The Conflict between Old and New in the Chinese Army

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 118-140
Author(s):  
Ellis Joffe
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Red Army

One of the most pressing needs of the Chinese Communists when they established their régime, was to convert the sprawling semi-guerrilla force which had brought them to power into a modern army capable of maintaining that power. China's leaders were acutely aware of this need and they lost little time in launching the armed forces on the long march to modernisation. No modernisation, however, could have succeeded without large numbers of officers skilled in running a complex military establishment. The Red Army commanders, though resourceful and battle-tested, were by and large not equipped for this task. It was necessary, therefore, to develop a professional officer corps.

Wider Officer Competence: The Importance of Politics and Practical Wisdom

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten F. Roennfeldt
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Education ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Professional Military Education ◽  
The U.S

Identifying and developing officer competence is important to a nation’s security and a crucial attribute of a legitimate military establishment. Critics have claimed that the U.S. officer corps favors a narrow conception of expertise that limits the armed forces’ utility as an instrument of policy. Drawing from the dialogue between Huntington and Janowitz, as well as Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom, this article proposes a wider understanding of officer competence consisting of four distinct conceptual categories. The U.S. defense establishment favors “military skill” over other categories of competence. As a result, the officer corps is poorly prepared for 21st-century warfare. To remedy this situation, professional military education should cultivate military leaders that, in addition to military skill, have sociopolitical competence and practical wisdom. In this context, this article suggests strategies to develop such competencies that officers need to be able to achieve a diversity of national political goals.

The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?

Slavic Review ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 626-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teddy J. Uldricks
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Petroleum Products ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Adolf Hitler ◽  
War Machine ◽  
Red Army ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Defensive Measures

Historians have had a great deal of difficulty accounting for the debacle wrought by Operation Barbarossa. How could the Red Army, a large and heavily equipped force, be so thoroughly decimated by the Wehrmacht, especially when evidence of the impending attack was plentiful? Most commonly, explanations have focused on the unexpectedly rapid success of the Blitzkrieg in western Europe, the impact of the Great Purges on the Soviet officer corps, the problems of reequipping the Red Army with modern weaponry and protecting newly expanded borders, the lack of adequate training for the rapidly growing Soviet armed forces, the confusing nature of available intelligence, and, most of all, the nearly fatal self-delusion of Iosif Stalin, which prevented the implementation of proper defensive measures. Although Stalin certainly realized that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was no more than a temporary truce and that a German attack was ultimately inevitable, he deluded himself that Adolf Hitler could be appeased until Soviet forces had grown strong enough to meet the Nazi assault. Soviet shipments of petroleum products, various raw materials, and foodstuffs were critically important to the German war machine and, thus, the key element in Stalin's strategy of appeasing Hitler.

“In Fact, We Do Not Have a Regular Army Yet…” A Letter of the Commander of Kiev Region Armed Forces General A.M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia General A.I. Denikin. 12 (25) December 1919

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 245-264
Author(s):  
Andrey Ganin
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Stanford University ◽  
The South ◽  
Moral Improvement ◽  
Policy And Strategy ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Regular Army ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Commander In Chief

The document published is a letter from the commander of the Kiev Region General Abram M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia General Anton I. Denikin of December, 1919. The source covers the events of the Civil War in Ukraine and the views of the leadership of the White Movement in the South of Russia on a number of issues of policy and strategy in Ukraine. The letter was found in the Hoover Archives of Stanford University in the USA in the collection of Lieutenant General Pavel A. Kusonsky. The document refers to the period when the white armies of the South of Russia after the bright success of the summer-autumn “March on Moscow” in 1919 were stopped by the Red Army and were forced to retreat. On the pages of the letter, Dragomirov describes in detail the depressing picture of the collapse of the white camp in the South of Russia and talks about how to improve the situation. Dragomirov saw the reasons for the failure of the White Movement such as, first of all, the lack of regular troops, the weakness of the officers, the lack of discipline and, as a consequence, the looting and pogroms. In this regard, Dragomirov was particularly concerned about the issue of moral improvement of the army. Part of the letter is devoted to the issues of the civil administration in the territories occupied by the White Army. Dragomirov offers both rational and frankly utopian measures. However, the thoughts of one of the closest Denikin’s companions about the reasons what had happened are interesting for understanding the essence of the Civil War and the worldview of the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik Camp.

