WHEN ALTRUISM LOWERS TOTAL WELFARE

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH S. CORTS
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Selfish Agents ◽  
Total Welfare

Ethical theories grounded in utilitarianism suggest that social welfare is improved when agents seek to maximize others' welfare in addition to their own (i.e., are altruistic). However, I use a simple game-theoretic model to demonstrate two shortcomings of this argument. First, altruistic preferences can generate coordination problems where none exist for selfish agents. Second, when agents care somewhat about others' utility but weight their own more highly, total social welfare may be lower than with selfish agents even in the absence of coordination problems.

Corporate communication in the emerging network economy

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss ◽  
Tore Kristensen ◽  
Ricky Wilke
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Corporate Communication ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Network Economy ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Knowledge Requirements ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Common ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

This paper draws on ideas in economics and game theory to develop a new theory of marketing in the emerging network economy. The paper argues that in a network economy, firms and consumers will confront “coordination problems”. With the emerging network economy all this becomes urgent because the availability and cost of information decreases. Also, timing issues become urgent as millions of people get access to the same information simultaneously. That explains why events where masses of viewers simultaneously participate in the same events become so important. The paper introduces a simple game theoretic model and discusses marketing applications and possible strategies. These strategies imply considerable use of communication resources in order to fulfil the common knowledge requirements.

The Problem of Clean Hands

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-113
Author(s):  
Eric Barnes ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Democratic Elections

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates.

Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292091120
Author(s):  
Muhammet A. Bas ◽  
Elena V. McLean
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Commitment Problems

This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment problems and cause conflict even before any disasters take place. Our approach represents a shift of focus from previous research, which investigates the effect of actual disasters and ignores rational expectations regarding future events. We use a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the commitment problem caused by disaster risks. We then discuss and apply an empirical strategy enabling us to disentangle effects of disaster proneness from effects of actual disaster events. Our results indicate that greater disaster risks are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of interstate conflict.

Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1042-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress, leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression. This logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression, in addition to sanctioning (i.e., the logic of consequences) and normative mechanisms (i.e., the logic of appropriateness). We formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or “anocracies.” In turn, this has broader implications for the strategies human rights advocates use in such regimes, how leaders structure their security forces, and for the study of why legal rules might be especially effective in such regimes.

Frenemies in Platform Markets: Heterogeneous Profit Foci as Drivers of Compatibility Decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (6) ◽  
pp. 2432-2451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Adner ◽  
Jianqing Chen ◽  
Feng Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Difference

We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 1303-1320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Powell
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Neoliberal Institutionalism

The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation. The latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict. Existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states' preferences. Using a simple game-theoretic model, this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states. Many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.

scholarly journals Game-theoretic model of a volunteer computer GRID

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 76-90
Author(s):  
Илья Чернов ◽  
Ilya Chernov
Keyword(s):  
Monotone Function ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Volunteer Computing ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Wrong Answer ◽  
Desktop Grid ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Mixed Strategies

In the paper we propose a simple game-theoretic model of a Desktop Grid for volunteer computing. Task replication reduces the risk of accepting wrong answers due to sabotage. Saboteur's attack by intruding multiple computing nodes brings him some profit in case a wrong answer is accepted, while the server suffers some penalty in this case. Nodes are assigned some reputation as a monotone function of the number of produced correct (or not exposed) answers. We obtain the optimal mixed strategies and show that the average gain of the players depends only on the server's penalty, nodes' reputation, and the size of the subgrid of nodes with the same reputation. Also we estimate the server's cost per an answer. Numerical examples show that the average cost of the server is not more than that in the case when the number of intruders is known.

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