The White Working Class and the 2016 Election

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Carnes ◽  
Noam Lupu

Academics and political pundits alike attribute rising support for right-wing political options across advanced democracies to the working classes. In the United States, authors claim that the white working class offered unprecedented and crucial support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election. But what is the evidence for this claim? We examine all of the available academic survey data gathered around the election, along with a number of surveys from prior elections. We test four common claims about the white working class in 2016: (1) that most Trump voters were white working-class Americans; (2) that most white working-class voters supported Trump; (3) that unusually large numbers of white working-class voters switched from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016; and (4) that white working-class voters were pivotal to Trump’s victory in several swing states. We find that three of the four are not supported by the available data, and the other lacks crucial context that casts doubt on the idea that Trump uniquely appealed to working-class Americans. White working-class Americans have been supporting Republican presidential candidates at higher rates in recent elections, but that process long predates 2016, and narratives that center on Trump’s alleged appeal obscure this important long-term trend.

Author(s):  
Harris Beider ◽  
Kusminder Chahal

Widely stereotyped as anti-immigrant, against civil-rights, or supporters of Trump and the right, can the white working class of the United States really be reduced to a singular group with similar views? This book begins with an overview of how the term “white working class” became weaponized and used as a vessel to describe people who were seen to be “deplorable.” The national narrative appears to credit (or blame) white working-class mobilization across the country for the success of Donald Trump in the 2016 US elections. Those who take this position see the white working class as being problematic in different ways: grounded in norms and behaviors that seem out of step with mainstream society; at odds with the reality of increased ethnic diversity across the country and especially in cities; blaming others for their economic plight; and disengaged from politics. Challenging populist views about the white working class in the United States, the book showcases what they really think about the defining issues in today's America—from race, identity, and change to the crucial on-the-ground debates occurring at the time of the 2016 U.S. election. As the 2020 presidential elections draw near, this is an invaluable insight into the complex views on 2016 election candidates, race, identity and cross-racial connections.


2021 ◽  
pp. 048661342097642
Author(s):  
Juan E. Santarcángelo ◽  
Juan Manuel Padín

Argentina’s right-wing shift in the 2015 presidential election concluded twelve years of center-left rule. The elected president, Mauricio Macri, claimed that the economy would experience normalization of existing imbalances and recover its strength in a “new political era.” However, the new administration quickly restored the dominance of neoliberal economic policies through a comprehensive set of initiatives, which centrally included the return to international financial debt and equity markets and submission to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) rules. This article analyzes Argentina’s external-debt-growth process and discusses its objectives and long-term effects. This paper posits that the indebtedness process carried out by the Macri administration—and its modality—not only increased the relevance of financial capital in the Argentine economy but also structurally conditioned any future nonorthodox alternative path of development. This outcome cannot be understood without taking into account the deliberate role of the United States, the IMF, and the top companies that operate in Argentina, as well as the complicity of many political sectors. JEL Classification: H63, F34, F63


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Niloufar Nouri ◽  
Naresh Devineni ◽  
Valerie Were ◽  
Reza Khanbilvardi

AbstractThe annual frequency of tornadoes during 1950–2018 across the major tornado-impacted states were examined and modeled using anthropogenic and large-scale climate covariates in a hierarchical Bayesian inference framework. Anthropogenic factors include increases in population density and better detection systems since the mid-1990s. Large-scale climate variables include El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Southern Oscillation Index (SOI), North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), Arctic Oscillation (AO), and Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation (AMO). The model provides a robust way of estimating the response coefficients by considering pooling of information across groups of states that belong to Tornado Alley, Dixie Alley, and Other States, thereby reducing their uncertainty. The influence of the anthropogenic factors and the large-scale climate variables are modeled in a nested framework to unravel secular trend from cyclical variability. Population density explains the long-term trend in Dixie Alley. The step-increase induced due to the installation of the Doppler Radar systems explains the long-term trend in Tornado Alley. NAO and the interplay between NAO and ENSO explained the interannual to multi-decadal variability in Tornado Alley. PDO and AMO are also contributing to this multi-time scale variability. SOI and AO explain the cyclical variability in Dixie Alley. This improved understanding of the variability and trends in tornadoes should be of immense value to public planners, businesses, and insurance-based risk management agencies.


2019 ◽  
pp. 244-271
Author(s):  
Martin Pugh

This chapter discusses how, misled by Islamophobic propaganda, Britain and America were unable to come to terms with what they called ‘Islamism’. The origins of what is variously known as Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, and radical Islamism lie in the 1960s, in the ideas of a handful of Muslims in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran who believed that Muslims had been led astray from their religion by nationalist movements. Although some Muslims were critical of Western morality and politics, Islamism was not primarily anti-Western: it was essentially a reaction against what were widely seen as the corrupt, authoritarian, and secular regimes that controlled much of the Muslim world. The aim was to evict them, return to a purer form of Islam and re-create an Islamic state. In view of the exaggerated reputation it enjoys in the West, it is worth remembering that this movement has largely been a failure. Yet while fundamentalism appeals to only a small minority, it is also the case that large numbers of Muslims have become aggrieved by the policies of the Western powers. The explanation for this can be found in long-term frustration with the consistently pro-Israeli policy of Britain and the United States over Palestine, in addition to the proximate causes in the shape of two Afghan wars, the genocide in Bosnia, the Rushdie affair, and the first Gulf War in 1990, which made many Muslims see themselves as the victims of Western aggression and interventionism.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1962 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-205
Author(s):  
Theodore C. Doege ◽  
Clark W. Heath ◽  
Ida L. Sherman

