scholarly journals Competence Implies Credibility

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Moscarini

The (reputation for) competence of a central bank at doing its job makes monetary policy under discretion credible and transparent. Based on its reading of the state of the economy, the central bank announces its policy intentions to the public in a cheap-talk game. The precision of its private signal measures its competence. The fineness of the equilibrium message space measures its credibility and transparency. This is increasing in the competence/inflation bias ratio: the public expects a competent central bank to use its discretion more to pursue its “objective” targets than to surprise expectations and stimulate output. (JEL E52, E58)

Author(s):  
Massimo Rostagno ◽  
Carlo Altavilla ◽  
Giacomo Carboni ◽  
Wolfgang Lemke ◽  
Roberto Motto ◽  
...  

Institutions dedicated to serving the public good must look to the past to learn from experience; and look to the future to prepare, as best they can, for the trials that might lie ahead. The 20th anniversary of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) offers an opportunity to apply such a perspective to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB): to evaluate its accomplishments and to learn the lessons that can improve the conduct of its policy in the future....


2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (628) ◽  
pp. 956-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenza Benhima ◽  
Isabella Blengini

Abstract The nature of the private sector’s information changes the optimal conduct of monetary policy. When firms observe their individual demand and use it as a signal of real shocks, the optimal policy consists in maximising the information content of that signal. When real shocks are deflationary (like labour supply shocks), the optimal policy is countercyclical and magnifies price movements, which contrasts with the exogenous information case, where optimal monetary policy is procyclical and stabilises prices. When the central bank communicates its information to the public, this policy is still optimal if firms pay limited attention to central bank announcements.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. e1019-e1027
Author(s):  
Julian A. Parra-Polania

Abstract Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 006-024
Author(s):  
Svetlana Kirdina-Chandler ◽  

For the study of the institutionalization of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia, an institutional-evolutionary approach was used, based on the ideas of Thorstein B. Veblen and Joseph A. Schumpeter, as well as John R. Commons. The object of the analysis was the institutional structures of money circulation, which are the most significant from the public interest point of view. The paper compares the results of the institutionalisation of money circulation in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of transitional periods. In transitional periods there was a rejection, filtration, and correction of institutional forms of money circulation in terms of their compliance with public goals to develop the country's socio-economic system. The following features of the institutional design of the Soviet model are identified: first, the presence of a single-link, a hierarchical, centralized banking system with the concentration of the entire payment turnover system in the State Bank of the USSR; second, the existence of a "three-circuit system" of money turnover with cash for servicing the turnover of consumer goods, non-cash money for industrial consumption (investment) and convertible rubles for international export-import payments; third, the division of money turnover was supported by the creation of special banking institutions for servicing each of them, controlled by the State Bank of the USSR - the "State Labour Savings Banks", "Stroybank" and "Vneshtorgbank", respectively; fourth, the institutions of money circulation were an internal element of the system of the planned national economy of the USSR and were organically integrated into it. The institutionalisation of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia is characterized by the presence of new (albeit previously represented in the history of our country) institutions and has the following features: first, a two-tier banking system, the upper level of which is represented by the Central Bank of Russia, and the lower level is represented by banks and non-banking credit institutions; second, organizations of various forms of ownership operate in the sphere of money circulation, while state forms of ownership are playing an increasingly significant role; third, there is a stock exchange where stocks, bonds, currencies and other instruments of the money market are traded. The official exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Russia is based on stock quotes; fourth, the Federal Treasury operates to mediate the movement of budgetary funds. An additional element of control over their use is the introduction of "treasury accounts", to which budget funds are transferred and from where they are used for the implementation of state development programs. As a result, one can see that the process of institutional renewal of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia is associated with the return to a number of institutions characteristic of pre-revolutionary and Soviet history. Therefore we can talk about a new "old" institutionalisation of money circulation in post-Soviet Russia. The main vector of changes in recent years is associated with the increasing recognition of the social significance of this sphere, serving the public interest. A forecast has been made that state control over the processes of money circulation in modern Russia is likely to increase.


