Prerogatives to Depart from Equality

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 95-111
Author(s):  
Michael Otsuka
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
Strong Form ◽  
Equal Share ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Richard Arneson

Should egalitarian justice be qualified by an agent-relative prerogative to act on a preference for—and thereby in a manner that gives rise to or preserves a greater than equal share of the goods of life for—oneself, one's family, loved ones, or friends as compared with strangers? Although many would reply that the answer to this question must be ‘yes’, I shall argue here that the case for such a prerogative to depart from equality is much less far-reaching than one might think. I have in mind a prerogative to depart from a specific form of equality: namely, equality of opportunity for such advantages as resources or welfare. I mean to refer to the strong form of equal opportunity elaborated and defended by Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen whereby, roughly speaking, two people have equal opportunity for advantage if they face the same choices and will end up at the same level of advantage if they make the same choices.

Prerogatives to Depart from Equality

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 95-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Otsuka
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
Strong Form ◽  
Equal Share ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Richard Arneson

Should egalitarian justice be qualified by an agent-relative prerogative to act on a preference for—and thereby in a manner that gives rise to or preserves a greater than equal share of the goods of life for—oneself, one's family, loved ones, or friends as compared with strangers? Although many would reply that the answer to this question must be ‘yes’, I shall argue here that the case for such a prerogative to depart from equality is much less far-reaching than one might think. I have in mind a prerogative to depart from a specific form of equality: namely, equality of opportunity for such advantages as resources or welfare. I mean to refer to the strong form of equal opportunity elaborated and defended by Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen whereby, roughly speaking, two people have equal opportunity for advantage if they face the same choices and will end up at the same level of advantage if they make the same choices.

Equality of opportunity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Navin
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Equal Access ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Ideal ◽  
Political Spectrum ◽  
Treat All ◽  
Individual Choices ◽  
Critical Literature

Equality of opportunity is a political ideal according to which participants in some cooperative systems should possess equal access to some advantages at some point in time. According to this ideal, distributive outcomes (e.g., of income, welfare, functionings) should not be fixed in advance, but should result from processes that treat all people equally. Equality of opportunity is an egalitarian ideal, but it focuses on the means by which people acquire advantages, rather than on outcomes. Diverse conceptions of equality of opportunity are distinguished by their different accounts of what it means to possess an equal opportunity, which sorts of advantages people ought to have an equal opportunity to acquire, and which kinds of cooperative activities ought to be regulated by this ideal. In particular, advocates of equality of opportunity disagree about whether equality of opportunity requires only a prohibition on discrimination (e.g., in employment), or whether it also requires efforts to mitigate the influences of some background conditions (e.g., family social status) on distributive outcomes. They also disagree about whether people ought to have an equal opportunity to acquire welfare, resources, functionings, or some combination of these kinds of goods. Finally, advocates of equality of opportunity disagree about whether this ideal should regulate individual choices or only institutional arrangements, and whether it applies only among members of the same society. The concept of equality of opportunity has widespread support across the political spectrum, and therefore most of the critical literature offers objections to particular conceptions of this ideal, rather than to the broader concept of equality of opportunity.

Equal Opportunity and Gender Disadvantage

1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley A. Jacobs
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Wage Gap ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Gender Inequalities ◽  
Pay Equity ◽  
Employment Equity ◽  
Equal Pay ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The Ideal

Recently, in Canada both the Federal Government and various provincial governments have introduced a series of measures intended to address gender inequalities in the workplace. These measures are of two basic types. Employment equity policies involve the implementation of affirmative action programmes designed to encourage the hiring and promotion of more women in, for example, the civil service. Pay equity policies have sought to institutionalize the principle of equal pay for work of equal value or, to use the American terminology, comparable worth. The aim of this paper is to resurrect the presently out of fashion view that the principles of affirmative action and comparative worth that underlie employment equity and pay equity can be defended on the grounds that they contribute to the realization of an ideal of equality of opportunity between men and women in Canadian society. This view, although once prevalent among those concerned with gender issues, has been pushed aside, largely because of doubts about the visionary depth of the ideal of equality of opportunity. It has been replaced instead by an ideal of equality of results which emphasizes the goal of reducing the gender wage gap. It is my intention here to formulate a principle of equality of opportunity that can incorporate recent feminist legal and political philosophy in a way that offers a promising way to analyze issues posed by gender inequalities in the workplace and, as a result, provide a clear rationale for the recent employment equity and pay equity initiatives in Canada.

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND OPPORTUNITY DOMINANCE

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hild ◽  
Alex Voorhoeve
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Simple Application ◽  
Selection Rules ◽  
Relevant Factors

All conceptions of equal opportunity draw on some distinction between morally justified and unjustified inequalities. We discuss how this distinction varies across a range of philosophical positions. We find that these positions often advance equality of opportunity in tandem with distributive principles based on merit, desert, consequentialist criteria or individuals' responsibility for outcomes. The result of this amalgam of principles is a festering controversy that unnecessarily diminishes the widespread acceptability of opportunity concerns. We therefore propose to restore the conceptual separation of opportunity principles concerning unjustified inequalities from distributive principles concerning justifiable inequalities. On this view, equal opportunity implies that that morally irrelevant factors should engender no differences in individuals' attainment, while remaining silent on inequalities due to morally relevant factors. We examine this idea by introducing the principle of ‘opportunity dominance' and explore in a simple application to what extent this principle may help us arbitrate between opposing distributive principles. We also compare this principle to the selection rules developed by John Roemer and Dirk Van de Gaer.

