Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 1303-1320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Powell
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Neoliberal Institutionalism

The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation. The latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict. Existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states' preferences. Using a simple game-theoretic model, this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states. Many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.

1. International Relations Theory and the Middle East

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-38
Author(s):  
Fred H. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
English School ◽  
Alternative Perspective ◽  
The Many ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Neoliberal Institutionalism

This chapter discusses the different theories and approaches that characterize the study of international relations. Mainstream theories focus on the ways that states interact with one another in circumstances where no overarching authority governs their behavior — in other words, under conditions of anarchy. These theories include structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the scholarship on relational contracting. An important alternative perspective — the English School — argues that, even under anarchic conditions, there is a high degree of orderliness in world affairs. Meanwhile, proponents of constructivism assert that states take shape in specific historical contexts, and that the conditions under which states coalesce and become socialized to one another play a crucial role in determining how they conceive of themselves and formulate their basic interests. Scholars of the Middle East have so far addressed only a fraction of the many theoretical debates and controversies that energize the field of international relations.

The Problem of Clean Hands

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-113
Author(s):  
Eric Barnes ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Democratic Elections

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates.

Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292091120
Author(s):  
Muhammet A. Bas ◽  
Elena V. McLean
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Commitment Problems

This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment problems and cause conflict even before any disasters take place. Our approach represents a shift of focus from previous research, which investigates the effect of actual disasters and ignores rational expectations regarding future events. We use a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the commitment problem caused by disaster risks. We then discuss and apply an empirical strategy enabling us to disentangle effects of disaster proneness from effects of actual disaster events. Our results indicate that greater disaster risks are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of interstate conflict.

Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1042-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress, leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression. This logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression, in addition to sanctioning (i.e., the logic of consequences) and normative mechanisms (i.e., the logic of appropriateness). We formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or “anocracies.” In turn, this has broader implications for the strategies human rights advocates use in such regimes, how leaders structure their security forces, and for the study of why legal rules might be especially effective in such regimes.

Corporate communication in the emerging network economy

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss ◽  
Tore Kristensen ◽  
Ricky Wilke
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Corporate Communication ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Network Economy ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Knowledge Requirements ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Common ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

This paper draws on ideas in economics and game theory to develop a new theory of marketing in the emerging network economy. The paper argues that in a network economy, firms and consumers will confront “coordination problems”. With the emerging network economy all this becomes urgent because the availability and cost of information decreases. Also, timing issues become urgent as millions of people get access to the same information simultaneously. That explains why events where masses of viewers simultaneously participate in the same events become so important. The paper introduces a simple game theoretic model and discusses marketing applications and possible strategies. These strategies imply considerable use of communication resources in order to fulfil the common knowledge requirements.

It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian C. Rathbun
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Levels Of Analysis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
Neoliberal Institutionalism

The insights of social psychology are not thoroughly integrated into international relations theory, yet social psychology has much to offer. Social psychology provides a conceptualization of a number of varieties of trust – moralistic, strategic, and generalized – and their opposites that implicitly drive the logic of major works of international relations. It also reveals the empirical presence of a number of different types of trusters who make different assumptions about the trustworthiness of others and consequently show markedly different propensities towards cooperation. The rough correspondence between these different ‘social orientations’ and the logics of the three approaches of structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism suggest that individuals carry a crude paradigm in their minds. Metatheoretically, the implication for international relations theory is that scholars capture a part but not the totality of world politics, the behavior of those who trust (or do not trust) in a particular way that matches the logic of their paradigms. Theoretically it suggests a research agenda at multiple levels of analysis, utilizing all of the types of trust and trusters. I review the work of others that offers some preliminary evidence for its plausibility, suggest some hypotheses of my own, and address potential theoretical objections.

1. International Relations Theory and the Middle East

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred H. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Historical Sociology ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Power Cycle Theory ◽  
Neoliberal Institutionalism

This chapter examines the different theories and approaches that characterize the study of international relations, along with their application to the Middle East. International relations theory takes many forms and presents a variety of challenges that can be addressed using Middle Eastern cases. The field of international relations is dominated by structural realist theory. The chapter considers the assumptions of structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, the English School, historical sociology, international society, constructivism, and relational contracting, along with post-structuralism and post-modernism. It also discusses political culture and statistical studies of world politics. In particular, it analyses some key findings from quantitative research in international relations. The chapter concludes with an assessment of power transition theory and power cycle theory, along with conceptual contributions from regional specialists.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

WHEN ALTRUISM LOWERS TOTAL WELFARE

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH S. CORTS
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Selfish Agents ◽  
Total Welfare

Ethical theories grounded in utilitarianism suggest that social welfare is improved when agents seek to maximize others' welfare in addition to their own (i.e., are altruistic). However, I use a simple game-theoretic model to demonstrate two shortcomings of this argument. First, altruistic preferences can generate coordination problems where none exist for selfish agents. Second, when agents care somewhat about others' utility but weight their own more highly, total social welfare may be lower than with selfish agents even in the absence of coordination problems.

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