scholarly journals The Interned Soldiers of UРR Army at the Camp Stshalkovo in Poland (the Second Half of 1921 – the Beginning of 1922): the Moral and Life Conditions

2017 ◽  
pp. 182-195
Author(s):  
I. Sribnyak
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Educational Work ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
Life Conditions ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Group A ◽  
Moral Condition ◽  
The Government ◽  
Destructive Processes

The article analyzes the moral condition and conditions of staying of interned Ukrainian soldiers in the camp of Stshalkovo (Poland) in the second half of 1921 – early 1922. Based on the use of a wide range of archival sources, the author concludes that the camp everyday life of the wartime period was marked by significant difficulties due to its extraordinary crowding and presence in the camp of interned and captured soldiers of other formations (Balahovtsy and Red Army soldiers). The lack of any material resources, the lack of adequate and high-quality food, the lack of fuel for heating booths, anti-Ukrainian agitation, led to the fact that a part of Ukrainian soldiers lost national moral values. In order to prevent the demoralization of Ukrainian warfare, the command of the group tried to intensify cultural and educational work in the camp, but due to lack of premises and lack of resources, it slowly collapsed. Some of the interned ones did not withstand the burden of hopeless and burdensome camping munitions, and left the camp in search of better living conditions. Obviously, this was a dangerous trend, and the command of the interned troops in various ways tried to prevent it from further spreading. The leader of the group A. Pиzitsky was particularly opposed to the destructive processes in the camp. His measures were fully understood and supported by the higher military leadership of the Armed Forces and the Government of the UPR.

On Fear-Induced Aggression

2020 ◽  
pp. 62-79
Author(s):  
Ned Dobos
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
International Norms ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Trade Off

Wherever there is a military establishment, there is a possibility that it will provoke the very thing that it is meant to deter. A foreign enemy might be driven to attack us not despite our armed forces, but because of them, in an act of fear-induced ‘defensive aggression’. What this tells us is that a military’s contribution to ‘national security’ is not unequivocally positive. There is a trade-off involved. States armed with militaries may be less likely to find themselves on the receiving end of ‘greedy’ or ‘opportunistic’ aggression, but they are more likely to find themselves on the receiving end of preventive aggression, motivated by feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. Thankfully, international norms against the use of preventive military force have limited the instances of defensive aggression over the last century. But today these norms are unravelling. If ‘defensive aggression’ becomes legitimized, we should expect to see more of it.

The Power of Experience? Innovative and Authoritative Leadership Values Among Danish Army Cadets

2020 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2095143
Author(s):  
Morten Brænder ◽  
Vilhelm Stefan Holsting
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Military Academy ◽  
Authoritarian Leadership ◽  
Leadership Values ◽  
The Military ◽  
Noncommissioned Officer

Traditionally, the military is seen as an unequivocally authoritarian organization. With survey data collected at the Royal Danish Military Academy, this study shows that that is a qualified truth. Thus, cadets enrolled directly from the noncommissioned officer corps—those most acquainted with the norms of the armed forces—do not weigh authoritarian leadership values over nonauthoritarian ones. Instead, their view reflects that for the experienced leader, the context, and not overt ideals, enables them to choose the leadership tools they expect will prove most effective. On the contrary, cadets enrolled based on their civilian merits clearly prioritize authoritarian values. This is particularly true among cadets returning to the military after a break, former professionals, and former draftees alike. Their view also reflects experience, but a different kind of experience, as they have primarily encountered the military hierarchy from the receiving end.

scholarly journals Praetorian Army in Action: A Critical Assessment of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-222
Author(s):  
Berk Esen
Keyword(s):  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Military Relations

With four successful and three failed coups in less than 60 years, the Turkish military is one of the most interventionist armed forces in the global south. Despite this record, few scholars have analyzed systematically how the military’s political role changed over time. To address this gap, this article examines the evolution of civil–military relations (CMR) in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Based on a historical analysis, this article offers a revisionist account for the extant Turkish scholarship and also contributes to the broader literature on CMR. It argues that the military’s guardian status was not clearly defined and that the officer corps differed strongly on major political issues throughout the Cold War. This article also demonstrates that the officer corps was divided into opposite ideological factions and political agendas and enjoyed varying levels of political influence due to frequent purges and conjectural changes.

