Reasoning asymmetries do not invalidate theory-theory

2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Bartsch ◽  
Tess N. Young

AbstractIn this commentary we suggest that asymmetries in reasoning associated with moral judgment do not necessarily invalidate a theory-theory account of naïve psychological reasoning. The asymmetries may reflect a core knowledge assumption that human nature is prosocial, an assumption that heightens vigilance for antisocial dispositions, which in turn leads to differing assumptions about what is the presumed topic of conversation.

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 778-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Branstetter

Hannah Arendt claims that Thomas Hobbes was responsible for constituting modern people as apolitical subjects who can no longer make independent moral judgments. The refusal to think that Hobbes allegedly engendered was a major factor in twentieth-century totalitarianism’s worst crimes. In her view, Hobbes’s Leviathan established the architecture of the totalitarian state and initiated the cultivation of people so incapable of exercising moral judgment that they stood idly by and let such a state commit horrors in their name. I argue that Hobbes rejected the proto-totalitarian form of domination Arendt attributes to him and expressed hope about the human capacities for practical judgment and moral improvement. Instead of creating thoughtless subjects which authorize any crime the state might commit, he suggests that the Leviathan should cultivate the public’s capacity for reason and judgment to make violence unnecessary. Considering Hobbes’s accounts of reason and science in light of his materialism shows that the Leviathan requires the exercise of individual moral thought and judgment to function properly. I suggest that the primary duty of the Hobbesian sovereign might be understood primarily in terms of the cultivation of individual judgment and reason rather than its suppression.


2020 ◽  
pp. 273-278
Author(s):  
Iris Berent

It appears that the Ancient Greeks were right in their fear of blindness, caves, and shadows. We are indeed blind, or at the very least, seriously nearsighted. And all these errors in our understanding of human nature emerge from a single source—human nature itself. Although we cannot entirely shed off our biological shackles, recognizing these constraints matters. First, blindness interferes with reasoning about topics that are at the heart of our social and political life, and it derails scholarly discussion of some of the key questions in the history of ideas. Blindness is also in the air. In an era of “fake news,” the systematic spreading of misinformation, and the denial of science, there is no better place to start clearing the public sphere than from within. The third, and most important reason to face our blindness is that we, as the storytellers, care about our stories—they define who we are, personally and collectively, and blindness is our way. While we are bound to think in the shadows of core knowledge, we are not necessarily doomed to utter darkness. Core knowledge is only one component in the rich suite of mechanisms that comprise human cognition; other rational capacities exist, and they allow us to look within, recognize the conspiracy, and begin to counteract it. Our path out of the cave begins with careful self-inspection. Perhaps this book could be a guide.


Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

This book is a selective discussion of the tradition in moral philosophy that runs from Socrates to the present. The main themes: (1) Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics take different positions in debates the relation between morality (including right action and the character of virtuous agents) and the human good. Aquinas’ version of an Aristotelian view identifies the human good with the fulfilment of human nature and capacities in a just society. These facts about the human good can be discovered by rational reflexion on human nature and human needs. (2) These views both about the content of ethics and about the sources of ethical knowledge are questioned by Scotus and later writers on natural law. Voluntarists take the principles of natural law and moral right to be the products of will; naturalists take them to be discovered by reason. (3) The dispute about will and reason is the source of the long dispute between sentimentalists (Hutcheson, Hume) and rationalists (Butler, Price, Reid) about whether moral judgment has a non-rational or a rational basis. Kant tries to resolve this dispute. (4) These arguments lead to further discussion about what makes morally right actions right. Sentimentalists, followed by Mill and Sidgwick and by later utilitarians, argue that actions are right in so far as they maximize pleasure. Others, including the rationalists, Kant, Ross, and Rawls, argue that moral principles are not subordinate to utility.