Global Equality of Opportunity and National Integrity

1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard R. Boxil
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Legal Restrictions ◽  
Formal Equality

Philosophers have long distinguished various interpretations of the principle of equal opportunity and argued over their implications and justifications. But they have almost always tacitly assumed that the context was a national one. They have not, in particular, considered whether some interpretation of the principle could apply and be justified globally, that is, to all people without regard to their nationality or citizenship. Yet, such an investigation is clearly demanded. The leading moral theories seem to support a case for at least some interpretation of the equal opportunity principle, and it is not obvious that they can support it only domestically.Consider, first, those moral theories which place great value on negative liberty, for example, libertarianism. Libertarianism supports a standard interpretation of the equal opportunity principle – “formal” equality of opportunity; formal equality of opportunity requires that legal restrictions j on the taking of opportunities be lifted, and such restrictions diminish negative liberty. But libertarianism would also seem to support a global. version of formal equality of opportunity, for example, that laws be rescinded which require that candidates for jobs in a country be citizens of that country, or which restrict emigration or immigration. Such laws also diminish negative liberty.Or consider those moral theories which place great value on efficiency, for example, utilitarianism. Utilitarianism probably supports formal equality of opportunity because legal restrictions on the taking of opportunity not only diminish negative liberty, but also often prevent talent and skill from going where it can best be used and thus reduce efficiency.

Which conception of political equality do deliberative mini-publics promote?

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Leydet
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Equal Probability ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Specific Subset ◽  
Participant Selection ◽  
Common Thread ◽  
The Impact

In democratic political systems, political equality is often defined as an equality of opportunity for influence. But inequalities in resources and status affect the capacity of disadvantaged citizens to achieve an effective political equality. One common thread running through recent democratic innovations is the belief that appropriate institutional devices and procedures can alleviate the impact of background inequalities on the presence and voice of the disadvantaged within those designs. My objective is to achieve a clearer understanding of the conception of political equality that informs a specific subset of these designs: deliberative mini-publics. I focus firstly on the methods of participant selection advocated to secure equal presence. According to what principle is participation distributed? If it is according to the ‘equal probability’ principle, rather than ‘equal opportunity’, what difference does this make in terms of political equality? Secondly, achieving equality of voice is usually conceived in terms of equalising opportunities for influence among participants. How is this objective understood and what does this say about the underlying conception of political equality?

Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to be a Hypocrite

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Academic Achievement ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
Private Schools ◽  
Private School ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
School Students ◽  
Selective Schools ◽  
K 12 ◽  
Equal Citizenship

Adam Swift objects to private schools on the grounds of equal opportunity and efficiency, and to both private and selective public schools on the grounds of solidarity and improving the academic achievement of less advantaged students. I argue that private schools are not inefficient, and that a meritocratic ideal of equality of opportunity in K-12 contexts is either inapplicable or undesirable. Swift’s objection that private school students unfairly ‘jump the queue’ is based on envy. Enforcing a queue by blocking extra parental investment in their children’s education would be inefficient and unjustly burden people who value education highly. Nor do the educational interests of the less advantaged always justify restrictions on selective schools. However, Swift’s solidarity objection against selective public schools is sound. I develop this objection in the context of ideals of democracy and equal citizenship.

scholarly journals Opportunities, Welfare, and Social Justice: A Review of Fishkin's Bottlenecks

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 580-591
Author(s):  
François Maniquet
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
The Core ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
The Way

In his Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity, Joseph Fishkin claims he presents an entirely new way of thinking about equality of opportunity. The core of the new theory is the call for opportunity pluralism, which consists in enlarging the range of opportunities available to people at every stage in life. In this essay, we discuss how successful Fishkin is at shaking the way economists think about equality of opportunity. We identify two aspects of Fishkin's theory that deeply conflict with economic theories of equality of opportunity. Those aspects have to do with the way economists interpret the ethical values of respect for preferences and responsibility. We also argue that the way Fishkin suggests to look at opportunities can help economists fill gaps in the way they define well-being and social justice. (JEL A13, D63, I31).

Equality of Opportunity Globalized?

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (02) ◽  
pp. 301-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darrel Moellendorf
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Opportunity Sets ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Equal Respect

The principle of global equality of opportunity is an important part of the commitment to global egalitarianism. In this paper I discuss how a principle of global equality of opportunity follows from a commitment to equal respect for the autonomy of all persons, and defend the principle against some of the criticism that it has received. The particular criticisms that I address contend that a moral view based upon dignity and respect cannot take properties of persons-such as their citizenship-as morally arbitrary, that any justification of what counts as equal opportunity sets must be based upon national cultural understandings, that a positive account of equality of opportunity cannot adequately handle the fact of value pluralism across the globe, and that the principle of equality of opportunity is incompatible with national self-determination. In the course of defending the principle of equality of opportunity from these criticisms, I make revisions to my previously published defense of the principle.

Self-Realization and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Priority Rule ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Richard Arneson

AbstractThe lexical priority of fair equality of opportunity in John Rawls’s justice as fairness, which has been sharply criticized by Larry Alexander and Richard Arneson among others, is left almost entirely undefended in Rawls’s works. I argue here that this priority rule can be successfully defended against its critics despite Rawls’s own doubts about it. Using the few textual clues he provides, I speculatively reconstruct his defense of this rule, showing that it can be grounded on our interest in self-realization through work. This reconstructed defense makes liberal use of concepts already present in A Theory of Justice, including the Aristotelian Principle (which motivates the achievement of increasing virtuosity) and the Humboldtian concept of social union (which provides the context for the development of such virtuosity). I also show that this commitment to self-realization, far from violating the priority of right in Rawls’s theory, stems directly from his underlying commitment to autonomy, which is the very foundation of the moral law in his doctrine of right. The reconstituted defense of this priority rule not only strengthens the case for justice as fairness but also has important and controversial implications for public policy.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document