scholarly journals PRAGMATIC UTOPIANISM AND RACE: H. G. WELLS AS SOCIAL SCIENTIST

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 863-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
DUNCAN BELL

H. G. Wells was one of the most celebrated writers in the world during the first half of the twentieth century. Famed for his innovative fiction, he was also an influential advocate of socialism and the world-state. What is much less well known is that he was a significant contributor to debates about the nature of social science. This article argues that Wells's account of social science in general, and sociology in particular, was shaped by an idiosyncratic philosophical pragmatism. In order to demonstrate how his philosophical arguments inflected his social thought, it explores his attack on prevailing theories of race, while also highlighting the limits of his analysis. The article concludes by tracing the reception of Wells's ideas among social scientists and political thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic. Although his program for utopian sociology attracted few disciples, his arguments about the dynamics of modern societies found a large audience.

Thesis Eleven ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 072551362110643
Author(s):  
Christopher Houston

Pierre Bourdieu famously dismissed phenomenology as offering anything useful to a critical science of society – even as he drew heavily upon its themes in his own work. This paper makes a case for why Bourdieu’s judgement should not be the last word on phenomenology. To do so it first reanimates phenomenology’s evocative language and concepts to illustrate their continuing centrality to social scientists’ ambitions to apprehend human engagement with the world. Part II shows how two crucial insights of phenomenology, its discovery of both the natural attitude and of the phenomenological epoche, allow an account of perception properly responsive to its intertwined personal and collective aspects. Contra Bourdieu, the paper’s third section asserts that phenomenology’s substantive socio-cultural analysis simultaneously entails methodological consequences for the social scientist, reversing their suspension of disbelief vis-à-vis the life-worlds of interlocutors and inaugurating the suspension of belief vis-à-vis their own natural attitudes.


2008 ◽  
Vol 80 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 245-252
Author(s):  
Olivia Maria Gomes da Cunha

[First paragraph]Measures of Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902-1940. Alejandra Marina Bronfman. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. xi + 234 pp. (Paper US$ 19.95)Afro-Cuban Religiosity, Revolution, and National Identity. Christine Ayorinde. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004. ix + 283 pp. (Cloth US$ 59.95)In the last ten years, research topics such as race and nation have been privileged areas for the historical and anthropological understanding of Caribbean and Latin American societies. Regarding Cuba in particular, social scientists have dedicated important scholarship to these issues by mapping conceptions of citizenship and political representation, while situating them within a broader debate on the making of the new postcolonial and republican society at the beginning of the twentieth century. By pursuing different aims and following distinct approaches, Alejandra Bronfman and Christine Ayorinde have made contributions to this academic literature. Through divergent theoretical and methodological perspectives, both of their books explore alternative ways of interpreting the making of the nation founded upon a multiple and fluid rhetoric of race.


1982 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacquelyn Mitchell

Jacquelyn Mitchell describes her experiences as a teacher in a compensatory preschool program and later as a graduate student and researcher, examining a number of issues relevant to black social scientists. She discusses some dilemmas (such as bicultural awareness and a sense of double marginality) of the black social scientist who is seeking a place in the academic/research world—simultaneously questioning the sociopolitical nature of social science inquiry and asking how research can more adequately reflect the reality of black people's lives.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. v-viii
Author(s):  
Ejaz Akram

Science Without Philosophy?Many of our readers and contributors have raised questions regarding thevarious definitions of social science and their relation to the scope of MISS.Definitions of social science have changed with time and place, and one of thereasons for that is not what is “social,” but what is “science”? “Science” inFrench, or “wissenschaft” in German, do not translate exactly the same as“science” in English. In English speaking world, “science” has an associationwith hard sciences while social sciences have been tacitly considered to be softsciences, or not sciences at all. Such a distinction does not exist in otherlanguages.It is not our intent here to provide a mere taxonomy of the meanings ofscience, but to develop an understanding as well as a consensus that socialsciences and their sub-disciplines are, without exception, based on certainparadigms that are philosophical in nature. Being a social scientist without theknowledge of these philosophical assumptions, upon which the paradigms ofthe socia1 sciences rest, is to willingly escape the full picture. Properphilosophical training, therefore, has a deep nexus with the methods of socialscience, and constitutes a necessary pre-requisite of understanding theparadigms. Paradigms establish the agenda and the agenda dictates the policy.social sciences therefore become a vehicle of understanding the society inconsonance with the accepted philosophical truths.Philosophical exposition of concepts and ideas in turn necessitates adefinition of philosophy itself. All definitions of philosophy will point tocertain “givens” or a priori assumptions that precede all scientific inquiry. Ifsocial sciences stay within the realm of the positivist paradigm, the problemmay seemingly be solved, but reducing inquiry to empiricism has its own pitfallsand the atomistic division in today’s academia is a direct result of that.Further, it restricts the scope of those social scientists who also happen to bebelievers in transcendental Truth. Conversely, to the degree that philosophy is ...


