The Italian Yearbook of International Law

Author(s):  
R. W. Ianni

To the impressive list of Italian periodicals on international law led by the prestigious Rivista di Diritto Internazionale there has now been added The Italian Yearbook of International Law, published exclusively in English. Italian scholars have made a very significant contribution to doctrinal developments in international law; however, some of their work has gone unnoticed because Italian is not among the languages in widespread use in international law circles. In addition, Italian scholarship has suffered somewhat from what some consider to be an overly theoretical or abstract approach to the subject matter. While it is always a noteworthy occasion to welcome a new member into the family of international law yearbooks, the advent of the Italian yearbook is particularly noteworthy, contributing as it does to the accessibility of a broad range of material and learned comment. It is appropriate, therefore, that the first issues of The Italian Yearbook of International Law receive extended comment in the pages of this Yearbook.

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Tomáš Gábriš ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Abstract The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.


1942 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 614-620
Author(s):  
William Marion Gibson

In explaining the nature of international law, each of the two major schools of thought draws upon legal philosophy and practice for evidence in support of its interpretation. It is not the purpose of this note to offer any conclusions or proofs as to the validity of the reasoning of one or the other of the two schools. It would require more than the subject-matter here considered to prove the “Monist” position, or to detract from that of the “Dualist.” However, inasmuch as state practice is one of the guides to the resolution of the debate on the nature of international law, it is hoped that an explanation of the attitude of the Colombian Supreme Court concerning the relationship of pacta to the national constitution and legislation of that state may merit mention.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-489
Author(s):  
Haris Jamil

Abstract The arbitral award in The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India) brings to the fore the issue of assigning a name to a case. To contextualise India’s contention regarding the name, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, in this article, I outline the law and practice regarding assigning names to cases by different international judicial bodies (ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and PCA). Examining India’s objection to the name, I argue that the name of the case does not capture the subject matter of the dispute accurately and emanates from the mainstream view of international law. The name prioritises an Italian flagged vessel, owned by a company engaged in international commerce and navigating under the protection of the Italian navy, over a fishing vessel owned by private individuals. The name reinforces a state-centric view of international law in which the victims of the incident do not picture.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
AKBAR RASULOV

AbstractA certain body of mythology has emerged in recent years around Martti Koskenniemi's From Apology to Utopia (FATU). At its heart lies a group of received wisdoms that tell us that FATU should essentially be considered a work of postmodern scholarship, that it provides a typical illustration of the so-called deconstructivist approach, and that its single most significant contribution to the field of international legal theory lies in its discussion of the subject of legal indeterminacy. In this article, I seek to challenge and displace this set of narratives, by excavating and restoring to the surface FATU's original intellectual project: a highly ambitious attempt to revive the traditional enterprise of ‘legal science’ by marrying Kelsenian legal positivism with Saussurean structuralist semiotics. In doing so, it succeeded in developing a set of analytical idioms and reasoning protocols that gave the international law profession not only a reason but also the necessary intellectual materials to revolutionize its day to day understanding of the essential character of international legal practice. Thus, far from being a manifestation of any kind of postmodernist sensibility, FATU, I am going to argue, represents, in fact, the exact opposite of it.


Author(s):  
Torremans Paul

This chapter examines the distinction between movables and immovables under English private international law. The first task of the court in a private international law case when required to rule on the question of a proprietary or possessory nature is to decide whether the item of property in dispute is movable or immovable. The legal system that will be applicable to the case depends on this preliminary decision. This chapter first considers the classification of the subject matter of ownership into movables and immovables by the law of the situs before looking at some examples relating to mortgages, trusts for sale, and annuities. It also discusses the relevance of the distinction between realty and personalty and concludes by explaining the distinction between tangible and intangible movables.


