Ayer's Place in the History of Philosophy

1991 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Anthony Quinton

When A. J. Ayer arrived in Oxford in the autumn of 1929 he had no thought of becoming a professional philosopher. He intended to go to the Bar, but, in the manner of an Etonian, by way of Literae Humaniores rather than the study of law. He had read a couple of philosophical books. The first of them was Russell's Sceptical Essays (Russell, 1928), which he bought on its first appearance in 1928. The other was Principia Ethica (Moore, 1903), to which he had been led by a reverent aside in Clive Bell's Art (1914). These choices were significant. Ayer always thought of himself as Russell's successor. He modelled his thought on that of Russell, both in its content and in its unguarded expression and also, to some extent, his manner of life, both political and amorous. What he got from Moore is less obvious, although his respect for Moore is evident, as is shown by the preface to Language, Truth and Logic and by his devoting a book to a close examination of his ideas, along with those of Russell. An important likeness is that both Moore and Ayer were provoked to philosophize by the assertions of other philosophers, not by problems arising outside philosophy in mathematics or the sciences, in history or everyday life.

Author(s):  
Alexander V. Koltsov ◽  

The paper is an attempt to narrow down the notion of spiritual crisis which is now widely applied in research on history of culture of the 19th–20th centuries, with respect to history of German philosophy and observation of modern reli­giosity. The shift from the history of philosophy to the religious context is ful­filled through analysis of texts of two religious thinkers, A. Reinach and S. Frank, whose thought clearly demonstrates strong interconnection between the both fields. Analysis of contemporary studies on history of phenomenological philos­ophy (C. Möckel and W. Gleixner) lets firstly observe ways of application of Koselleck’s notion of crisis to investigations in the history of philosophy. Sec­ondly it discovers two possibilities of philosophical contextualization of the con­cept of spiritual crisis – on the one hand, as a constituent rhetorical element of the philosophical statement (Möckel), on the other hand, as a term which de­scribes the uniqueness of an intellectual situation of the beginning of the 20thcentury (Gleixner). Then these aspects of the rhetoric of crisis are applied to reli­gious philosophy of Reinach and Frank, what leads to interpretation of their works as a particular statement discovering the divine (or the holy) as a new cat­egory of religious consciousness.


Author(s):  
Karin de Boer

This chapter examines Hegel’s lectures on the history of modern philosophy in view of the tension between, on the one hand, his ambition to grasp philosophy’s past in a truly philosophical way and, on the other hand, the necessity to account for the actual particularities of a wide range of philosophical systems. Hegel’s lectures are put in relief by comparing their methodological principles to those put forward by his Kantian predecessor Tennemann. After discussing Hegel’s conception of modern philosophy as a whole, the chapter turns to his reading of Locke, Leibniz, and, in particular, Kant. In this context, it also compares Hegel’s assessment of Kant’s achievements to that of Tennemann. The chapter concludes by considering Hegel’s account of the final moment of the history of philosophy.


1919 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-198
Author(s):  
F. A. Foraker

Leibnitz and Descartes made remarkable contributions to both mathematics and philosophy. Newton obtains a high rank in the history of the former subject, but only a minor place in the history of philosophy, while Kant, who possessed a well-founded knowledge of the science and mathematics of his time, receives one of the foremost positions in the history of philosophy. Upon the basis of these facts, if we neglect a few of the lesser lights, the statement is often made that there is a relationship between the study of mathematics and the study of philosophy, and that he who studies one of them will also find himself a devotee in the pursuit of the other.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (136) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Bento Silva Santos

Resumo: O artigo comenta globalmente algumas anotações da Vorlesung não proferida – “Os Fundamentos Filosóficos da Mística Medieval” (1918-1919) – na tentativa ainda fragmentária de esboçar uma compreensão fenomenológica da experiência mística. Assim, destaco, primeiramente, as duas observações iniciais de Heidegger sobre o sentido ambíguo da formulação “fundamentos filosóficos da mística medieval” ora com base na história da filosofia (1), ora com base na abordagem fenomenológica. Em segundo lugar, optando pela mística medieval como expressão (Ausdruck) da religiosidade cristã, Heidegger estabelece uma dupla distinção: de um lado, a religiosidade se distingue tanto da filosofia da religião como da teologia; de outro lado, a separação entre o problema da teologia e problema da religiosidade cristã (2). Por fim, em função desta oposição problemática entre teologia escolástica e mística medieval, trato brevemente da permanência ambígua do esquema de pensamento da teologia cristã no Denkweg de Heidegger, que pressupõe inegavelmente suas origens católicas (3).Abstract: This article broadly discusses Heidegger’s notes for his undelivered Vorlesung - “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism” (1918-1919) - in a still fragmentary attempt to outline a phenomenological understanding of the mystical experience. In order to do so, I first highlight the two initial observations of Heidegger concerning the meaning of the ambiguous wording “philosophical foundations of medieval mysticism”, sometimes referring to the basis of mysticism in the history of philosophy (1), sometimes to its phenomenological approach. Second, I discuss Heidegger’s option to consider medieval mystic as expression (Ausdruck) of Christian religiousness. Thus, the author establishes a double distinction: on the one hand, religiousness distinguishes itself from both the philosophy of religion and theology, and on the other hand, the problem of theology is separated from that of Christian religiousness (2). Finally, in light of this problematic opposition between scholastic theology and medieval mysticism, I briefly deal with the ambiguous persistence of the model of thinking of the Christian theology in Heidegger’s Denkweg, that unmistakably presupposes his Catholic origins (3).


