The Uses of Karl Popper

1995 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 177-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Wächtershäuser

Karl Popper's work is of great diversity. It touches on virtually every intellectual activity. But he himself considered his philosophy of science one of his most important achievements. And indeed his achievement here is revolutionary. It destroyed the philosophy of inductivism which held sway over science for hundreds of years.

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wettersten

Two sharply separated traditions in the philosophy of science and in thought psychology began with Otto Selz’s psychology. The first tradition began with Karl Popper; it has been developed by many others. The developers of the second tradition have included Julius Bahle, Adriaan de Groot, Herbert Simon, and Gerd Gigerenzer. The first tradition has ignored empirical studies of thought processes. The second tradition is widely based on Simon’s inductivist philosophy. The first tradition can be improved by integrating empirical studies of rationality into its research. The second tradition can be improved by replacing its inductivist assumptions with a fallibilist framework.


1969 ◽  
Vol 115 (519) ◽  
pp. 129-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Dalén

The rules known as Koch's postulates have served as invaluable guides to the discovery of the specific causes of various infectious diseases. It may safely be assumed that their influence has also been great on the methods of study in the field of non-infectious diseases. For example, with slight modification Koch's postulates may be applied to the study of diseases caused by poisons. But can they be modified and applied with profit in psychiatric research? This is an important problem, and it cannot be discussed without reference, explicit or implicit, to philosophical assumptions. In this paper some consequences of the philosophy of science of Sir Karl Popper will be tentatively explored.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 840-851 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyce C Havstad ◽  
N Adam Smith

AbstractThe last half century of paleornithological research has transformed the way that biologists perceive the evolutionary history of birds. This transformation has been driven, since 1969, by a series of exciting fossil discoveries combined with intense scientific debate over how best to interpret these discoveries. Ideally, as evidence accrues and results accumulate, interpretive scientific agreement forms. But this has not entirely happened in the debate over avian origins: the accumulation of scientific evidence and analyses has had some effect, but not a conclusive one, in terms of resolving the question of avian origins. Although the majority of biologists have come to accept that birds are dinosaurs, there is lingering and, in some quarters, strident opposition to this view. In order to both understand the ongoing disagreement about avian origins and generate a prediction about the future of the debate, here we use a revised model of scientific practice to assess the current and historical state of play surrounding the topic of bird evolutionary origins. Many scientists are familiar with the metascientific scholars Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, and these are the primary figures that have been appealed to so far, in prior attempts to assess the dispute. But we demonstrate that a variation of Imre Lakatos’s model of progressive versus degenerative research programmes provides a novel and productive assessment of the debate. We establish that a refurbished Lakatosian account both explains the intractability of the dispute and predicts a likely outcome for the debate about avian origins. In short, here, we offer a metascientific tool for rationally assessing competing theories—one that allows researchers involved in seemingly intractable scientific disputes to advance their debates.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maarten Derksen

In response to what are seen as fundamental problems in Psychology, a reform movement has emerged that finds inspiration in philosophy of science, the work of Karl Popper in particular. The reformers attempt to put Popper into practice and create a discipline based on the principles of critical rationalism. In this article I describe the concrete sociotechnical practices by which the reformers attempt to realise their ideals, and I argue that they go a long way towards bridging the gap between rules and practice that sociologists of science Mulkay and Gilbert had identified in their study of the role of Popper’s philosophy in the work of scientists. Second, I note the considerable resistance that the reformers meet and the disruptive force of their work. I argue that this disruption is productive and raises fundamental questions regarding psychology and its object of study.


1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Pickel

AbstractThe philosophy of Karl Popper has rarely been examined with respect to its fruitfulness and relevance for political theory. While his contributions to the philosophy of science may appear to be of only marginal significance for the fundamental concerns of political theory, his own forays into the field, particularly in The Open Society and Its Enemies, have been polemical in tone and explicitly political in motivation. This article re-examines Popper's critique of the theory of sovereignty and his own approach to political theory by employing a largely neglected element of his critical approach, namely his problem-oriented method.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Gerson Albuquerque de Araujo Neto

O presente texto é um estudo do problema do realismo na filsofia da ciência de Karl Popper. O texto inicia com a definição de realismo e a sua importância na filosofia atual. Mostra, também, em que textos Popper trabalha a questão do realismo e onde, no seu texto autobiográfico, ele se assume como realista. Analisa, ainda, o realismo na teoria dos três mundos de Popper.Abstract: The present essay is an study about the problem of realism in Karl Popper's philosophy of science. The essay begins with the definition of realism and its importance in nowadays philosophy. It also shows in which texts Popper works the question of realism and where,  in his autobiographical text, he assumes himself as a realist. The essay also analises the realism in Popper's Three Worlds Theory. Key words: Realism. Karl Popper. Philosophy of Science.