Author(s):  
C. H. Alexandrowicz

This chapter considers problems in the study of the history of the law of nations in Asia. It argues that international lawyers have focused their attention on the legal aspects of contemporary problems of international relations and politics, and on the operation of tribunals and quasi-tribunals and the case law they produce. Writers of present day treatises of international law devote just a few introductory pages to the history of the subject and these short chapters are often based on similar introductions in nineteenth-century treatises. The chapter discusses some of the elements of legal change in which European–Asian relations played a significant role; the gradual elimination of the natural law outlook by growing European positivism; the principle of universality of the law of nations and the principle of identity of de facto and de jure State sovereignty; and the use of capitulations to delay the ‘entry’ of Asian States into the family of nations.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Charles Moorhouse ◽  
David Abrahams

The purpose of this article is to put forward submissions regarding the implementation of a weapons review process in compliance of South Africa’s obligations under Additional Protocol I (hereinafter “API”) Article 36. Article 36 requires each state party to determine whether the employment of any new weapon, means or method of warfare that it studies, develops, acquires or adopts would, insome or all circumstances, be prohibited by international law. Article 36 does not specify how such a legal review should be implemented or conducted. Thus this article puts forward proposals regarding both the substantive and procedural aspectsof a review of the legality of weapons, means and methods of warfare that the authors submit best befits the South African context.A background regarding the legal limitations placed upon the use of certain weapons, means and methods of warfare and an explanation of South Africa’s obligations regarding national implementation of a weapons review process, is given in paragraph 1 so as to create an understanding as to why it is necessary for the Republic of South Africa to implement a process to review the legality of weapons, means and methods of warfare. Before the implementation of a weapons review process can be discussed, the subject matter of such a review must first be ascertained. Thus paragraph 2 contains a discussion regarding the definition of the term “weapons, means and methods of warfare” and a determination of which weapons shall form the subject matter of legal reviews. No specific manner of implementation is contained within API and thus it is at the discretion of the state in question, in this case South Africa, to adopt the necessary measures to implement this obligation. In this regard, paragraph 3 contains submissions regarding the status of the review body within the state hierarchy and its method of establishment. This paragraph also contains an explanation of the process by which South Africa acquires its weapons. The legal scope of the review process is dealt with in paragraph 4. Within thisparagraph, the place of both treaty-based law and customary international law (“CIL”) in the South African legal system is discussed. Furthermore, the treaty-law and customary international law rules binding upon South Africa regarding limitations of specific weapons and general weapons limitations are enumerated and the paragraph ends with a discussion of the Martens Clause. 


Author(s):  
Эдвард Пилипсон ◽  
Edvard Pilipson

Contractual succession of legal claims and liabilities in administering rules of private international law is a quite complicated practical problem. The correct choice of the applicable law is the priority in this situation. As of today inheritance of movables, including claims, liabilities takes place according to the connecting factors’ rules “lex patriae” and “lex domicilii” which according to the offered assumption, are not adequate in a situation of the inheritance by contract. It is worth mentioning that in some cases the right to claim, liability acquires legal regime called “res in transitu” which requires special succession regime. Secondly, it is necessary to evaluate the subject matter of the contract. Inheritance by contract is mediated by the tools of the contractual right which is based on the concluded contract with the cross material perquisites evaluated in a certain sum. Due to this circumstance the assessment should be accepted as a basis for the contract price. Since in accordance with the current legislation the assessment can be made solely in relation to a constant liability (for example, in the situation with a contract of purchase), in case of a contractual inheritance of legal claims (cession), it is not clear how provisional assessment can be made, as the cost of liabilities can change drastically depending on circumstances in the course of a certain period of time. This article is devoted to the investigation of these problems.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bartosz Pacholski

The subject matter of this commentary, which instigates the Views of the Human Rights Committee of 27 January 2021, is the protection of one of the fundamental human rights – the right to life. The Committee, as an authority appointed to oversee compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, had to decide on the issue of Italy’s responsibility for failing to provide assistance to a boat in distress, even if the area in which the vessel was located was not within the territory of this state and other acts of international law attribute the responsibility for executing the rescue operation to a third country. According to the Committee’s views, which applied extraterritorial approach to the protection of the right to life, whenever states have the opportunity to take action for the protection of human rights they should do everything possible in a given situation to help people in need.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 5 sets out the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court. It declares that the jurisdiction is limited to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’. It lists the four crimes over which the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction: (i) the crime of genocide; (ii) crimes against humanity; (iii) war crimes; and (iv) the crime of aggression. The chapter argues that the function of Article 5 seems largely symbolic, a consequence of the drafting history. At its beginnings, when it was article 22 of the International Law Association 1993 draft, article 5 was described as the ‘core’ or the ‘heart’ of the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae, providing an enumeration of crimes whose detailed description was to be left to treaties, customary law, and judicial interpretation. But the Preparatory Committee insisted upon precise definitions, and as the texts emerged — they became articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Statute — the function of article 5 became increasingly redundant.


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