Author(s):  
Michael Banton

The first theories of race were attempts to explain why the peoples of Europe (or sometimes particular peoples within Europe) had developed a higher civilization than the peoples of other regions. They attributed inequality in development to different biological inheritance, undervaluing the importance of the learning process. Between the world wars social scientists demonstrated how many apparently natural differences, and attitudes towards other groups, were not inherited but learned behaviour. They asked instead why people should entertain false ideas about members of other groups. As the twentieth century comes to an end, it is claimed on the one hand that processes of racial group formation can be explained in the same terms as those used for explaining group phenomena in general. On the other hand it is maintained that the only possible theories are those explaining why, in particular societies and at particular times, racism assumes a given form.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Sezgin Selvi ◽  
Selcuk Besir Demir

This qualitative study was conducted to compare the perceptions of students with gifted intelligence and studentswith those of normal intelligence about social science and social scientists. The data obtained from 23 giftedintelligent and 23 normal participants within the same age group was analysed using content analysis and resultswere represented with a straight and systematic language. A significant part of normal participants confused socialscience teacher with social scientist. Both groups find a social scientist happy. Social scientist was represented asyoung and dynamic, was thought without hindrance as well. As a common finding, gender is significant for bothgroups and males were distinguished. They do not sufficiently recognise social scientists. However, normalintelligence participants confuse social sciences with the natural sciences and they give names of both naturalscientists and inventors instead of social scientists.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Streeck

It is not only economics that needs to regain a sense of history but also much of social science. Like economists social scientists need to liberate themselves from a Newtonian clockwork view of the world, and from a view of social reality as an emanation and arbitrary illustration of universal laws governing social life in general. Social science needs a renewed awareness of its origins in a systematic theory of historical social development and evolution, of endogenous social dynamics, and of directionality of social and institutional change, especially in contemporary capitalism, free from historical teleology and economic determinism.


Philosophy ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 54 (210) ◽  
pp. 473-483
Author(s):  
Jay Newman

Once upon a time, when there was no psychoanalysis or cultural anthro-pology or meta-ethics, most philosophers believed that there was objective truth in such statements as, ‘Murder is wrong’, ‘One should not steal’, and ‘Heliogabalus was an evil man’. Many philosophers still believe that there is, and though their view is not wholly respectable in most English-speaking philosophical circles, it probably has the important merit of being true. There are serious reasons for worrying about the traditional view: it is not clear how an ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’; there are problems s e in trying to translate evaluative terms into descriptive ones; reflective men disagree profoundly on ethical issues; ethical judgments appear to have an emotive component; etc. Still, there are also very good reasons for believing that murder is wrong and that Heliogabalus was an evil man. I shall not defend the objectivity of statements of the form, ‘X is good (bad, evil, right, wrong)’, for I am not at all worried about such statements passing out of the language of rational men. Even behaviourists and relativists and emotivists still make reasonably intelligent statements of this form. But I am worried about the future of a related class of statements, those of the form, ‘X is civilized (barbarous)’. These statements have been gradually disappearing from our discourse; perhaps they have been casualties of recent revolutions in social science and philosophy. And this state of affairs is a tragic one indeed, for not only is there a need for statements of this form, but of all ethical statements, these are the ones whose descriptive content is most incontrovertible. Non-cognitivistic moral philosophers generally dismiss statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ along with statements about the ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. But social scientists have made statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ special objects of attack. They have even suggested that people who make such statements are narrow-minded, naive, and ‘ethnocentric’. ‘Ethnocentrism’, an eminent social scientist tells us, ‘is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.’ Ethnocentrism is innocent enough up to a point, but reflective men should be careful not to allow it to blind their moral sense. The noted anthropologist, Herskovits, has given us the following warning:Cultures are sometimes evaluated by the use of the designations ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’. These terms have a deceptive simplicity, and attempts to document the differences implied in them have proved to be of unexpected difficulty.


2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 466-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow ◽  
Marta Kołczyńska ◽  
Kazimierz M Slomczynski ◽  
Irina Tomescu-Dubrow

Professional events that feature face-to-face interaction of social scientists from across the world are, next to publications and research, important forms of scientific knowledge production and dissemination. Thus, they are vital to the World Science System (WSS). Like other WSS elements, scholarly involvement in international social science events is characterized by unequal cross-national representation. This article focuses in-depth on the International Sociological Association (ISA), a major international social science professional association, to examine inequality in attendance at its flagship conferences. To what extent do countries differ with respect to the number of scholars attending ISA conferences? What factors drive attendance? The authors base their hypotheses on the economic, political and social dimensions that influence country representation. To test these hypotheses the authors use a dataset containing information on 212 countries and their participation in the eight ISA conferences – World Congresses and Forums – held from 1990 to 2012. Results show that a country’s GDP, level of democracy and social science research infrastructure (SSRI) substantially determine their level of representation. SSRI effects are significant above and beyond the effect of GDP and of other controls. Findings also show a meaningful over-time decrease in representation inequality according to countries’ GDP.


1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (03) ◽  
pp. 294-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan MacRae

“…[T]hereis no necessary conflict among these three desires of the American social scientist: to be a scientist like physical and biological scientists, to provide useful technical services, and to be significant at the level of policy. The chapters of this symposium are intended to illustrate their compatibility.”This statement indicates a major theme ofThe Policy Sciences– a volume that marked, as of 1951, the aspirations of a group of leading American social scientists for the policy applications of their disciplines. The harmony of goals that it suggests is no longer evident today.The possibleincompatibilities among the goals of pure science, applied science, and policy can be seen by examiningThe Policy Sciencesin two decades' perspective. They are of three major kinds:1. To provide intelligent advice on practical problems, the social science disciplines need to include systematicvaluative discoursein a way that natural science does not.2. Applied social science (like applied science generally) differs from pure natural science in stressing valuative dependentvariablesthat may not be closely related to the conceptual schemes of pure science, and independent variables related to alternative choices open to the actor.3. Different roles andchannels of influenceare appropriate for pure and applied science; and for applied social science in democratic regimes, participation and consent on the part of those influenced are of vital significance.


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