scholarly journals 50 States or 50 Countries: What Did We Miss and What Do We Do Now?

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M. Burkle ◽  
Asha V. Devereaux

AbstractThere have been multiple inconsistencies in the manner the COVID-19 pandemic has been investigated and managed by countries. Population-based management (PBM) has been inconsistent, yet serves as a necessary first step in managing public health crises. Unfortunately, these have dominated the landscape within the United States and continue as of this writing. Political and economic influences have greatly influenced major public health management and control decisions. Responsibility for global public health crises and modeling for management are the responsibility of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Health Regulations Treaty (IHR). This review calls upon both to reassess their roles and responsibilities that must be markedly improved and better replicated world-wide in order to optimize the global public health protections and its PBM.“Ask a big enough question, and you need more than one discipline to answer it.”Liz Lerman, MacArthur “Genius” Fellow, Choreographer, Modern Dance legend, and 2011 Artist-in Residence, Harvard Music Department

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M Burkle ◽  
Christopher M Burkle

AbstractLiberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea lack the public health infrastructure, economic stability, and overall governance to stem the spread of Ebola. Even with robust outside assistance, the epidemiological data have not improved. Vital resource management is haphazard and left to the discretion of individual Ebola treatment units. Only recently has the International Health Regulations (IHR) and World Health Organization (WHO) declared Ebola a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, making this crisis their fifth ongoing level 3 emergency. In particular, the WHO has been severely compromised by post-2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) staffing, budget cuts, a weakened IHR treaty, and no unambiguous legal mandate. Population-based triage management under a central authority is indicated to control the transmission and ensure fair and decisive resource allocation across all triage categories. The shared responsibilities critical to global health solutions must be realized and the rightful attention, sustained resources, and properly placed legal authority be assured within the WHO, the IHR, and the vulnerable nations. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2014;0:1-6)


Viruses ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuefei Jin ◽  
Haiyan Yang ◽  
Wangquan Ji ◽  
Weidong Wu ◽  
Shuaiyin Chen ◽  
...  

The outbreak of emerging severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) disease (COVID-19) in China has been brought to global attention and declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020. Scientific advancements since the pandemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002~2003 and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2012 have accelerated our understanding of the epidemiology and pathogenesis of SARS-CoV-2 and the development of therapeutics to treat viral infection. As no specific therapeutics and vaccines are available for disease control, the epidemic of COVID-19 is posing a great threat for global public health. To provide a comprehensive summary to public health authorities and potential readers worldwide, we detail the present understanding of COVID-19 and introduce the current state of development of measures in this review.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 1-2 ◽  
Author(s):  
J C Desenclos

In May 2005 the World Health Assembly approved an innovative and ambitious revision of the International Health Regulations, known as IHR(2005), in order to detect and control, in a timely manner, all public health events that may have a serious international impact. It represents a dramatic move from administrative notification by Member States (MS) to the World Health Organization (WHO) of cases of a limited list of diseases to a systematic analysis of health events of international concern, infectious or not [1]. The analysis of the public health events will take into account severity, unexpectedness, potential for international spread, and interference with international movement of people and goods. National focal points are to be identified in each MS to interact with WHO. The philosophy behind the new IHR is to promote early dialogue between MS and WHO, leading to early mutual risk assessment of events which may not necessarily have to be notified, depending on the results of the assessment and measures taken. WHO can also use informal sources to detect earlier events of international concern and then, together with the national focal point, conduct verification, risk assessment and implement appropriate measures.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
F Parry-Ford ◽  
N Boddington ◽  
R Pebody ◽  
N Phin ◽  
Collective on behalf of the Incident Management Team

In May 2014, Public Health England was alerted to two separate laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection who transited through London Heathrow Airport while symptomatic on flights from Saudi Arabia to the United States of America. We present the rationale for the public health response to both incidents, and report results of contact tracing. Following a risk assessment, passengers seated two seats around the cases were prioritised for contact tracing and a proactive media approach was used to alert all passengers on the planes of their possible exposure in both incidents. In total, 64 United Kingdom (UK) residents were successfully contacted, 14 of whom were sat in the priority area two seats all around the case(s). Five passengers reported respiratory symptoms within 14 days of the flight, but all tested were negative for MERS-CoV. Details of non-UK residents were passed on to relevant World Health Organization International Health Regulation focal points for follow-up, and no further cases were reported back. Different approaches were used to manage contact tracing for each flight due to variations in the quality and timeliness of the passenger contact information provided by the airlines involved. No evidence of symptomatic onward transmission was found.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-221
Author(s):  
Rahuldeep Singh ◽  
Kumar Sumit ◽  
Shaikh Shah Hossain

