The New Deal, Cuba, and the Rise of a Global Foreign Economic Policy

1977 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules R. Benjamin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy ◽  
Direct Role ◽  
The North ◽  
Sugar Market ◽  
The Right

By early 1933 President Roosevelt's advisors concluded that the United States Government would have to play a direct role in the Cuban economy. That nation, economically dependent upon the North American sugar market and politically dependent through the Platt amendment that gave the United States the right to intervene in its internal affairs, was economically prostrate and on the verge of civil war. The United States proceeded to abandon both the free trade and protectionist doctrines that had divided the President's advisors for a program that structurally integrated United States-Cuban trade and employed federal funds to support cooperative Cuban leaders. All of this, Professor Benjamin believes, foreshadowed the massive foreign trade and lending programs so common to American foreign policy after World War II.

Anglo-american policy in Greece (1946-50)

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spero Simeon Zachary Paravantes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Early Years ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Dramatic Shift ◽  
Current Financial Crisis ◽  
Post War

While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-American foreign policy in the pre and early years of the Cold War, the role thatperception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became acentral focus. From this point came the realization of a general lack of emphasisand research into the ways in which the British government managed to convincethe United States government to assume support for worldwide British strategicobjectives. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation.This work attempts to provide a new analysis of the role that the British played in the dramatic shift in American foreign policy from 1946 to 1950. Toachieve this shift (which also included support of British strategic interests in theEastern Mediterranean) this dissertation argues that the British used Greece, first asa way to draw the United States further into European affairs, and then as a way toanchor the United States in Europe, achieving a guarantee of security of theEastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe.To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British andAmerican documents relating to Greece from 1946 to 1950 in an attempt to clearlyexplain how these nations made and implemented policy towards Greece duringthis crucial period in history. In so doing it also tries to explain how Americanforeign policy in general changed from its pre-war focus on non-intervention, to the American foreign policy to which the world has become accustomed since 1950. To answer these questions, I, like the occupying (and later intervening)powers did, must use Greece as an example. In this, I hope that I may be forgivensince unlike them, I intend not to make of it one. My objectives for doing so lie notin justifying policy, but rather in explaining it. This study would appear to havespecial relevance now, not only for the current financial crisis which has placedGreece once again in world headlines, but also for the legacy of the Second WorldWar and the post-war strife the country experienced which is still playing out todaywith examples like the Distomo massacre, German war reparations and on-goingsocial, academic and political strife over the legacy of the Greek Civil War.

The connection between the «color revolutions» and the strategic doctrines of the United States (late 20th century — 2014)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Igorevna Filimonova
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Late 20Th Century ◽  
The Us ◽  
Color Revolutions ◽  
The Right

After the collapse of the USSR, fundamentally new phenomena appeared on the world arena, which became a watershed separating the bipolar order from the monopolar order associated with the establishment of the US global hegemony. Such phenomena were the events that are most often called «revolutions» in connection with the scale of the changes being made — «velvet revolutions» in the former Eastern Bloc, as well as revolutions of a different type, which ended in a change in the current regimes with such serious consequences that we are also talking about revolutionary transformations. These are technologies of «color revolutions» that allow organizing artificial and seemingly spontaneous mass protests leading to the removal of the legitimate government operating in the country and, in fact, to the seizure of power by a pro-American forces that ensure the Westernization of the country and the implementation of "neoliberal modernization", which essentially means the opening of national markets and the provision of natural resources for the undivided use of the Western factor (TNC and TNB). «Color revolutions» are inseparable from the strategic documents of the United States, in which, from the end of the 20th century, even before the collapse of the USSR, two main tendencies were clearly traced: the expansion of the right to unilateral use of force up to a preemptive strike, which is inextricably linked with the ideological justification of «missionary» American foreign policy, and the right to «assess» the internal state of affairs in countries and change it to a «democratic format», that is, «democratization». «Color revolutions», although they are not directly mentioned in strategic documents, but, being a «technical package of actions», straightforwardly follow from the right, assigned to itself by Washington, to unilateral use of force, which is gradually expanding from exclusively military actions to a comprehensive impact on an opponent country, i.e. essentially a hybrid war. Thus, the «color revolutions» clearly fit into the strategic concept of Washington on the use of force across the entire spectrum (conventional and unconventional war) under the pretext of «democratization». The article examines the period of registration and expansion of the US right to use force (which, according to the current international law, is a crime without a statute of limitations) in the time interval from the end of the twentieth century until 2014, filling semantic content about the need for «democratic transformations» of other states, with which the United States approached the key point of the events of the «Arab spring» and «color revolutions» in the post-Soviet space, the last and most ambitious of which was the «Euromaidan» in Ukraine in 2014. The article presents the material for the preparation of lectures and seminars in the framework of the training fields «International Relations» and «Political Science».

