scholarly journals TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY POLICY, SIGNALING, AND HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Hahn
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Heterogeneous Information ◽  
Conflict Of Interests ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Output Variance

We examine the welfare implications of two types of central-bank transparency: the publication of the information underlying the central bank's decision (decision transparency) and the release of the information that the central bank observes afterwards (postdecision transparency). Decision transparency does not make the public better informed in equilibrium. Even so, it may be socially desirable because it eliminates harmful equilibria. Postdecision transparency has ambiguous effects. It reduces output variance and the distortions stemming from heterogeneous information. In this sense, it can be used as a substitute for monetary policy. However, postdecision transparency generally raises the variance of inflation. We argue that a conflict of interests may arise between society and the central bank with regard to transparency.

Central bank transparency, inflation targeting and monetary policy: a panel data approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Cristiane Gea
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Policy Interest

Purpose The evidence concerning the effects of the inflation targeting (IT) regime as well as greater central bank transparency on monetary policy interest rates is not conclusive, and the following questions remain open. What is the effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of monetary policy interest rate? Does central bank transparency affect the level of the monetary policy interest rate and its volatility? Are these effects greater in developing countries? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by answering these questions. Hence, the paper analyzes the effects of IT and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses a sample of 48 countries (31 developing) comprising the period between 1998 and 2014. Based on panel data methodology, estimates are made for the full sample, and then for the sample of developing countries. Findings Countries that adopt the IT regime tend to have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. The effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is smaller in developing countries. Besides, countries with more transparent central banks have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. In turn, the effect of central bank transparency on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is greater in developing countries. Practical implications The study brings important practical implications regarding the influence of both the IT regime and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Originality/value Studies have sought to analyze whether IT and central bank transparency are effective to control inflation. However, few studies analyze the influence of IT and central bank transparency on interest rates. This study differs from the few existing studies since: the analysis is done not only for the effect of transparency on the level of the monetary policy interest rate, but also on its volatility; the central bank transparency index that is used has never been utilized in this sort of analysis; and the study uses panel data methodology, and compares the results between different samples.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Massimo Rostagno ◽  
Carlo Altavilla ◽  
Giacomo Carboni ◽  
Wolfgang Lemke ◽  
Roberto Motto ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
20Th Anniversary

Institutions dedicated to serving the public good must look to the past to learn from experience; and look to the future to prepare, as best they can, for the trials that might lie ahead. The 20th anniversary of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) offers an opportunity to apply such a perspective to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB): to evaluate its accomplishments and to learn the lessons that can improve the conduct of its policy in the future....

scholarly journals Optimal Monetary Policy when Information is Market-Generated

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (628) ◽  
pp. 956-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenza Benhima ◽  
Isabella Blengini
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Supply Shocks ◽  
Individual Demand ◽  
Real Shocks

Abstract The nature of the private sector’s information changes the optimal conduct of monetary policy. When firms observe their individual demand and use it as a signal of real shocks, the optimal policy consists in maximising the information content of that signal. When real shocks are deflationary (like labour supply shocks), the optimal policy is countercyclical and magnifies price movements, which contrasts with the exogenous information case, where optimal monetary policy is procyclical and stabilises prices. When the central bank communicates its information to the public, this policy is still optimal if firms pay limited attention to central bank announcements.

Risks are high despite Turkey’s policy 'normalisation'

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Foreign Debt ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
High Inflation ◽  
The Government

Significance With the lira at a record low, the Central Bank continued to tighten monetary policy this week, funding the market through competitive one-month repo tenders at rates of around 12.5%. In recent weeks, the government and Central Bank have taken a series of steps to modify the expansionary and in some cases unorthodox policies adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Impacts Foreign portfolio investors could shun the Turkish market for some more months, and the risk premium will remain high. Although this year’s annual contraction in GDP, at 3-4%, may be less severe than expected, the recovery may decelerate or be interrupted. The lira may fall further with concerns about foreign debt, forex reserves, budgets, inflation and financial stability persisting into 2021. Given the weak lira, the jobs crisis and high inflation, the government will struggle to persuade the public it has managed the crisis well.

scholarly journals Modelling Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Deus Ex Machina?

