scholarly journals Locating Ḥākimiyya in Global History: The Concept of Sovereignty in Premodern Islam and Its Reception after Mawdūdī and Quṭb

Author(s):  
USAAMA AL-AZAMI

Abstract The concept of ḥākimiyya (sovereignty), as understood by its leading proponents, refers to the notion that it is God, rather than humans, Who possesses the prerogative to make laws. A concomitant of this is that Muslims with political power and authority must recognise the supremacy of Islamic law. This notion, perhaps most notably articulated in modern times by Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, may be viewed as the rearticulation of ideas latent in the premodern Islamic juristic tradition, but whose modern incarnation as ḥākimiyya emerged in response to the legislative norms of the liberal colonial state. Despite its modern articulation, and against the views of several scholars, I argue that ḥākimiyya qua sovereignty finds its antecedents quite clearly in the Islamic scholarly tradition. Such an understanding leads into a discussion of how Islamic conceptions of sovereignty can help us reassess influential Western articulations of the concept. I also show that Mawdūdī's influential younger contemporary, the Islamist alim Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Nadwī, upholds ḥākimiyya despite his critique of Mawdūdī and Sayyid Quṭb's conceptions of it. I conclude with a brief reflection on how our understanding of ḥākimiyya as sovereignty can help us provincialise Europe in global historical studies.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 174
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zainuddin Sunarto

Social relations in modern times is now very universal, without limitation of religion, race, and class, then it allows two people of different religions into love, affection, and was about to enter into marriage. On the other hand, freedom of religion in Indonesia is guaranteed in the Constitution and protected in points on human rights. In Islamic law known several methods in the determination of a law one of which is Syad Zari’ah, is defined as preventive measures to avoid the ugliness. Imam al-Syatibi, One philosopher of Islamic law has its own ideas about these methods. In Usul al-Fiqh Study, Syad Zari’ah interpreted as closing the road that leads to destruction. Imam al-Syatibi at defining about Syad Zari’ah “do a job which all contain kindness changed to an ugliness”. someone doing a job that basically allowed because it contains a kindness, but the objectives to be achieved end on an ugliness. haram law in this case not because of his own actions, but the law forbidden here because the objectives to be achieved from such actions. this is called the practice of Syad Zari’ah. This method is deemed the application form from the rules of fiqh “dar’u al-mafasid muqaddamun ‘ala jalbi al-masalih”. From the other side, haram law here is also based of maqasid syari’ah in keeping religion in order to avoid switching to another religion


Author(s):  
Mark Twain

Inasmuch as I was now the second personage in the Kingdom, as far as political power and authority were concerned, much was made of me. My raiment was of silks and velvets and cloth of gold, and by consequence was very showy, also uncomfortable....


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184
Author(s):  
Neera Chandhoke ◽  
Ayi Kwei Armah