Diphtheria attack rates and cases, and to a much lesser extent case-fatality rates, have fallen steadily within the United States during the past 25 years. However, during 1959 and 1960 there was a halt in this long-term trend. Epidemiologic data on 868 clinical cases of diphtheria occurring in 1959 and 873 cases in 1960 were submitted to the Communicable Disease Center by 45 states. The cases and several major outbreaks tended to concentrate in the southern and southwestern states. Attack rates and deaths were highest for children under 10 years, and attack rates were more than five times greater for nonwhite children. Analysis of 1960 immunization data shows that 72% of the patients had received no immunizations. Fifty-five per cent of carriers, but only 18% of persons with bacteriologically confirmed cases, had received a primary series. Only 1 person of 58 fatal cases occurring in 1960 had received a primary series. Certain problems for future investigation, disclosed by the surveillance data, are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Liberty Kohn

The 2016 election cycle and ensuing presidency of Donald Trump has been attributed in large part to his support among working-class whites (Gest 2016, p. 193; Tyson and Maniam 2016). Their reasons for support, however, are open to interpretation. This article will suggest that elements of Donald Trump’s public communication style and ethos align with elements of working-class culture, language use, and knowledge construction. Trump’s anti-institutional, anti-government rhetoric reifies these components of working-class culture because of institutions’ and government’s deep foundations in middle-class culture, language use, and knowledge construction—and the working-class’s, especially the white working-class’s, alienation from these institutions, with the result being anger or apathy (Lareau 2003; Jensen 2012; Gest 2016). These values are often embedded in a master narrative that defines white working-class life as one of victimization (Hochschild 2016; Gest 2016; Cramer 2016). The article next suggests that Trump’s oft-used rhetorical framework of not just immigrants as threat, but of immigrants as protected and valued by institutions that overlook white workingclass concerns (Gest 2016), opens up one possible persuasive framework to legitimate Trump’s xenophobia and racism through white working-class attitudes.


This book critically analyzes the right-wing attack on workers and unions in the United States and offers strategies to build a working-class movement. While President Trump's election in 2016 may have been a wakeup call for labor and the left, the underlying processes behind this shift to the right have been building for at least forty years. The book shows that only by analyzing the vulnerabilities in the right-wing strategy can the labor movement develop an effective response. The chapters examine the conservative upsurge, explore key challenges the labor movement faces today, and draw lessons from recent activist successes.


2020 ◽  
pp. 370-382
Author(s):  
Michael Goldfield

The conclusion looks at the implications of the failure to organize southern workers for the United States today and asks how successful southern organizing might have led to different outcomes. Foremost is the possibility that the civil rights movement of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s would have been much more powerful if more white working-class support had been enlisted. This possibility, which the book asserts was real, had the potential to make the contemporary social and political landscape of the United States vastly different.


2006 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Weinstein

Recent research on consumer culture and working-class femininity in the United States has argued that attention to fashionable clothing and dime novels did not undermine female working-class identities, but rather provided key resources for creating those identities. In this essay I consider whether we can see a similar process of appropriation by working-class women in Latin America. There women employed in factories had to contend with widespread denigration of the female factory worker. Looking first at the employer-run “Centers for Domestic Instruction” in São Paulo, I argue that “proper femininity” in these centers—frequented by large numbers of working-class women—reflected middle-class notions of the skilled housewife, and situated working-class women as nearly middle class. What we see is a process of “approximation,” not appropriation. I then look at the case of Argentina (especially Greater Buenos Aires) where Peronism also promoted “traditional” roles for working-class women but where Eva Perón emerges as a working-class heroine. The figure of Evita—widely reviled by women of the middle and upper classes—becomes a means to construct an alternative, class-based femininity for working-class women.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Kang

What has been the impact of Donald J. Trump’s presidency on the place of the United States in East Asia? Trump already has shown a proclivity for upending the mainstream American consensus about grand strategy to East Asia, with the real possibility of a trade war with China or a shooting war with North Korea on the horizon. However, this article will place President Trump’s first year in office into a larger context of long-term decline of U.S. leadership and influence in East Asia, arguing that this trend has been underway for quite some time, and that Trump has not altered fundamentally this trajectory. Some of Trump’s actions may accelerate a decline in U.S. leadership, but by no means was Trump the first nor will he be the last U.S. president to deal with a swiftly changing East Asia. The region has been changing rapidly for decades, and there are no indications that this will stop anytime soon. However, continuing and gradual U.S. withdrawal from leadership does not mean less American-East Asia interaction. East Asia will remain the most important trading and investment region for the U.S. for the foreseeable future.


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