Significance With the lira at a record low, the Central Bank continued to tighten monetary policy this week, funding the market through competitive one-month repo tenders at rates of around 12.5%. In recent weeks, the government and Central Bank have taken a series of steps to modify the expansionary and in some cases unorthodox policies adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Impacts Foreign portfolio investors could shun the Turkish market for some more months, and the risk premium will remain high. Although this year’s annual contraction in GDP, at 3-4%, may be less severe than expected, the recovery may decelerate or be interrupted. The lira may fall further with concerns about foreign debt, forex reserves, budgets, inflation and financial stability persisting into 2021. Given the weak lira, the jobs crisis and high inflation, the government will struggle to persuade the public it has managed the crisis well.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-610
Author(s):  
David M. Woodruff

Robert C. Hockett’s “franchise view” argues, convincingly, that the capacity of banks or quasi-bank financial entities to create money rests on the laws, regulations, and guarantees of the state under which they operate. Fred Block advocates the use of this insight as a beachhead for establishing the legitimacy of locally embedded, nonprofit lenders whose investments would be dedicated to public purposes. However, given the pervasive influence of “everyday libertarianism,” which fosters blindness to the public character of private economic power, this commentary warns of possible counterproductive consequences of this proposal unless it is fused to the democratization of central banking. An end to central bank independence would highlight the ineliminable role of the state in the market and make that role easier to reshape. It would also end the dynamic whereby monetary easing provides political cover for damaging fiscal austerity and thus lead to better democratic deliberation on the contours of policy.


2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helge Berger ◽  
Marcel Thum

Abstract Central banks are often considered to be better informed about the present or future state of the economy than the government. A conservative central bank has an incentive to exploit this asymmetry by strategically managing its information policy. Strategic news management will keep the government uncertain about the state of the economy and increase the central bank's leeway for conducting a conservative monetary policy. We show that withholding information from the government is an equilibrium. However, there are also well-defined limits to strategic information policy as the central bank has to distort monetary policy to be in line with its news management. A simple extension of our findings is that, if the government on occasion learns about the bank's true information, it will then overrule the central bank's decision on monetary policy.


Author(s):  
Karin Thrasher

Banknotes, or cash, can be used continuously by any person for nearly every transaction and provide anonymity for the parties. However, as digitization increases, the role and form of money is changing. In response to pressure produced by the increase in new forms of money and the potential for a cashless society, states are exploring potential substitutes to cash. Governments have begun to investigate the intersection of digitization and fiat currency: Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”). States have begun researching and developing CBDCs to serve in lieu of cash. Central banks are analyzing the potential for a CBDC that could be made available to the public and serve as a substitute for cash by providing an alternate, safe, and robust payment instrument. However, the greatest attribute of cash is that it protects purchaser anonymity. Fully eliminating cash, without a substitute that safeguards anonymity, would undermine privacy of individuals. The creation of a CBDC in response to the potential cashless society raises the question whether the anonymity previously provided by cash must be safeguarded by the state. This note posits that a central bank in a cashless society must opt for the token-based form of CBDC, which provides the most privacy to individuals. States that choose an account-based CBDC will be in violation of fundamental international privacy principles. This note begins by drawing the crucial distinction between account-based and token-based currencies. Then, this note argues that the broad right to privacy in the digital age is inclusive of personal financial data; this data is subject to the lawful and arbitrary standards of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Applying the ICCPR framework, it becomes abundantly clear that the privacy of individuals must be protected, even in the rapidly changing landscape of payments in the digital age.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Hahn

We examine the welfare implications of two types of central-bank transparency: the publication of the information underlying the central bank's decision (decision transparency) and the release of the information that the central bank observes afterwards (postdecision transparency). Decision transparency does not make the public better informed in equilibrium. Even so, it may be socially desirable because it eliminates harmful equilibria. Postdecision transparency has ambiguous effects. It reduces output variance and the distortions stemming from heterogeneous information. In this sense, it can be used as a substitute for monetary policy. However, postdecision transparency generally raises the variance of inflation. We argue that a conflict of interests may arise between society and the central bank with regard to transparency.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARVID J. LUKAUSKAS ◽  
YUMIKO SHIMABUKURO

In 1997, the Japanese Diet revised the Bank of Japan law thereby granting the central bank greater independence in monetary policy making. The revision was an attempt by Japan's political class to weaken the authority of the powerful Ministry of Finance over the central bank and augment its own influence. The Bank of Japan, however, gained more autonomy than politicians ever intended, leading to frequent confrontations between the government and the central bank over monetary policy. This paper explores the new strategic relationship that emerged between the Bank of Japan and government and the nature of monetary policy implemented in the post-reform period. We demonstrate that several factors contributed to the Bank's unexpected ability to enhance its independence: the astute leadership of the first post-reform governor Hayami Masaru; the Bank's ability to turn politicization of monetary policy to its advantage; and its pursuit of a ‘power through knowledge’ strategy achieved by augmenting its own research capacity. On a theoretical level, our findings show that the passage of a new legal framework only marks the completion of one stage of institutional change and the start of the next; post-enactment politics have as much importance as pre-enactment politics in shaping outcomes. In the post-enactment phase, various factors, including the state of the economy and informal institutions or processes, matter greatly and may shift the direction of institutional change away from the intended path.


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