Comparing Régime Performance in Africa: the Limitations of Cross-National Aggregate Analysis

1980 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ravenhill
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Corporate Identity ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Positive Contribution ◽  
Institutional Performance ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Impact

The continuing prominence of coups d'état in the political life of the Third World has sustained interest in the question of whether, and in what circumstances, the armed forces are capable of making a positive contribution to modernisation. During the 1960s, a number of scholars began to take a favourable view of the military's modernising potential based on ideal-typical conceptions of armed-force organisations which, in Henry Bienen's felicitous phrase, were ‘unencumbered by empirical detail’.1 A second dimension of support for the positive image was perceived in the attitudes and class background of the officer corps.2 Critics of this viewpoint questioned the accuracy of these characterisations given the impact that transfer to a different socio-economic and political context has on institutional performance. Case-studies of Third-World militaries found that many lacked a single corporate identity, suffering from factionalism along cleavages of age, ethnicity, and regionalism; organisational cohesion was undermined by a proliferation of patron-client relationships.3 The motives for staging coups also were questioned, the military being perceived as particularly well-equipped to defend and pursue its corporate interests.1

scholarly journals 3 Żelazna Dywizja Strzelecka Armii Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej w 1920 r. Zarys szlaku bojowego w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 120-162
Author(s):  
Marek Kozubel
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Active Part ◽  
Red Army ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Soviet Russia ◽  
Southern Section

The subject of the article is the battle route of the 3rd Iron Rifle Division of the Ukrainian People’s Republic Army in the last year of the Polish-Soviet war. This formation was the strongest and most numerous in the Ukrainian armed forces in 1920. It was commanded by Oleksandr Udovychenko, a famous and very talented officer. It should be noted that the 3rd Iron Rifle Division was initially formed at the Polish Army as the 2nd Rifle Division, but due to the presence of many veterans of the 3rd Iron Division of 1919 in its ranks, which was also commanded by Udovychenko, it was decided to rename the formation. The 3rd Iron Rifle Division took an active part in the Kiev expedition in the spring of 1920. It fought on the southern section of the front in the Mohyliv-Podilskyi area. Later, in the summer of 1920, it took part in the defense of Eastern Galicia against the Red Army. It succeeded in several fights against the Bolsheviks there, among others at Sydoriv and Horodenka. Then it participated in further combat activities in Podolia. After 18 October 1920, the Ukrainian People’s Republic Army had to continue fighting on its own due to the signing of a ceasefire between Poland and Soviet Russia. The warfare conducted until the second half of November 1920 ended in defeat for the Ukrainians, whose armed forces withdrew to the Polish territory, where they were interned. In this group there were also soldiers of the 3rd Iron Rifle Division.

scholarly journals Negative Selection: Prohibitions and Restrictions in Red Army Recruitment on Ethnic Grounds during the Great Patriotic War

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-888
Author(s):  
Alexey Yu. Bezugolny
Keyword(s):  
Military Service ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Linguistic Features ◽  
Great Patriotic War ◽  
Red Army ◽  
History Of ◽  
First Time

The present article continues the research about the role of the ethnic factor in Red Army recruitment during the Great Patriotic War, the first part of which was published in RUDN Journal of Russian History 19, no. 2 (May 2020). This time the focus is on admission restrictions and prohibitions for certain Soviet ethnic groups, as well as on purges from the army due to soldiers nationality. The contribution analyzes the major causes and the scale of this phenomenon, as well as the regulatory framework of restrictions and prohibitions and their development during the war. It is established that the reason for such restrictions could be political motives (distrust towards citizens on ethnic grounds), but also the ethno-cultural and linguistic features of conscripts coming from certain nationalities, with the idea that these features prevented their full use in military service. The article analyzes the practice of restrictions on ethnic grounds, including cases when military authorities in the field allowed for significant deviations from the regulatory framework. The scientific novelty of the present research consists in the fact that for the first time the ethnonational aspect of the history of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War is analyzed with quantitative methods, which made it possible to significantly deepen our understanding of ethnic processes in the Soviet armed forces.

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