1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-192
Author(s):  
J Sudarminta

Abstrak: Dalam artikel ini pandangan John Dewey tentang tolok ukur penilaian moral, sebagaimana ia jelaskan dalam teori etika pragmatiknya, akan disajikan dan dievaluasi. Artikel dibagi dalam tiga bagian. Pertama, berbeda dengan teori-teori etika teleologis, di mana moralitas tindakan dinilai dari menunjang tidaknya tindakan tersebut dalam upaya mencapai tujuan akhir hidup manusia, dalam pandangan Dewey, suatu tindakan dinilai secara moral baik kalau tindakan tersebut mencapai tujuan yang dimaksudkan untuknya. Tujuan tersebut bersifat kontekstual dan plural serta selalu terkait dengan sarana yang tersedia untuk mencapainya. Kedua, bagi Dewey suatu tindakan dinilai baik atau benar secara moral kalau menunjang proses perwujudan diri si pelaku tindakan. Apa yang menunjang proses perwujudan diri si pelaku tindakan tak pernah dapat ditentukan secara a priori berdasarkan konsep kodrat manusia. Dalam memahami manusia, Dewey menolak paham esensialisme kondrat manusia. Ia memahami pengertian perwujudan diri manusia dalam konteks proses ‘transaksi’ manusia sebagai organisme dengan lingkungan hidup sekitarnya. Ketiga, sebuah evaluasi terhadap pandangan Dewey mengenai tolok ukur penilaian moral dalam teori etika pragmatiknya akan disajikan.   Katakunci: etika, penilaian moral, organisme, lingkungan, ends-in-view, pengembangan diri, tradisi moral, pragmatisme, naturalisme, transaksi.   Abstract: In this article John Dewey’s criteria for moral judgment, as he expounds in his pragmatic ethics, will be presented and evaluated. The article will be divided into three parts. First, different from traditional teleological ethics, in which the morality of an act is judged from the point of view of certain human final end,  an act, in Dewey’s view, should be judged as morally good if it achieves its specific and contextual end-in-view. There are many ends-in-view as there are many moral acts, and an end-in-view can never be determined apart from its actually available means to achieve it. Second, for Dewey, an act is considered good or morally right if it does in practice lead to the human self-realization of the agent. What constitutes an agent’s human self-realization can never be determined in a priori way. Dewey rejects essentialism of human nature in understanding human being. He understands human self-realization within the context human dynamic process of “transactions” with his or her concrete environment. Third, an evaluation of Dewey’s view will be provided.   Keywords: ethics, moral judgment, organism, environment, ends-in-view, self-realization, moral tradition, pragmatism, naturalism, transaction.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Kurth

Abstract Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.


2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-26
Author(s):  
Helen M. Sharp ◽  
Mary O'Gara

The Council for Clinical Certification in Audiology and Speech-Language Pathology (CCFC) sets accreditation standards and these standards list broad domains of knowledge with specific coverage of “the appropriate etiologies, characteristics, anatomical/physiological, acoustic, psychological, developmental, and linguistic and cultural correlates” and assessment, intervention, and methods of prevention for each domain” (CCFC, 2013, “Standard IV-C”). One domain in the 2014 standards is “voice and resonance.” Studies of graduate training programs suggest that fewer programs require coursework in cleft palate, the course in which resonance was traditionally taught. The purpose of this paper is to propose a standardized learning outcomes specific to resonance that would achieve the minimum knowledge required for all entry-level professionals in speech-language pathology. Graduate programs and faculty should retain flexibility and creativity in how these learning outcomes are achieved. Shared learning objectives across programs would serve programs, faculty, students, accreditation site visitors, and the public in assuring that a consistent, minimum core knowledge is achieved across graduate training programs. Proficiency in the management of individuals with resonance disorders would require additional knowledge and skills.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris L. Žeželj ◽  
Biljana R. Jokić

Eyal, Liberman, and Trope (2008) established that people judged moral transgressions more harshly and virtuous acts more positively when the acts were psychologically distant than close. In a series of conceptual and direct replications, Gong and Medin (2012) came to the opposite conclusion. Attempting to resolve these inconsistencies, we conducted four high-powered replication studies in which we varied temporal distance (Studies 1 and 3), social distance (Study 2) or construal level (Study 4), and registered their impact on moral judgment. We found no systematic effect of temporal distance, the effect of social distance consistent with Eyal et al., and the reversed effect of direct construal level manipulation, consistent with Gong and Medin. Possible explanations for the incompatible results are discussed.


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