scholarly journals The Full Circle

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. v-viii
Author(s):  
Ejaz Akram

Science Without Philosophy?Many of our readers and contributors have raised questions regarding thevarious definitions of social science and their relation to the scope of MISS.Definitions of social science have changed with time and place, and one of thereasons for that is not what is “social,” but what is “science”? “Science” inFrench, or “wissenschaft” in German, do not translate exactly the same as“science” in English. In English speaking world, “science” has an associationwith hard sciences while social sciences have been tacitly considered to be softsciences, or not sciences at all. Such a distinction does not exist in otherlanguages.It is not our intent here to provide a mere taxonomy of the meanings ofscience, but to develop an understanding as well as a consensus that socialsciences and their sub-disciplines are, without exception, based on certainparadigms that are philosophical in nature. Being a social scientist without theknowledge of these philosophical assumptions, upon which the paradigms ofthe socia1 sciences rest, is to willingly escape the full picture. Properphilosophical training, therefore, has a deep nexus with the methods of socialscience, and constitutes a necessary pre-requisite of understanding theparadigms. Paradigms establish the agenda and the agenda dictates the policy.social sciences therefore become a vehicle of understanding the society inconsonance with the accepted philosophical truths.Philosophical exposition of concepts and ideas in turn necessitates adefinition of philosophy itself. All definitions of philosophy will point tocertain “givens” or a priori assumptions that precede all scientific inquiry. Ifsocial sciences stay within the realm of the positivist paradigm, the problemmay seemingly be solved, but reducing inquiry to empiricism has its own pitfallsand the atomistic division in today’s academia is a direct result of that.Further, it restricts the scope of those social scientists who also happen to bebelievers in transcendental Truth. Conversely, to the degree that philosophy is ...

Philosophy ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 54 (210) ◽  
pp. 473-483
Author(s):  
Jay Newman

Once upon a time, when there was no psychoanalysis or cultural anthro-pology or meta-ethics, most philosophers believed that there was objective truth in such statements as, ‘Murder is wrong’, ‘One should not steal’, and ‘Heliogabalus was an evil man’. Many philosophers still believe that there is, and though their view is not wholly respectable in most English-speaking philosophical circles, it probably has the important merit of being true. There are serious reasons for worrying about the traditional view: it is not clear how an ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’; there are problems s e in trying to translate evaluative terms into descriptive ones; reflective men disagree profoundly on ethical issues; ethical judgments appear to have an emotive component; etc. Still, there are also very good reasons for believing that murder is wrong and that Heliogabalus was an evil man. I shall not defend the objectivity of statements of the form, ‘X is good (bad, evil, right, wrong)’, for I am not at all worried about such statements passing out of the language of rational men. Even behaviourists and relativists and emotivists still make reasonably intelligent statements of this form. But I am worried about the future of a related class of statements, those of the form, ‘X is civilized (barbarous)’. These statements have been gradually disappearing from our discourse; perhaps they have been casualties of recent revolutions in social science and philosophy. And this state of affairs is a tragic one indeed, for not only is there a need for statements of this form, but of all ethical statements, these are the ones whose descriptive content is most incontrovertible. Non-cognitivistic moral philosophers generally dismiss statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ along with statements about the ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. But social scientists have made statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ special objects of attack. They have even suggested that people who make such statements are narrow-minded, naive, and ‘ethnocentric’. ‘Ethnocentrism’, an eminent social scientist tells us, ‘is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.’ Ethnocentrism is innocent enough up to a point, but reflective men should be careful not to allow it to blind their moral sense. The noted anthropologist, Herskovits, has given us the following warning:Cultures are sometimes evaluated by the use of the designations ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’. These terms have a deceptive simplicity, and attempts to document the differences implied in them have proved to be of unexpected difficulty.