The political economy of international shipping: Europe versus America

1985 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan W. Cafruny
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Shipping ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
The North ◽  
Political Challenge ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Theory Of Hegemonic Stability

The political challenge to the post-World War II order in shipping has been issued in the context of the North-South debate, but American power and interest are central to current developments. In the bulk and tanker sector the United States retains a strong interest in stability and successfully defends the existing order. In the liner sector, on the other hand, the United States has participated in recent assaults on the postwar order, producing great tension between Europe and America. There is a strong correlation between this growing maritime conflict and the political processes anticipated by the general theory of hegemonic stability. But “hegemony” and “power” are distinct concepts. Instability in international shipping arises neither from America's loss of power in shipping nor from challenges from Europe and the Third World. Rather, instability reflects American attempts to establish a closer identity between the existing regime and short-term national interest.

The God of the Internet

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Goldsmith ◽  
Tim Wu
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Critical Time ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Government ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Human Operators ◽  
The Right ◽  
E Mail

If you had met Jon Postel in 1998, you might have been surprised to learn that you were in the presence of one of the Internet’s greatest living authorities. He had a rambling, ragged look, living in sandals and a large, unkempt beard. He lived like a modern-day Obi-Wan Kenobi, an academic hermit who favored solitary walks on the Southern California beach. When told once by a reporter that readers were interested in learning more about his personal life, he answered: “If we tell them, they won’t be interested anymore.” Yet this man was, and had been for as long as anyone could remember, the ultimate authority for assignment of the all-important Internet Protocol (IP) numbers that are the essential feature of Internet membership. Like the medallions assigned to New York City taxicabs, each globally unique number identifies a computer on the Net, determining who belongs and who doesn’t. “If the Net does have a God,” wrote the Economist in 1997, “he is probably Jon Postel.” Jon Postel was a quiet man who kept strong opinions and sometimes acted in surprising ways. The day of January 28, 1998, provided the best example. On that day Postel wrote an e-mail to the human operators of eight of the twelve “name servers” around the globe. Name servers are the critical computers that are ultimately responsible for making sure that when you type a name like google.com you reach the right address (123.23.83.0). On that day Postel asked the eight operators, all personally loyal to Postel, to recognize his computer as the “root,” or, in essence, the master computer for the whole Internet. The operators complied, pointing their servers to Postel’s computer instead of the authoritative root controlled by the United States government. The order made the operators nervous—Paul Vixie, one of the eight, quietly arranged to have someone look after his kids in case he was arrested. Postel was playing with fire. His act could have divided the Internet’s critical naming system into two gigantic networks, one headed by himself, the other headed by the United States. He engineered things so that the Internet continued to run smoothly. But had he wanted to during this critical time, he might have created chaos.

scholarly journals The United States, Britain and the Marshall Plan: oil and finance in the early postwar era*

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 355-373
Author(s):  
Nicholas Miller Trebat
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Oil Industry ◽  
The United States ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy

Abstract This paper discusses United States foreign economic policy in the early post-World War II period, focusing on Anglo-American relations and the international oil industry. Contrary to popular opinion, these relations were not friendly, as one of the goals of US policymakers was to force the former power to relinquish key areas of strategic and commercial influence, such as the trading networks of the British Commonwealth and, more importantly, the oil regions of the Middle East. In particular, the paper analyzes US oil policy during the Marshall Plan. Though not questioning the Plan’s overall positive impact on European economic growth, the paper argues that, with regard to the oil industry, its primary objective was not to stimulate recovery but to secure a dominant role for US producers in the Middle East.

