scholarly journals On the Lissabon-Urteil: Democracy and a Democratic Paradox

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-344
Author(s):  
JHR ◽  
LB

The Bundesverfassungsgericht was castigated for the Maastricht-Urteil by most European lawyers, especially the Germans among them. But that judgment has placed its stamp on much of the constitutional development of the Union and has allowed theories of constitutional pluralism, polycentrism, multilevel constitutionalism, Verfassungsverbund and the constitution composée to flourish. The German constitutional court is likewise being castigated for its Lissabon-Urteil. Certainly, it has put the questions of democracy, the level at which democracy is to be aggregated and articulated, and the pertaining institutional arrangements in the member states and in the Union higher on the agenda of intellectual and political engagement than they have been over the last decades. Perhaps it will be just as fruitful for European constitutional theory as the Maastricht-Urteil was.

2021 ◽  
pp. 163-177
Author(s):  
Michael A. Wilkinson

<Online Only>This chapter outlines how the political constitution after Maastricht developed into a paradoxical configuration, whereby EU constitutional authority was augmented in specific areas, but was subject to increasing domestic contestation. This generated heightened constitutional conflicts in formal arenas, particularly in the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, which will be examined in this chapter, and social and political contestation and opposition in informal arenas (examined in the next chapter). The chapter outlines how issues of sovereignty and domestic constituent power resurfaced after their post-war sublimation, but without obvious practical moment, since the judicial practice and academic discourse of European constitutionalization continued apace, exacerbating their disconnect from popular support. The chapter concludes by considering how, in constitutional theory, the discourse of post-sovereignty becomes dominant yet highly ideological, given the concrete constitutional developments, a disconnect which is dialectically deconstructed to reveal a hollow authoritarianism.</Online Only>


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-46
Author(s):  
I. G. Dudko

The change of the scientific paradigm in Russian jurisprudence is accompanied by the affirmation of pluralism in a legal science. The paper has highlighted that the modern Russian constitutional theory seeks to express itself in the problems of ontological and axiological foundations, claiming to form an integral ”constitutional philosophy.”Constitutional axiology represents one of the most significant concepts of constitutionalism. Constitutional axiology is built as a field of scientific reflection (the nature, content, system of constitutional values). From these standpoints, the author provides for the assessment of law-enforcement carried out by the body of constitutional justice. The paper recognizes the high importance of research of constitutional law from the axiological point of view.The author has concluded that constitutional values as a reflection and expression of the “charter” of the life of the society (“protoconstitutional”) represent objectivated systemic totality functioning as the ultimate goal of constitutional development. Constitutional values represent concepts that must correspond to the social and spiritual environment of the society and the purpose of the State.The paper critically assesses the concept of a “living constitution” in its Russian interpretation as the constitutional and appraisal activity of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with regard to “generation” of constitutional values. It is noted that the result of the work of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation expressed in its legal determinations, can not represent other (“generated” by it) constitutional values except those contained in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. “Transformation” of the content and legal attitudes and meanings of the Constitution, constitutional values without changing the text of the Constitution may lead to “distortions” of the essence of the Constitution and intent for the Constitution to be an act with the highest legal force.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1003-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This article analyzes the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) inGauweiler, answering the first preliminary reference ever by the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), on the legality of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program of the European Central Bank (ECB). As the article explains, the ECJ rejected any possible claim of illegality of a key program devised by the ECB at the height of the Euro-crisis. However, because the BVerfG had defined the OMT program as ultra vires, and had threatened to strike it down if the ECJ did not reach the same result, the article defends the principle of the supremacy of European Union (EU) law, indicating that a possible nullification of the OMT program by the BVerfG would be clearly unlawful. To re-affirm the supremacy of EU law, the article argues that this principle is functional to ensure the equality of the member states before the law, preventing each country of the EU from cherry-picking which provisions of EU it likes or not. As the article suggests, respect of the principle of the supremacy of EU law – including by the BVerfG – is ultimately in the interest of every EU member state, including of Germany.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (8) ◽  
pp. 847-851
Author(s):  
Winfried Tilmann

Abstract The UK has announced its withdrawal from the UPCA. In order to effectively leave the group of CMS it would have to notify its departure from the UPCA and the two Regulations to the EU Council and from the Protocol on provisional application to the Council of Europe. The UPCA-CMS on the continent should quickly pick up preparatory work after a new ratification law has been enacted in Germany consequential to the decision of the German Constitutional Court. The alternative of merging the UPC with a new specialised court within the Court of the CJEU has no realistic prospect of succeeding because ratification by all EU Member States is necessary.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
László Blutman

In its PSPP decision, the German Constitutional Court for the first time declared an EU act ultra vires. The decision resulted in a flood of studies, blog posts, and comments. Most criticised the verdict raising a series of objections. We agree with some objections. However, the present study approaches the judgment from the other side. It seeks to understand the situation of the constitutional courts of Member States in the EU legal system, to examine their main dilemmas in relation to EU law, and to explore their possibilities regarding their main task, which is the protection of constitutions. The study highlights the fundamental structural tension that currently characterises the EU legal system concerning Member States’ sovereignty and examines how a balance can be struck in addressing this tension.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Marco Meyer

Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.


2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Bieber

German Constitutional Court decision of 30 June 2009 on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the German Constitution – Continuing sovereignty of member states under the EU Treaty – Extended constitutional limits to European integration (‘eternity clause’) under German Constitution, but these are not violated by Lisbon Treaty – Composition of European Parliament does not satisfy fundamental requirement of democracy but does not violate German Constitution since EU is not a state – Critical assessment of conceptual foundations of decision


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