scholarly journals Crafting Constitutional Identity in the Era of Migration and Financial Crises–The Case of Greece

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 1683-1702
Author(s):  
Dimitra Gamba ◽  
Dimosthenis Lentzis

The debate on the exact meaning and content of their constitutional identity has a long history in many European countries, with national courts playing the leading role. Ten years ago, this debate was given a new boost by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), article 4 paragraph 2 of which urges the European Union to respect the constitutional identities of the Member States. The national courts in a number of Member States saw in this provision the recognition of their zealous efforts to control the ongoing expansion of EU competences and to overcome the absolute primacy of EU law over domestic constitutional law. In Greece, however, no debate on the possible use of constitutional identity as a limit to the European Union and its law had taken place—at least not until recently. Our main objective in this article is to try to explain why Greek courts, and especially the Symvoulion Epikrateias, the supreme administrative court, failed to develop and make recourse to a notion of constitutional identity, even in cases they had good reasons to do so, and to find out if—and, if yes, to what extent—the situation has changed after the outbreak of the financial and, soon after, the migration crises. The analysis of the relevant case-law will permit us to conclude that the Greek constitutional identity is currently still under construction and that it is constructed using elements from both the liberal and the exclusionist models.

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 111-131
Author(s):  
Valentinas Mikelėnas ◽  
Rasa Zaščiurinskaitė

Quantification of harm is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles for the full compensation of harm and development of private enforcement within the European Union, including CEE Member States. Consequently, the Damages Directive establishes general rules and requirements for the quantification of harm, such as a rebuttable presumption of harm in case of cartels, the power of national courts to estimate harm as well as others, which closely interact with the principle of full compensation emphasized by the case-law of the European Union and directly established in the Damages Directive. The main focus of this paper is the effectiveness of the rules on the quantification of harm in general, and how these rules will contribute to the development of private antitrust enforcement in CEE Member States. Therefore, one of the issues to be discussed in the paper is the analysis of how, and to what extent specific rules and requirements for the quantification of harm have been transposed into the national legislation of CEE Member States. As certain CEE national jurisdictions have had certain rules for the quantification of harm already before the implementation of the Damages Directive, the paper analyses how effective these rules have been, and how much they have contributed to the development of private antitrust enforcement of those CEE national jurisdictions. Previous experience of those CEE Member States in applying specific rules for the quantification of harm is important, in order to assess the possible impact of the newly introduced rules on the quantification of harm and on private antitrust enforcement in general in other CEE Member States. The rules for the quantification of harm will not enhance private antitrust enforcement on their own, however, their effective application by national courts together with other rules under the Damages Directive should contribute to a quicker development of private enforcement in CEE Members States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Graham Butler

The vast majority of cases that are submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) through the preliminary reference procedure that is contained in Article 267 TFEU come from lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States. As a result, it is not always appellate courts, or higher instance national courts and tribunals, such as courts of final appeal, which make orders for reference. Judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court through this Article 267 TFEU procedure is notable for its particular quality of it being open to receiving orders for reference, for an interpretation of EU law from national courts and tribunals – of any instance – from first instance, to final instance. But can this judicial dialogue between lower instance national courts and tribunals and the Court be impeded by national courts’ more senior national Brethren, with appeals being allowed against orders for reference within national legal orders? The case law of the Court on such an issue has been progressive, in that it developed slowly over time, and the Court, by 2021, becoming increasingly assertive. As will be analysed in this article, the Court’s approach to the arising issue has clearly been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one hand, and national rules on the other. Yet, with the Court’s broader case law tightening the understanding of who constitutes the European judiciary, and ensuring that all national courts and tribunals remain independent from executive interference in EU Member States, the article commends recent developments, but makes the further plea for an affirmative judgment of the Court to not permit, as a matter of EU law, appeals against orders for reference made by lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States, in the name of preserving judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference procedure.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2019 ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. M. Rym

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.


Author(s):  
Barbara Luize Iacovino Barreiros

The municipality is the basic territorial organization for almost all the Member States of the European Union and has approximately the same attributions in all these. Even so, the territorial structure of municipalities differs in each of the Member States, and it is possible to group them into two large groups: those that have implemented reforms with a consequent reduction in the number of these entities and those with a high number of municipalities. Although Spain is a neighbor of Portugal and Portugal gets some influences from France, in fact the territorial organization of municipalities corresponds to very different realities. Through this research you can see that Portugal did reform its municipalities while France and Spain failed to do so. However, they all recognize that there is a need to reform the territorial structure of municipalities.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 1223-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslava Scholten ◽  
Marloes van Rijsbergen

Although not explicitly regulated by the EU treaties, EU agencies not only exist but also have increased in number and power. In addition, while EU agencies may exercise very similar functions to those of the Commission, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not list agencies among the possible authors of non-legislative acts. The existing situation raises the questions of the extent to which the ongoing agencification in the EU is legitimate and what its limits are. This article addresses these questions in the light of the old and new Treaties and case law, including the just releasedESMA-shortsellingcase. It shows that while the Lisbon Treaty made a few steps forward on the road of legitimizing EU agencies and delegating important powers to them, the scope of powers that EU agencies can have remains unclear. In this respect, the European Court of Justice's lenient approach in theESMA-shortsellingcase is unfortunate because it neither clarifies the issue nor pushes the Union Legislator and the Member States to address it. Consequently, in the absence of clear limits, further agencification is likely to persist at the risk of increasing the democratic legitimacy deficit and remaining accountability gaps.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1099-1130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Szabados

AbstractIn several golden share cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) condemned Member States for reserving certain special rights in privatized companies for themselves. In spite of the Court's consistently strict approach in the golden share cases, the more recent golden share judgments demonstrate that the Court's practice is not free from uncertainties. In its case law, the Court seems to hesitate between the application of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. Additionally, it is not entirely clear which measures are caught by provisions on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.


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