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 56-69
Author(s):  
Florin Dumiter ◽  
Petre Brezeanu ◽  
Claudia Radu ◽  
Florin Turcas
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Core Element ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
High Degree

Abstract Central bank independence represents the core element of assessing the complex relationship between government and central bank, having at background the fundamental issue of a free monetary policy decision-making process from the hands of the political circle. However, central bank independence is a multilevel concept within some social, economic and behavioral implications both for the central banks and for the society at whole. Central bank independence is needed in order to establish an autonomous central bank with a high degree of freedom in choosing its’ instruments, objectives, techniques and tactics. Moreover, a high degree of transparency for the public disclosure and monitoring of central bank operation and transaction is needed for the social barometer of the central bank. Consequently the central bank must have a high degree of accountability and responsibility vis - á - vis of the most democratic institution, i.e. Parliament. In this article it is presented a comprehensive study regarding the complex relationship between central bank independence and inflation by modeling these two monetary policy panacea, in order to make a fine tuning regarding the causal relationship established in a heterodox manner.

scholarly journals Competence Implies Credibility

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Moscarini
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
The State ◽  
The Public ◽  
Inflation Bias ◽  
State Of The Economy ◽  
Bias Ratio ◽  
Message Space

The (reputation for) competence of a central bank at doing its job makes monetary policy under discretion credible and transparent. Based on its reading of the state of the economy, the central bank announces its policy intentions to the public in a cheap-talk game. The precision of its private signal measures its competence. The fineness of the equilibrium message space measures its credibility and transparency. This is increasing in the competence/inflation bias ratio: the public expects a competent central bank to use its discretion more to pursue its “objective” targets than to surprise expectations and stimulate output. (JEL E52, E58)

scholarly journals Does Monetary Policy Credibility Help in Anchoring Inflation Expectations? Evidence from Six Inflation Targeting Emerging Economies

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Aslı Güler
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
The Public ◽  
Inflation Expectation ◽  
Using Data

Abstract Most emerging market central banks have adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy system. The heart of inflation targeting system is inflation expectations. The success of a central bank in achieving targets depends on to the extent to which inflation expectations are formed by the announced targets. As the credibility of the central bank increases, its ability to affect the public expectation also increases. The public adjusts its inflation expectations based on announced inflation target only in case of that they believe that the central bank has the sufficiency to reach the inflation target. Credibility enables expectation to be formed in a forward-looking way by weakening its connection with the past. This study aims to contribute to the literature concerning the effects of credibility on monetary policy. For this purpose, using data of six emerging inflation targeting economies (Turkey, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Chile, Poland, and South Africa), the empirical tests were carried out in order to understand the effect of the credibility on the behaviour of inflation expectation in emerging economies. The findings denote that credibility is quite relevant to reduce inflation expectations and contributes to the strength of inflation targets being an anchor for inflation expectations.

The ECB’s quantitative easing programme as a constitutional game changer

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-107
Author(s):  
Klaus Tuori
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central

The European Central Bank started its quantitative easing programme in 2015 in order to support euro area financial conditions and ultimately increase inflation. The controversial Public Sector Purchase programme has resulted in central bank purchases of government bonds in the magnitude of €2.1 trillion and the Eurosystem (the European Central Bank and the national central banks) become the largest creditor to the euro area Member States. The constitutional framework of the European Central Bank did foresee such a programme, which also makes it potentially problematic for the European Central Bank’s accountability. The underlying source for constitutional concerns is the European Central Bank’s exceptional independence, which could be justified with a narrow central banking model, but becomes problematic when the European Central Bank’s influence on the society becomes more multifaceted, which blurs the borderlines between monetary policy and other economic policies. The specific constitutional concerns related to the Public Sector Purchase programme and accountability are highlighted by three claims: (a) With the Public Sector Purchase programme, the European Central Bank takes deeper inroads to the society than with traditional monetary policy; (b) Through the Public Sector Purchase programme, the European Central Bank became the largest creditor to Member States it was not allowed to finance; and (c) The Public Sector Purchase programme can lead to conflicts between the price stability objective and financial stability.

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