African countries seem to be constantly groping for the distinctive political paradigm as evinced by the fact that forms of political order have followed each other in rapid succession—the multi-party state, the one party syndrome, the charismatic presidency, the military coup d'etat and in some cases, like that of Nigeria and for a short while in Ghana, a return to civilian rule. The future of the African continent is thus viewed with deep rooted pessimism by political analysts, economists and literary writers. They prophesy in symphony that African countries are catapaulting down the path of political unrest—economic disorder, suspension of human rights, a breakdown of law and order—towards instability and general anomie. In the words of the noted author Chinuah Achebe, in Africa “things fall apart.”1 Dennis Austen using the title of this book for his article, writes that since their inception African states have been in a state of flux moving with regularity in and out of misfortune: The treachery of political life has been very real: armed coups, civil wars, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their public life (as in Tanzania).2 The keynote of the criticisms made in this vein3 is the absence of stability and the consequent destabilization, disorganization and anarchy. However, all evidence in the African countries points to the centralization of power and authority which can lead to a kind of stability—i.e. if stability is the only end of government and politics. The post-colonial state in Africa has created strong centralized administrations to weld the various social groups in common structures. The striking feature of post-independence politics to Markovitz, is not the lack of stability, but “indeed from any long range historical perspective the rapidity with which stability has been achieved…. The military coup d'etats and civil wars, appearence of anarchy notwithstanding, have furthered this process of consolidation.”4 The modern African state is one which is increasingly dominated by a powerful public sector, an overpowering bureaucracy and increasing militarization.5 The highly centralized nature of the African state is almost a throwback to the early colonial state. The colonial state was based on patterns of domination, its very raison d'etre was domination. The colonial institutional form consequently was aimed at establishing hegemony over the subject population, together with its essential militarised character and the system of irresistable power and force associated with it. In the Belgian case, the state was known as “Bula Matari” (the crusher of rocks).6 The pre-independence state forms have persisted. The observations of De Tocqueville are brought to mind. To De Tocqueville the 1789 Revolution did not bring an end to the ideas and order of the old regime in France. Springing from the chaos created by the revolution was a powerful institutional framework. Never since the fall of the Roman Empire, he commented, had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution, or, rather grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet paradoxically they were infinitely more powerful.7 In Africa the heritage of colonial politics, namely power-politics, has been taken up by the post-colonial state. The colonial tradition has led to a scheme of affairs in African states where a premium has been placed on the holding and consolidation of political power. Politics has been construed strictly as a “struggle for rulership.”8 Political power is seen as a means of controlling the socio-economic structures of society. What becomes important in this context is the identification of the group that wields power. What is the nature and social basis of this ruling elite? As a pre-requisite to this, is the question as to what is the nature of class in Africa, so that the nature of class domination can be comprehended,


1985 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. 234-252
Author(s):  
Donald C. Clarke

One of the major changes in Chinese Government policy since the death of Mao Zedong has been the new emphasis on the need for stability and regularity in everyday life, to be achieved by the systematic codification of laws and the strengthening of institutions for administering them. Since 1978 much legislation has been enacted with this end in mind, but the significance of this legislation is not self-evident. What the new laws minimally represent is a set of rules promulgated by the government which purport to govern social relationships in specified areas. Whatever else they might mean – that is, what social effects will follow from the declaration of particular rules – needs to be understood through a study of the individuals and institutions that will have to deal with these rules. Fundamentally, this is a matter of asking whether and why violations of “the law” should matter, and who has the power to find a violation and to remedy it.


1996 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhat Ziadeh

AbstractDifferent legal systems have employed a variety of measures to insure the appearance of the defendant in court. The earliest conception of an action in Rome and in pre-Islamic Arabia was the voluntary appearance of both parties before a recognized or prestigious authority. Thus, early Roman law could not pass judgment against a defendant who failed to appear, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The idea that the court could give a judgment in the plaintiff's absence—the so-called judgment by default—took a long time to materialize in the West. Classical Islamic law requires that the defendant or his legal representative (wakīl) be present for a judgment to be given. This requirement is predicated on the assumption that the primary function of the judge is conciliation of the parties and not necessarily the vindication of rights. The law describes various measures that may be employed to force the defendant to appear in court. Failing that, it provides for the appointment of a legal representative for the defendant. Judgment by default was introduced into Muslim countries only in modern times under the influence of Western codes of procedure.


