 1949. Moscow and Washington opposed their clients’ invasion plans until April 1950 when Kim persuaded Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin that with mass support in South Korea, he would achieve a quick victory. At first, Truman hoped that South Korea could defend itself with more military equipment and U.S. air support. Commitment of U.S. ground forces came after General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. occupation commander in Japan, visited the front and advised that the South Koreans could not halt the advance. Overconfident U.S. soldiers would sustain defeat as well, retreating to the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula. On September 15, MacArthur staged a risky amphibious landing at Inchon behind enemy lines that sent Communist forces fleeing back into North Korea. The People’s Republic of China viewed the U.S. offensive for reunification that followed as a threat to its security and prestige. In late November, Chinese “volunteers” attacked in mass. After a chaotic retreat, U.S. forces counterattacked in February 1951 and moved the line of battle just north of the parallel. After two Chinese offensives failed, negotiations to end the war began in July 1951, but stalemated in May 1952 over the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. Peace came because of Stalin’s death in March 1953, rather than President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s veiled threat to stage nuclear strikes against China. Scholars have disagreed about many issues surrounding the Korean War, but the most important debate continues to center on whether the conflict had international or domestic origins. Initially, historians relied mainly on U.S. government publications to write accounts that ignored events prior to North Korea’s attack, endorsing an orthodox interpretation assigning blame to the Soviet Union and applauding the U.S. response. Declassification of U.S. government documents and presidential papers during the 1970s led to the publication of studies assigning considerable responsibility to the United States for helping to create a kind of war in Korea before June 1950. Moreover, left revisionist writers labeled the conflict a classic civil war. Release of Chinese and Soviet sources after 1989 established that Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong approved the North Korean invasion, prompting right revisionist scholars to reassert key orthodox arguments. This essay describes how and why recent access to Communist documents has not settled the disagreements among historians about the causes, course, and consequences of the Korean War.


1977 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules R. Benjamin

By early 1933 President Roosevelt's advisors concluded that the United States Government would have to play a direct role in the Cuban economy. That nation, economically dependent upon the North American sugar market and politically dependent through the Platt amendment that gave the United States the right to intervene in its internal affairs, was economically prostrate and on the verge of civil war. The United States proceeded to abandon both the free trade and protectionist doctrines that had divided the President's advisors for a program that structurally integrated United States-Cuban trade and employed federal funds to support cooperative Cuban leaders. All of this, Professor Benjamin believes, foreshadowed the massive foreign trade and lending programs so common to American foreign policy after World War II.


1979 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 402-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Tynan

Wallace K. Ferguson, the noted Renaissance scholar, once wrote that history must be seen through the eyes of the one writing it. He went on to say that, “since history is in this sense created by the historian, and he, in turn, is the product of his age and environment, history varies from generation to generation and must be constantly reinterpreted.” It is with this thought in mind that we will undertake a reexamination of the role of the Arctic in Canadian-American relations.In recent years the Arctic has become a region of growing significance for both the United States and Canada after decades of marginal interest bordering on neglect. It is this article's position that Canadian foreign policy, concerning the Arctic regions to the north of her mainland, has consistently from 1880 to 1970 been based upon a perception of potential threats, which in fact never existed. Furthermore, such a perception has been based in part upon the unsettled nature of international law in the Arctic and the effect of certain environmental factors, labeled as domestic sources of foreign policy in Dale Thomson and Roger Swanson's Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives. The article, then, shows how Canadian foreign policy in this issue-area illustrates the Sprout's paradigm of perception in decision-making. According to this paradigm, “what matters in policymaking (and, of course, in analysis thereof) is how the human policymaker (or group) perceives, interprets and responds to the environing conditions and events.”


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 574-578

CouncilOn July 16, the Council of the North Adantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its seventeenth ministerial session in Paris under the chairmanship of Stephanos Stephanopolos, Foreign Minister of Greece. According to press reports, the session had been arranged to provide an opportunity for the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to exchange views with their NATO colleagues prior to the Geneva Conference. The one-day meeting agreed that the unification of Germany was the issue of primary importance to be discussed at Geneva. Nothing should be done to prejudice the ultimate uniting of Germany by free elections or its right to choose its own foreign policy when unified. Following the remarks of Mr. Spaak, it was agreed that the defense system built around the Adantic coalition was not negotiable, and that the NATO system should not be subject to discussion with die Soviet Union. Germany should remain in this system whatever new agreement on arms limitations might be reached, and a united Germany should have the right to adhere to the system if it so chose. Mr. Spaak urged that the two sides should agree at Geneva not to increase their forces rather than try to agree on immediate major reductions in armaments.


2020 ◽  
pp. 114-139
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz

With the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese taking all of Indochina, Roosevelt prepared the country for war and began to implement his grand strategy for victory. The president implemented his expansive vision of the Monroe Doctrine to allow naval escorts of lend-lease supplies across the North Atlantic, extended American aid to Russia, creating the Grand Alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and joined with London in enumerating Western war aims through the adoption of the Atlantic Charter. At the same time, he extended the economic embargo against Japan to include oil, bringing the final break in relations with Tokyo. By the fall 1941, the U.S. Navy was engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic with German submarines. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 brought the United States directly into World War II.


Author(s):  
Alan K. Rode

During the height of World War II, Curtiz directed Mission to Moscow (1943), the most controversial film of his career. The wartime alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the United States motivated President Roosevelt to personally request the brothers Warner to produce this film. It was based on the best-selling “diary” of a former Soviet ambassador and F.D.R. intimate, Joseph Davies, and the Warners and Curtiz believed that they were supporting the war effort. Davies, however, exercised both script approval and the power of the White House in shaping the film into an absurdly biased tribute to Stalin and the Soviet Union. Although the finished film had minimal influence on public opinion, it fueled the creation of the right-wing Motion Picture Alliance and the postwar HUAC witch hunt.Curtiz pivoted to direct the Irving Berlin musical revue This Is the Army, which became his most financially successful Warner picture; Harry and Jack Warner donated all of the considerable profits to the Army Emergency Relief Fund.He also directed Passage to Marseille, a problem-wracked failure, and Janie, an adolescent drama that was a box-office hit.


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