1982 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacquelyn Mitchell

Jacquelyn Mitchell describes her experiences as a teacher in a compensatory preschool program and later as a graduate student and researcher, examining a number of issues relevant to black social scientists. She discusses some dilemmas (such as bicultural awareness and a sense of double marginality) of the black social scientist who is seeking a place in the academic/research world—simultaneously questioning the sociopolitical nature of social science inquiry and asking how research can more adequately reflect the reality of black people's lives.


1952 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 402-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Knorr

Although the term “imperialism” is gaining currency at present, social scientists in the English-speaking world continue to treat with slight interest the phenomena which the term seeks to identify. The authors of the two books under review are of continental European origin. This is hardly an unusual coincidence; the paucity of Anglo-American literature on imperialism contrasts oddly with the prolific stream of writings which has appeared in continental Europe during the last seventy years. One reason for this striking difference lies no doubt in the traditional reluctance of Anglo-American social scientists to generalize about the causation of historical events—and, without such generalization, no theory of imperialism is possible. There is a good deal to be said both for this unwillingness to generalize readily, and against the irrepressible enthusiasm with which European savants construct their sweeping theories. Yet neither can it be denied that the European tradition has produced theories of outstanding and abiding value for the understanding of social and political events. Both Marx and Freud, and many lesser lights, were of this tradition and one need not be Marxist or Freudian to appreciate how immensely their brilliant theories have enriched the social sciences in the Englishspeaking countries.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Sezgin Selvi ◽  
Selcuk Besir Demir

This qualitative study was conducted to compare the perceptions of students with gifted intelligence and studentswith those of normal intelligence about social science and social scientists. The data obtained from 23 giftedintelligent and 23 normal participants within the same age group was analysed using content analysis and resultswere represented with a straight and systematic language. A significant part of normal participants confused socialscience teacher with social scientist. Both groups find a social scientist happy. Social scientist was represented asyoung and dynamic, was thought without hindrance as well. As a common finding, gender is significant for bothgroups and males were distinguished. They do not sufficiently recognise social scientists. However, normalintelligence participants confuse social sciences with the natural sciences and they give names of both naturalscientists and inventors instead of social scientists.


1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert F. Hoselitz

When John Stuart Mill composed his System of Logic, he maintained that valid application of the comparative method to problems in the moral or social sciences is impossible, or, at best, inadmissible, since it must be based on a priori judgments. Mill founded his objection to the use of this method in social science on two essentially interrelated propositions: the uniqueness of each social event, and the multiplicity and variety of causal factors which may be considered as having a determining influence on these events. Although this conception of the special nature of social events has, on the whole, remained unchanged, social scientists have freely applied the comparative method to the analysis of social problems. History has been outstanding among the social sciences in rejecting longest the application of this method. The main argument against its use was derived from the description of history formulated by Ranke and his school, a description which was endowed with a philosophical underpinning by Windelband and Rickert, who classified sciences according to method into a nomothetic and an ideographic group. History was the ideographic science par excellence, and with the strong historical emphasis that was placed in Germany upon other social sciences as well, there was a tendency to return to the viewpoint of Mill and to regard as scientifically suspect generalizations in social science based on the application of the comparative method.


1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (03) ◽  
pp. 294-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan MacRae

“…[T]hereis no necessary conflict among these three desires of the American social scientist: to be a scientist like physical and biological scientists, to provide useful technical services, and to be significant at the level of policy. The chapters of this symposium are intended to illustrate their compatibility.”This statement indicates a major theme ofThe Policy Sciences– a volume that marked, as of 1951, the aspirations of a group of leading American social scientists for the policy applications of their disciplines. The harmony of goals that it suggests is no longer evident today.The possibleincompatibilities among the goals of pure science, applied science, and policy can be seen by examiningThe Policy Sciencesin two decades' perspective. They are of three major kinds:1. To provide intelligent advice on practical problems, the social science disciplines need to include systematicvaluative discoursein a way that natural science does not.2. Applied social science (like applied science generally) differs from pure natural science in stressing valuative dependentvariablesthat may not be closely related to the conceptual schemes of pure science, and independent variables related to alternative choices open to the actor.3. Different roles andchannels of influenceare appropriate for pure and applied science; and for applied social science in democratic regimes, participation and consent on the part of those influenced are of vital significance.


