Global Human Rights, Peace and Cultural Difference: Huntington and the Political Philosophy of International Relations

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 5-34
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kersting

SummaryIn 1989, the age of power political realism ended. The conditions were set to replace the prevailing Hobbesian model of peace by deterrence with the considerably more challenging Kantian model of peace by right. If, however, Huntington's paradigm of fighting civilizations were right, we would have to forget Kant and remember Hobbes. Sober rationality, healthy distrust, striving for power accumulation and all the other instruments from the realist's toolbox of political prudence are very well suited to facilitate political self-assertion in an age of violently clashing cultures. However, this helplessness is not well grounded. Considering that from the very beginning liberalism is a theory of religious and ethical pluralism and well-experienced in dealing with problems of multiculturalism, it is at least possible to argue for a weak liberal universalism which provides normative foundations for a global order of peacefully living together. Of course, conceptual and moral modesty is crucial. If the human rights doctrine wants to defend its universal claim in the face of cultural diversity (which is defined as culturally different interpretations of a good, true and perfect human life), it has to restrict itself to the conditions of esse: the pre-cultural and sheer natural conditions of human being and human coexistence. However, the formulation of the conditions of bene esse (which enable human flourishing, let persons thrive and furnish human living with sense and significance) has to be left to culture and its authorities and belief systems which buttress a cultural constitution of meaning, both theologically and metaphysically. Traditional natural rights theory knew that both have to go together, and that the esse-enabling duties necessarily enjoy priority. No cultural conception of thriving life and existential significance can be accepted which contradicts the fundamental imperatives and conditions of pure human existence and coexistence.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
Castor M. M. Bartolomé Ruiz

Os direitos humanos, enquanto discurso e prática, sempre estão em construção, desafiados pelos acontecimentos históricos de cada tempo. Nosso tempo vive sob o impacto de uma pandemia que tem provocado profundas mudanças no modo de vida e nas estratégias governamentais. Entre outras questões, a pandemia tem retirado a máscara dos principais argumentos do modelo neoliberal, particularmente em vários dos principios que sustentavam sua filosofia do homo economicus. A redução da vida humana a mera variável econômica, substrato do neoliberalismo, mostrou na pandemia as reais consequências de uma tanatopolítica que prioriza a economia em detrimento da vida humana. A obstinada negação pregada pelo neoliberalismo do valor do público e da dimensão comunitária, tem mostrado sua intrínseca fragilidade durante a pandemia, pois só os países que mantiveram um sistema público de saúde consistente conseguiram enfrentar de modo coletivo e efetivo as graves sequelas da pandemia. Por último, a cultura do individualismo, tão insistentemente inoculada em nossas subjetividades pelo neoliberalismo, também ruiu perante a radical interdepência que a pandemia mostrou existir entre todos nossos atos individuais e suas consequências comunitárias. A pandemia evidenciou que todos somos responsáveis por todos e que meus atos individuais repercutem diretamente sobre os demais.  Essa interdependência constitutiva do humano é o fio que mostra que os direitos individuais são o desdobramento das obrigações de nossa responsabilidade para com os outros.    Human rights, the commodification of life and the pandemic Human rights, as a discurse and practice, are always under construction, challenged by the historical events of each time. Our time lives under the impact of a pandemic that has removed the mask of the main arguments of the neoliberal model, particularly in several of the principles that supported its philosophy of homo economicus. The reduction of human life to a mere economic variable, a substrate of neoliberalism, showed in the pandemic the real consequences of a thanatopolitics that prioritizes the economy at the the expense of human life. The obstinate denial preached by neoliberalims of the value of the public and the community dimension, has shown its intrinsic fragility during the pandemic, as only countries that maintained a consistent public health system were able to face the serius consequences of the pandemic collectively ond effectively. Finally, the culture of individualism, so insistently inoculated into our subjetivities by neoliberalim, has also collapsed in the face of the radical interdepence that the pandemic has shown to exist between all our individual acts and their community consequences. The pandemic has shown that we are all responsible for everyone and that my individual actions have a direct impact on others. This constitutive interdependence of the humam is the thread that shows that individual rights are the unfolding of the obligations of our responsibility to others. Keywords: Human rights. Neoliberalism. Homo economicus. Pandemic. Alterity


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-106
Author(s):  
ASTEMIR ZHURTOV ◽  

Cruel and inhumane acts that harm human life and health, as well as humiliate the dignity, are prohibited in most countries of the world, and Russia is no exception in this issue. The article presents an analysis of the institution of responsibility for torture in the Russian Federation. The author comes to the conclusion that the current criminal law of Russia superficially and fragmentally regulates liability for torture, in connection with which the author formulated the proposals to define such act as an independent crime. In the frame of modern globalization, the world community pays special attention to the protection of human rights, in connection with which large-scale international standards have been created a long time ago. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international acts enshrine prohibitions of cruel and inhumane acts that harm human life and health, as well as degrade the dignity.Considering the historical experience of the past, these standards focus on the prohibition of any kind of torture, regardless of the purpose of their implementation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-291
Author(s):  
Manuel A. Vasquez ◽  
Anna L. Peterson