2007 ◽  
Vol 50 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 287-324
Author(s):  
Takashi Oishi

AbstractThis paper puts focus on Indian Muslim merchants who extended their intra-regional networks over to Mozambique and South Africa from the late-nineteenth century. Through the analysis of market niches secured by these merchants in various consumer products and services in rivalry with larger European capitalists and indigenous players, I emphasize the importance of their strategic association with the colonial state, its institutions and sociopolitical structure as de fined by the state; more specifically, with the trading license, officially induced racial divisions, nationality, customs duties. Their business based on appropriation of as well as complicity with the states was different from that of Indian traders and bankers until the early modern times which had been largely steered along with privileges and acknowledgements in official monopoly regime. Cette contribution traite des marchands musulmans indiens qui, à partir de la fin du XIXième siècle, ont étendu leurs réseaux intra régionaux jusqu'au Mozambique et à l'Afrique du Sud. En analysant les niches de marché qu'ils se constituent, variété des produits de consommation et de services, en concurrence avec de grands capitalistes européens et desautochtones en présence, il sera mis l'accent sur l'importance de leur association stratégique avec l'Etat colonial, ses institutions et sa structure socio-politique telles que l'Etat les dé finit; et plus particulièrement avec l'obtention de la licence commerciale qui induit officiellement des divisions raciales, de nationalité et de droits de douane. Leurs activités fondées sur l'appropriation et la connivence avec les états, sont différentes de celles menées par les commerçants et banquiers indiens jusqu'à l'aube des temps modernes qui ont connu privilèges et reconnaissance dans le régime officiel de monopole.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Umar Al-Haddad

Assumption that the door of ijtihad was closed, despite ever becoming conspicuous in general, has never been universally accepted by all scholars. In the period after the fourth century BC /10 AD—during the opinion was evolving—history still noted the emergence of figures not only by showing their thought on ijtihad but also by showing their firm rejection to the view which said that the door of ijtihad was closed. By reviewing the position of ijtihad and its development in the history of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), this article proves that ijtihad is a must in the dynamics of the Islamic law. With the spirit of ijtihad, various reform ideas in Islamic jurisprudence in modern times have become possible and kept open for discourse, such as the approach between schools, collective ijtihad, ijtihad in the field of principles (ushûl) , and a review toward the qualification of mujtahid in modern times.DOI: 10.15408/ajis.v16i1.2896


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-147
Author(s):  
Jihad Khufaya ◽  
Muhammad Kholil ◽  
Nurrohman Syarif

 Islamic law is often identical with the number of Islamic rules and doctrines regarding a number of static and standardized daily problems of Muslims. However, it often gives birth to various nuances of new thinking, in response to the emergence of a number of contemporary challenges and problems that make Islamic law seem dynamic. How far is the existence of Islamic law with its stability without being trapped in a stagnant attitude, and whether Islamic law in modern times is still relevant to Islamic law revealed by Allah SWT. and to what extent it must accommodate the various dynamics of new thinking without having to reduce the eternal and universal values and principles of Islam, is very important to put forward


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-70
Author(s):  
Khamami Zada

The application of Islamic rules in Aceh and Kelantan is also related to the political power. There is a significant difference about political treatment on the application of Islamic law in Aceh and Kelantan. In Aceh, the central government (Indonesia) thinks that it is needed to apply jinâyah law in Aceh as a strategy to solve conflicts. This political rule has been applied in the republic of Indonesia since the leadership of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarno Putri to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The main factor that influences the Indonesian political government rule is the central conflict with the Acehnese in the leadership of Soeharto presidential to the Helsinski Agreement 2005. Some vertical conflicts happened between the central government and the Acehnese were solved by giving special autonomy in applying the Islamic rules. Not only family law and economic law which are given autonomy to be applied in Aceh, but also the autonomy to apply jinâyah Law. In Kelantan, Federal government (Malaysia) did not have political wish to apply Jinayah Law in Kelantan since the leadership of Mahathir Muhammad, Abdullah Badawi to Najib Razak. Moreover the federal government made the issue of the application of jinâyah law as the political commodity to get the political sympathy from the people, who are the partner of non Moslem voters in the national ranks and some Moslem voters who are not affiliated with PAS. This political needs factor is kept by the Federal Government to respond the Kelantan’s government wish to apply Islamic rules.Copyright (c) 2015 by Al-Ihkam. All right reserved DOI : 10.19105/al-ihkam.v10i1.588 


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