1990 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-101
Author(s):  
Karol J. Krotki

If the editor of this journal was given to that type C?f language slant, this review could begin with the question "Why is Pakistan fertility as low as it is?", or with the statement "Forty percent of Pakistan infertility is due to sterility"; or still differently "Pakistani mothers of sons are less fertile than those of daughters". However, as matters stand, we have to begin more soberly. 'This book has been there now for six years and it is rather late in the day to review it. Yet, it probably remains unknown to many readers and it does contain unusual information. The work is strong methodologically, and it applies in parts analytic methods not ordinarily used among demographers and social scientists in the English-speaking world. Most importantly, it relates Islam with fertility - analytically, seriously and respectfully. 'This reviewer is no judge of the religion-related parts of the book, but he knows the author personally. In fact, Kouaouci, a professor of demography and economic planning at the University of Algiers, spent the summer of 1988 at the University of Alberta preparing his paper for presentation to the Second African Population Conference at Dakar the following November. The author displayed not only all the external symptoms of a pious person, but carried the inner dignity and all-round friendliness of a truly religious man. More convincingly and objectively, all his important statements are generously documented in footnotes for experts to review.


Author(s):  
Ola Hall ◽  
Ibrahim Wahab

Drones are increasingly becoming a ubiquitous feature of society. They are being used for a multiplicity of applications for military, leisure, economic, and academic purposes. Their application in the latter, especially as social science research tools has seen a sharp uptake in the last decade. This has been possible due, largely, to significant developments in computerization and miniaturization which have culminated in safer, cheaper, lighter, and thus more accessible drones for social scientists. Despite their increasingly widespread use, there has not been an adequate reflection on their use in the spatial social sciences. There is need a deeper reflection on their application in these fields of study. Should the drone even be considered a tool in the toolbox of the social scientist? In which fields is it most relevant? Should it be taught as a course in the universities much in the same way that geographic information system (GIS) became mainstream in geography? What are the ethical implications of its application in the spatial social science? This paper is a brief reflection on these questions. We contend that drones are a neutral tool which can be good and evil. They have actual and potential wide applications in academia but can be a tool through which breaches in ethics can be occasioned given their unique abilities to capture data from vantage perspectives. Researchers therefore need to be circumspect in how they deploy this powerful tool which is increasingly becoming mainstream in the social sciences.


Author(s):  
Tom L. Beauchamp

Leading theorists in the social sciences have insisted that value judgments should be strictly separated from scientific judgments, which should be value-free. Yet these same thinkers recognize that social scientists are often committed to values in carrying out their work and may be motivated by moral goals of removing or remedying social conditions. From this perspective, scientific conclusions (one sort of fact) and moral commitments (one sort of value) are intertwined in scientific practices, and the question arises whether a social scientist qua scientist makes value judgments or only makes such judgments in a nonscientific capacity. Related questions concern the role played by moral, social, and political values in the pursuit of scientific knowledge and the impact of these values on scientific theories and methods.


Societies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 122 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Southwood ◽  
Sara Delamont

The empirical focus of this paper is a martial art, Savate, which has received little scholarly attention from social scientists in the English-speaking world. The disciplinary framework is based on symbolic interactionist approaches to bodies, embodiment and movement. The ethnographic methods employ the research agenda of John Urry as set out in his wider call for a mobile sociology. Here Urry’s research agenda is used as a strategy: a key goal for ethnographic researchers. The utility of Urry’s sociological work on mobilities for scholarship on combat sports is exemplified. Until now that approach has not been widely used in martial arts investigations or sports studies. The data are drawn from an ethnographic study conducted dialogically by an experienced Savate teacher and a sociologist who observes him teaching. Nine ways in which the ethnographic data on Savate classes are illuminated by the mobilities paradigm are explored so that previously unconsidered aspects of this martial art are better understood and the potential of Urry’s ideas for investigating other martial arts and sports is apparent.


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