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Catana

Abstract This article critically explores the history and nature of a hermeneutic assumption which frequently guided interpretations of Plotinus from the 18th century onwards, namely that Plotinus advanced a system of philosophy. It is argued that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the 18th and 19th centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy, dating from the 1740s, to which the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ was essential. It is observed that the concept is absent from Ficino’s commentary from the 15th century, and that it remained absent in interpretations produced between the 15th and 18th centuries. It is also argued that the assumption of a ‘system of philosophy’ in Plotinus is historically incorrect—we do not find this concept in Plotinus’ writings, and his own statements about method point in other directions. Eduard Zeller (active in the second half of the 19th century) is typically regarded as the first to give a satisfying account of Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole. In this article, on the other hand, Zeller is seen as having finalised a tradition initiated in the 18th century. Very few Plotinus scholars have examined the interpretative development prior to Zeller. Schiavone (1952) and Bonetti (1971), for instance, have given little attention to Brucker’s introduction of the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’. The present analysis, then, has value for an understanding of Plotinus’ Enneads. It also explains why “pre-Bruckerian” interpretations of Plotinus appear alien to the modern reader; the analysis may even serve to make some sense of the hermeneutics employed by Renaissance Platonists and commentators, who are often eclipsed from the tradition of Platonism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Fernanda Henriques

This paper explores the thought of Paul Ricœur from a feminist point of view. My goal is to show that it is necessary to narrate differently the history of our culture – in particular, the history of philosophy – in order for wommen to attain a self-representation that is equal to that of men. I seek to show that Ricoeur’s philosophy – especially his approach to the topics of memory and history, on the one hand, and the human capacity for initiative, on the other hand– can support the idea that it is possible and legitimate to tell our history otherwise by envisioning a more accurate truth about ourselves. 


2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84
Author(s):  
Jacek Filek

The history of philosophy is a history of the basic paradigms of philosophical thinking. These paradigms are marked out by the changing ways of experiencing being. Philosophy „declines“ being. Expressing this more grammatico, philosophy conjugates the infinitive „to be“. The first word of the first First Philosophy is „is“ - this is the „antiquity“ of philosophizing, the objective paradigm, the philosophy of objectivity, for which reason is the dominant human faculty and truth is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the past. The first word of the second First Philosophy is „I am“ - this is the „modernity“ of philosophizing, the subjective paradigm, the monological philosophy of subjectivity, for which the will is the dominant human faculty and freedom is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the future. The first word of the third First Philosophy is „you are“ - this is „the now“ of philosophizing, the dialogical paradigm, the philosophy of „the other“, for which feeling is the dominant faculty and responsibility is the primary notion. The basic notion of this new paradigm of thinking is responsibility, and its time is the present. These paradigms, however, are not in conflict with one another; rather, in showing the various aspects of being they help us to experience its fullness. The full experience of being can therefore be summarized in a triad of notions: truth - freedom - responsibility. However, what responsibility consists of remains to be determined.


Rusin ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 190-205
Author(s):  
О.А. Drach ◽  

The study of interethnic relations through the prism of ego-documents provides an opportunity to identify dominant ethnic stereotypes and restore the authentic image of the “Other”. The relevance of this approach to the history of Rusins derives from the ethno-confessional diversity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The source base of the research engages the diaries of an aspiring writer Olha Kobylianska. In Câmpulung, Bukovina, Rusins contacted with Jews, Germans, Poles, and Romanians in their everyday life, with Jews being most frequently mentioned nation in Olha’s writings. The stereotypical image of the Jew implies their de-individualization, expressed by means of the semantics of collectiveness, emphasizing the ultimate isolation of the nation. The fact that she was in love with a Jew and hoped to marry him did not preclude the condemnatory connotations in the Jewish discourse. Germans in her diaries are young men, whose attractive appearance emphasizes their professionalism, cultural sensitivity, good education, intelligence, and morality. Kobylianska thought the “Other” from Germany to be able to outshine everyone around him. The Poles are represented by the Serbinkys Catholic family, whose neighbourship with the Kobylianska’s family determined the homelike relationship and positive tone. The Catholic priest and officer, who epitomize the nation in the diaries, are endowed with natural beauty, classical proportions, culturalness, and good manners. Emotionally, the girl’s ego-narrative demonstrates a negative attitude towards Romanians, whose indecent behaviour is interpreted by Kobylianska as humiliation based on ethnicity.


Author(s):  
Władysław Bartoszewski

This chapter assesses Polish–Jewish relations. The Poles and Jews shared the same lands within the same country for hundreds of years. The overwhelming majority of the Jews of Poland rejected assimilationist tendencies, steadfastly maintaining the primary value of their separate identity, and a significant number of Orthodox Jews preferred actual isolation from the non-Jewish environment. The Poles too, having numerous links with the Jews arising from the practicalities of everyday life, were not overly eager to break down barriers dividing them. Each side also displayed tendencies of superiority towards the other. Ultimately, the hundreds of years of Polish Jewry demand historical remembrance. Despite the unfavourable environment in Poland, serious interest has developed in the social history of Jews in Poland, in the religion, customs, and culture of people who are no longer there.


Philosophy ◽  
1962 ◽  
Vol 37 (141) ◽  
pp. 229-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur W. H Adkins

Heidegger's thought has recently been made more available to English readers by the publication of two books: one a translation of one of Heidegger's works, the other, by Thomas Langan, an American scholar, described as a critical study of Heidegger. Heidegger's philosophy has had little or no influence in England; and this seems a good opportunity for considering whether this neglect is merited, or whether some defence can be offered of Heidegger's curious manipulations of the German and Greek tongues. Since An Introduction to Metaphysics philosophises on a basis of Greek, though it purports to be philosophy, not history of philosophy, most of this article will be concerned with Heidegger's use and abuse of that language. I shall suggest, however, that the same conclusions hold good of Heidegger's use of German.


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