ABSTRACTObjective:International airports, ports, and ground crossings are required to have health units for undertaking public health measures during routine times and specific measures during the time of public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). This study was conducted at a ground crossing of North India to assess the implementation status of International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) at a ground crossing in the prevention and control of public health emergencies and to assess the risk of imported infections from a ground crossing.Methods:A qualitative study was conducted at the selected point of entry. The World Health Organization (WHO) core capacity assessment tool and in-depth interviews were used for data collection in the form of meetings and visits to isolation sites, and general observations were conducted regarding facilities on routine and other infrastructure and equipment that can be used during emergencies. Respondents were recruited using purposive methods.Results:The findings reveal that there is lack of awareness among the travelers, which increases the risks of spreading diseases. The overall implementation status at the ground crossing according to the assessment conducted using WHO Tool was 76%. It showed the need for further strengthening of the implementation at the site. Gaps were identified regarding the local capacity for handling chemical, radiological and nuclear hazards, and shortage of regular staff through stakeholders.Conclusion:The findings from this study, as well as the suggestions and recommendations given by stakeholders, should help revise the current strategies of action. Hence, the gaps identified should be fulfilled to better respond to PHEIC at the ground crossings.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (S2) ◽  
pp. 49-56
Author(s):  
Polly J. Price

These teaching materials explore the specific powers of governments to implement control measures in response to communicable disease, in two different contexts:The first context concerns global pandemic diseases. Relevant legal authority includes international law, World Health Organization governance and the International Health Regulations, and regulatory authority of nations.The second context is centered on U.S. law and concerns control measures for drug-resistant disease, using tuberculosis as an example. In both contexts, international and domestic, the point is to understand legal authority to address public health emergencies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Kreps

BACKGROUND Misinformation about COVID-19 has presented challenges to public health authorities during pandemics. Understanding the prevalence and type of misinformation across contexts offers a way to understand the discourse around COVID-19 while informing potential countermeasures. OBJECTIVE The aim of the study was to study COVID-19 content on two prominent microblogging platform, Twitter, based in the United States, and Sina Weibo, based in China, and compare the content and relative prevalence of misinformation to better understand public discourse of public health issues across social media and cultural contexts. METHODS A total of 3,579,575 posts were scraped from both Weibo and Twitter, focusing on content from January 30th, 2020, when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” and February 6th, 2020. A 1% random sample of tweets that contained both the English keywords “coronavirus” and “covid-19” and the equivalent Chinese characters was extracted and analyzed based on changes in the frequencies of keywords and hashtags. Misinformation on each platform was compared by manually coding and comparing posts using the World Health Organization fact-check page to adjudicate accuracy of content. RESULTS Both platforms posted about the outbreak and transmission but posts on Sina Weibo were less likely to reference controversial topics such as the World Health Organization and death and more likely to cite themes of resisting, fighting, and cheering against the coronavirus. Misinformation constituted 1.1% of Twitter content and 0.3% of Weibo content. CONCLUSIONS Quantitative and qualitative analysis of content on both platforms points to cross-platform differences in public discourse surrounding the pandemic and informs potential countermeasures for online misinformation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 19-23
Author(s):  
Donizete Tavares Da Silva ◽  
Priscila De Sousa Barros Lima ◽  
Renato Sampaio Mello Neto ◽  
Gustavo Magalhães Valente ◽  
Débora Dias Cabral ◽  
...  

In March 2020, the World Health Organization (1) declared COVID-19 as a pandemic and a threat to global public health (2). The virus mainly affects the lungs and can cause acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). In addition, coronavirus 2 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARSCOV2) also has devastating effects on other important organs, including the circulatory system, brain, gastrointestinal tract, kidneys and liver


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudeepa Abeysinghe

ArgumentScientific uncertainty is fundamental to the management of contemporary global risks. In 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the start of the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. This declaration signified the risk posed by the spread of the H1N1 virus, and in turn precipitated a range of actions by global public health actors. This article analyzes the WHO's public representation of risk and examines the centrality of scientific uncertainty in the case of H1N1. It argues that the WHO's risk narrative reflected the context of scientific uncertainty in which it was working. The WHO argued that it was attempting to remain faithful to the scientific evidence, and the uncertain nature of the threat. However, as a result, the WHO's public risk narrative was neither consistent nor socially robust, leading to the eventual contestation of the WHO's position by other global public health actors, most notably the Council of Europe. This illustrates both the significance of scientific uncertainty in the investigation of risk, and the difficulty for risk managing institutions in effectively acting in the face of this uncertainty.


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