scholarly journals Measures with Multiple Purposes: Puzzles from EC—Seal Products

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 315-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald H. Regan

European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products is the first case in which the dispute system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has wrestled with a regulation that pursued mul-tiple conflicting, legitimate purposes. (I will explain later why Brazil—Retreaded Tyres is not such a case.) This generates puzzles about applying the definition of a “technical regulation” to complex measures; about whether an exception to a ban can be justified by a purpose different from that of the ban; and about how to apply “less restrictive alternative” analysis to measures with multiple goals. The first of these puzzles is unique to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); the second and third concern the TBT, the General Agree-ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and probably other agreements.

Author(s):  
Eduardo Trajano Gadret ◽  
Martius Vicente Rodriguez y Rodriguez

Transparency is a core principle of the World Trade Organization – WTO, which includes the objective to reduce technical barriers to global commerce. Country members of this international organization presume that the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provide the exporters greater expectation security related to their investments in manufacturing of goods, on account of containing detailed transparency obligations and for requiring notifications of new regulatory measures. This paper results from bibliography and documentary research on technical barriers to trade and on the Brazilian experience. It examines how the flow of information on foreign technical requirements to be complied by exporters is a question of competitive market access. It is expected to contribute to the analysis and identification of market access difficulties and its qualitative impact on competitiveness. It is also hoped that this study increases the knowledge of how the transparency principle can positively affect exports.


Author(s):  
Maureen Irish

SummaryRecent decisions of the Appellate Body of the WTO deal with the interpretation of GATT Article XX, which provides exemptions from trade obligations for important non-trade policies such as the protection of health and the environment. The article discusses those decisions, as well as the balance between trade and non-trade interests in the provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Clive Vinti

This paper juxtaposes the long-mooted Plant Health (Phytosanitary) Bill with its corollary, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). Firstly, this paper finds that the Bill creates an ambiguity by including in the definition of “phytosanitary measures”, those “measures, regulations or procedures that limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests”, without any guidance on the relevant factors to be considered in this regard. Secondly, it is found that the Bill explicitly establishes the requirement that the new phytosanitary regime is based on “scientific principles”. Thirdly, the paper argues that the Bill also establishes the general rule that makes “sufficient science” the basis of any phytosanitary measure in conformity with South Africa’s core obligations under the SPS. Fourthly, this paper finds that the Bill contravenes Article 5.7 of the SPS in that it provides for the implementation of the so-called “emergency and provisional measures” by the competent authority as an exception to the “sufficient science” rule, without any of the necessary safeguards created by Article 5.7. Lastly, the paper finds that the Bill has unduly shifted the primary burden of preventing the entry and establishment of a pest, from the competent authority to the “user of land”.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 323-327
Author(s):  
Joel Trachtman

The negotiators and drafters of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization(WTO), which includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947(GATT) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade(TBT), as well as other subagreements dealing with domestic regulation, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS), did not do a great job of doctrinal integration among the different documents that comprise the WTO Agreement. To be fair, at the end of the Uruguay Round, the hour was late and they may have felt that the basic ideas were sufficiently clear that it could all be sorted out in litigation. But in several contexts, including within the original GATT, the text of which dates from 1947, they covered the same ground in multiple places, without stating clearly how the different norms relate to one another,and without articulating plausible reasons for different treatment. For example, why is different language used for national treatment in three different places within Article III of GATT, and why is that language different from the language that appearsto have the same purpose in the TBT Agreement or in the SPS Agreement?


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-578
Author(s):  
Chad P Bown ◽  
Jennifer A Hillman

Abstract The USA, European Union, and Japan have begun a trilateral process to confront the Chinese economic model, including its use of industrial subsidies and deployment of state-owned enterprises. This paper seeks to identify the main areas of tension and to assess the legal-economic challenges to constructing new rules to address the underlying conflict. It begins by providing a brief history of subsidy disciplines in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization predating any concerns introduced by China. It then describes contemporary economic problems with China’s approach to subsidies, their impact, and the apparent ineffectiveness of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to address them. Finally, it calls for increased efforts to measure and pinpoint the source of the problems—in a manner analogous to how the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development took on agricultural subsidies in the 1980s—before providing a legal-economic assessment of proposals for reforms to notifications, evidence, remedies, enforcement, and the definition of a subsidy.


Equilibrium ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Ghodsi Ghodsi ◽  
Jan Jakub Michałek

The aim of this paper is to verify empirically whether the Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) regarding Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) notifications by WTO members can serve as an early warning system for past and future disputes (DS) covering allegedly trade restricting TBTs. WTO members, in order to increase transparency of trade policies, have made efforts to compile data on notified TBTs. For several years the WTO provides a TBT dataset, used in our paper, which covers the STCs raised by its members (“reverse” notifications). From 1995-2011, there have been 45 requests for consultation under the Dispute Settlement (DS) Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to identify possible violations of the technical barriers to trade (TBT) agreement. This paper attempts to find the linkages between DS cases citing the TBT agreement and the STC data regarding TBTs. The DS Body’s decisions regarding possible violations of the TBT agreement are discussed in detail. Afterwards, we analyze, descriptively and econometrically, the relationship between notified STCs and DS consultations regarding TBTs.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 600-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benn McGrady

In September 2011, the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel report in US – Clove Cigarettes was released. The report addressed a complaint brought by Indonesia concerning prohibitions on certain flavored tobacco products implemented by the United States (US). The dispute is one of a number of contemporary disputes under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Given that relatively few disputes have been resolved under the TBT Agreement, the outcome may have significant implications for interpretation of the agreement and risk regulation through technical regulations. The panel report may also have more specific implications for risk regulation in the context of tobacco products (author's headnote).


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Barrios Villarreal

The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement requires that national regulations and standards are based on international standards; however, it fails to define the terms international standard and international standardizing body (ISB). As of today, the panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have put more emphasis on the requirement that a standard is adopted by an ISB than the process through which it is adopted to be considered as ‘international' for the TBT Agreement. This article shows, using the standardization process of the OOXML in the ISO/IEC JTC1 as an example, that an ISB may adopt standards that are not necessarily international for the Agreement purposes. Hence, the importance that in future disputes the panels and the Appellate Body follow the path opened in the US-Tuna II case in which the Appellate Body stated that there may be additional procedural conditions that must be met for a standard to be considered international for the TBT Agreement.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Delvos

This article considers the negotiations on a possible modification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) in relation to fisheries subsidies. The mandate for these negotiations was given by the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001. The current WTO regulations are deficient in that many subsidies do not meet certain criteria of the SCM Agreement. This is mainly due to the current definition of a subsidy, the requirements for specificity and the inadequate categorisation of "red box" and "amber box" subsidies. In order to address fisheries subsidies adequately, this article contends that the SCM Agreement must be changed. The United States, the European Community, several developing countries and Japan are actively discussing this issue. After examining the different proposals, the best solution seems to be to find a common categorisation for fisheries subsidies and to identify those which lead to over-capacity and over-fishing. Such subsides should be prohibited and named in an illustrative list. Furthermore, subsidies which are not reported to the WTO should be actionable. Any country which has not fulfilled its notification duties would have the burden of proving that these subsidies are consistent with the SCM Agreement. Under new WTO rules, subsidies which are beneficial for the environment should be permitted, such as subsidies for the retirement of fishing licences, the retraining of fishers and the scrapping of old vessels.


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