Problemos ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 153-162
Author(s):  
Evaldas Juozelis

Mokslo filosofijos grandai Karlas Popperis ir Adolfas Grünbaumas vieningai, nors ir dėl skirtingų metodologinių priežasčių, atmetė psichoanalizės mokslinio statuso galimybę. Tokia vienareikšmė pozicija (psichoanalizė yra pseudomokslas) analitinės filosofijos tradicijoje vyrauja iki šiol, net ir nunykus racionalizmo ir pozityvizmo įtakai filosofiniame diskurse. Kita vertus, plėtojantis nuosaikesniems mokslinio žinojimo modeliams, susiformavo atitinkama sociokultūrinė ir intelektinė terpė samprotavimams, jog tiek mokslo filosofijai, tiek mokslui, nesusidorojantiems su jų pačių ideologinėmis ir metodologinėmis neurozėmis, būtina terapija, kurią įvairiais pavidalais gali pasiūlyti pofroidistinės psichoanalizės formos. Straipsnyje trumpai apžvelgiama, kodėl dalis autorių, paslaugiai siūlančių terapines priemones akademiniam diskursui, tiesiai reikalauja psichoanalizę pripažinti mokslu, o dalis laikosi nuomonės, jog psichoanalizei moksliškumo vainikas nei siektinas, nei priimtinas.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: psichoanalizė, mokslo filosofija, K. Popperis, A. Grünbaumas, N. Maxwellas, neurozė.Post-Freudian Theraphy for the Philosophy of ScienceEvaldas JuozelisSummaryAuthorities of the philosophy of science Karl Popper and Adolf Grünbaum jointly repudiated the potential status of psychoanalysis as scientific edifice, though for particular methodological reasons. In the tradition of analytical philosophy psychoanalysis is widely considered pseudoscientific, despite the significant decrease of rationalist and positivist influence on philosophical discourse. However, during the last few decades moderate approaches of scientific knowledge evolved and appropriate socio-cultural and intellectual medium emerged, proposing particular therapies of post-Freudian psychoanalysis for the philosophy of science itself, since it allegedly suffers from certain ideological and methodological neuroses. Some authors, while offering certain remedies for academic discourse, insist on scientific status of psychoanalysis, others are certain that scientific status for psychoanalysis is neither necessary nor acceptable.Keywords: psychoanalysis, philosophy of science, K. Popper, A. Grünbaum, N. Maxwell, neurosis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
Theodore M. Porter

This chapter investigates the political philosophy of quantification. The intellectualist defense of quantification bears on the ethical issues. A system of demonstrably false or untestable dogmas, the product of state power and not of free persuasion, has obvious moral implications to anyone concerned about individual freedom. This point, indeed, has been at the heart of some of the most influential philosophical defenses of science in this century. John Dewey considered science an ally of democracy, and argued that scientific method means nothing more than the subjection of beliefs to skeptical inquiry. Karl Popper held it up as antidote to the century's totalitarianisms. While Popper did not stress quantification in his political philosophy of science, his terms could easily be applied to it. Although it is of course possible to use numbers casually and informally, quantification for public as well as scientific purposes has generally been allied to a spirit of rigor. The chapter then explores objectivity and objectification, as well as French statistics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wettersten

The early research of Karl Popper both in psychology and in philosophy of science is described; its basis for his later breakthroughs in the philosophy of science is explained. His debt to Otto Selz’s thought psychology is thereby detailed. Otto Selz’s philosophy of science is then explained, and its conflict with Popper’s early as well as his later views is portrayed. These studies of the conflicting views of Popper’s early views and Selz’s philosophy of science provide the basis for demonstrating the mistakes that Michel ter Hark has made in claiming that the alleged originality of Popper’s views occurred only in the 1970s and are little more than a rehash of Selz’s alleged evolutionary epistemology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document