The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michla Pomerance
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Puerto Rican ◽  
The United States ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
World War ◽  
Cultural Autonomy ◽  
Conflicting Demands ◽  
The Right

Ever since the principle of self-determination entered the lexicon of international politics during World War I, American foreign policymakers have had to contend with problems revolving around that concept. The need to favor one or another claimant, each waving the banner of self-determination and invoking the “right to determine its own fate,” continues to present dilemmas, often extremely troubling ones, for U.S. decisionmakers. Examples from recent history come readily to mind. The entire post-World War II decolonization process entailed an endless series of such dilemmas, and even after formal decolonization was all but completed, such nagging issues as Katanga, Biafra, and Eritrea remained, not to mention the problems of South Africa, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Indochina. Indeed, even within America’s own imperial domain, the United States was faced with the conflicting demands of the Puerto Rican nationalists and the majority of the Puerto Rican electorate, the claims of the Marianas as against those of Micronesia as a whole, and demands for cultural autonomy on the part of diverse ethnic groups.

Foreign Economic Aid

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey F. Taffet
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Political Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Economic Assistance ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Economic Aid ◽  
Aid Programs ◽  
The Impact

In the first half of the 20th century, and more actively in the post–World War II period, the United States government used economic aid programs to advance its foreign policy interests. US policymakers generally believed that support for economic development in poorer countries would help create global stability, which would limit military threats and strengthen the global capitalist system. Aid was offered on a country-by-country basis to guide political development; its implementation reflected views about how humanity had advanced in richer countries and how it could and should similarly advance in poorer regions. Humanitarianism did play a role in driving US aid spending, but it was consistently secondary to political considerations. Overall, while funding varied over time, amounts spent were always substantial. Between 1946 and 2015, the United States offered almost $757 billion in economic assistance to countries around the world—$1.6 trillion in inflation-adjusted 2015 dollars. Assessing the impact of this spending is difficult; there has long been disagreement among scholars and politicians about how much economic growth, if any, resulted from aid spending and similar disputes about its utility in advancing US interests. Nevertheless, for most political leaders, even without solid evidence of successes, aid often seemed to be the best option for constructively engaging poorer countries and trying to create the kind of world in which the United States could be secure and prosperous.

scholarly journals German Question in the Foreign Policy Strategy of the USA in the Second Half of the 1940s – 1980s

2020 ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Dmytro Lakishyk
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
German Question ◽  
The Usa

The article examines US policy towards West Germany after World War II, covering a historical span from the second half of the 1940s to the 1980s. It was US policy in Europe, and in West Germany in particular, that determined the dynamics and nature of US-German relations that arose on a long-term basis after the formation of Germany in September 1949. One of the peculiarities of US-German relations was the fact that both partners found themselves embroiled in a rapidly escalating international situation after 1945. The Cold War, which broke out after the seemingly inviolable Potsdam Accords, forced the United States and Germany to be on one side of the conflict. Despite the fact that both states were yesterday’s opponents and came out of the war with completely different, at that time, incomparable, statuses. A characteristic feature of US policy on the German question in the postwar years was its controversial evolution. The American leadership had neither a conceptual plan for development, nor a clear idea of Germany’s place in the world, nor an idea of how to plan the country’s future. However, the deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR and the birth of the two blocs forced the US government to resort to economic revival (the Marshall Plan) and military-political consolidation of Western Europe and Germany (NATO creation). US policy toward Germany has been at the heart of its wider European policy. The United States favored a strong and united Western Europe over American hegemony, trying to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. Joint participation in the suppression of communism, however, could not prevent the periodic exacerbation of relations between the United States and Germany, and at the same time did not lead to an unconditional follow-up of the West Germans in the fairway of American foreign policy.

Accord de coopération dans l'Arctique entre le Canada et les États-Unis d'Amérique

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 345-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
François-Antoine Mathys
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Prevention Act ◽  
The Right

SummaryThe Arctic Cooperation Agreement signed at Ottawa on January 11, 1988 deals strictly with movements of United States government-owned or government-operated icebreakers. In future, the United States will seek Canada's prior consent for each and every transit of United States icebreakers through the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. The Agreement provides Canada with more effective control over the waters of the Arctic archipelago than it had at the time of the Polar Sea voyage through the Northwest Passage in 1985. The Agreement does not resolve the legal dispute between Canada and the United States over the status of the Canadian Arctic waters. It does not affect the legal position of either country. Canada takes the view that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal waters by virtue of historic title. The United States, on the other hand, takes the position that these Arctic waters are international straits subject to the right of innocent passage or the right of transit passage. The Agreement does not cover the movements of U.S. naval vessels, including submarines, which are in accordance with Alliance commitments and relevant bilateral arrangements. U.S. (and other foreign flag) commercial vessels operating in Canadian Arctic waters have to conform, as in the past, with the provisions of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and other relevant laws and regulations.

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