In this article, we explore the debates surrounding the proposed canonization of Archbishop Oscar Romero, an outspoken defender of human rights and the poor during the civil war in El Salvador, who was assassinated in March 1980 by paramilitary death squads while saying Mass. More specifically, we examine the tension between, on the one hand, local and popular understandings of Romero’s life and legacy and, on the other hand, transnational and institutional interpretations. We argue that the reluctance of the Vatican to advance Romero’s canonization process has to do with the need to domesticate and “privatize” his image. This depoliticization of Romero’s work and teachings is a part of a larger agenda of neo-Romanization, an attempt by the Holy See to redeploy a post-colonial and transnational Catholic regime in the face of the crisis of modernity and the advent of postmodern relativism. This redeployment is based on the control of local religious expressions, particularly those that advocate for a more participatory church, which have proliferated with contemporary globalization


Author(s):  
Mary L. Hirschfeld

There are two ways to answer the question, What can Catholic social thought learn from the social sciences about the common good? A more modern form of Catholic social thought, which primarily thinks of the common good in terms of the equitable distribution of goods like health, education, and opportunity, could benefit from the extensive literature in public policy, economics, and political science, which study the role of institutions and policies in generating desirable social outcomes. A second approach, rooted in pre-Machiavellian Catholic thought, would expand on this modern notion to include concerns about the way the culture shapes our understanding of what genuine human flourishing entails. On that account, the social sciences offer a valuable description of human life; but because they underestimate how human behavior is shaped by institutions, policies, and the discourse of social science itself, their insights need to be treated with caution.


Author(s):  
Mark Migotti

In this chapter, the author attempts to establish what is philosophically living and what is philosophically dead in Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Against the background of the intriguing the history of the terms “optimism” and “pessimism”—in debates about Leibniz’s theodicy in the early eighteenth century and the popularity of Schopenhauer in the late nineteenth century, respectively—the author points up the distinction between affirming life, which all living beings do naturally, and subscribing to philosophical optimism (or pessimism), which is possible only for reflective beings like us. Next, the author notes the significance of Schopenhauer’s claim that optimism is a necessary condition of theism and explains its bearing on his pessimistic argument for the moral unacceptability of suicide. The chapter concludes that Schopenhauer’s case for pessimism is not conclusive, but instructive; his dim view of the prospects for leading a truly rewarding, worthwhile human life draws vivid attention to important questions about how and to what degree an atheistic world can nevertheless be conducive to human flourishing.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Maruma Mrema

While 2020 –dubbed the “Super Year for Nature –has seen the world battling an unforeseen global pandemic, this article comes back on the Convention of Biological Diversity and its regime, studies the aim of the negotiations of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework and the relevance of this framework for the planet, considering that the protection of biological diversity impacts all aspects of human life, including the full enjoying of human rights and protection against future pandemics.


Author(s):  
Susan Petrilli

AbstractIdentity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: (1) Premiss; (2) Justice, uniqueness, and love; (3) Sign and language; (4) Dialogue and alterity; (5) Semiotic materiality; (6) Globalization and the trap of identity; (7) Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; (8) Ethics; (9) The World; (10) Outside the subject; (11) Responsibility and Substitution; (12) The face; (13) Fear of the other; (14) Alterity and justice; (15) Justice and proximity; (16) Literary writing; (17) Unjust justice; (18) Caring for the other.


2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Krisch

The consensual structure of the international legal order, with its strong emphasis on the sovereign equality of states, has always been somewhat precarious. In different waves over the centuries, it has been attacked for its incongruence with the realities of inequality in international politics, for its tension with ideals of democracy and human rights, and for standing in the way of more effective problem solving in the international community. While surprisingly resilient in the face of such challenges, the consensual structure has seen renewed attacks in recent years. In the 1990s, those attacks were mainly “moral” in character. They were related to the liberal turn in international law, and some of them, under the banner of human rights, aimed at weakening principles of nonintervention and immunity. Others, starting from the idea of an emerging “international community,” questioned the prevailing contractual models of international law and emphasized the rise of norms and processes reflecting community values rather than individual state interests. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the focus has shifted, and attacks are more often framed in terms of effectiveness or global public goods. Classical international law is regarded as increasingly incapable of providing much-needed solutions for the challenges of a globalized world; as countries become ever more interdependent and vulnerable to global challenges, an order that safeguards states’ freedoms at the cost of common policies is often seen as anachronistic. According to this view, what is needed—and what we are likely to see—is a turn to nonconsensual lawmaking mechanisms, especially through powerful international institutions with majoritarian voting rules.


2008 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Yee Karen Lee

AbstractThe idea of “human dignity” is accorded a prominent status in domestic constitutions and international human rights law. Its symbolism as a universal ground of human rights sits awkwardly with the absence of a precise definition. The concept has evolved over history and has been interpreted in various ways by people holding different worldviews. The elusive nature of human dignity creates challenges when it is evaluated across cultures. Despite its common association with the concept of liberal democracy, the idea of human worthiness is not necessarily absent in Asian societies, many of which function under alternative political systems.A cross-cultural perspective requires putting aside ethnocentrism and exploring the convergence of views from different belief systems. Examples from Confucianism and Islam may provide insights on how human dignity is understood and realized in various Asian contexts.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Israel de Jesús Butler

AbstractThe continuous transfer of authority from the national sphere to inter-governmental organizations gives rise to an increasing risk that States may be mandated by their obligations under these organizations to take measures that are inconsistent with their obligations under International Human Rights Law. Drawing on the approaches of various international, regional and national jurisdictions, this article explores two possible models for restructuring International Law that could ensure that human rights obligations remain effective. The ‘international constitutional’ approach would ensure that human rights are enshrined within the ‘constitutional’ instruments of IGOs, preventing incompatible rules from emerging. The ‘parochial’ approach would ensure that human rights as protected at the national or regional level would take precedence over conflicting international obligations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document