Balancing Resources and Collections Needs: I. Acquisition and Accession of Invertebrate Fossils

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 73-82
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Merritt ◽  
Scott Lidgard
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Staff Time ◽  
Invertebrate Paleontology ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Acquisition Costs ◽  
Museum Staff ◽  
Invertebrate Fossils ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Cost

ALL MUSEUMS have limited resources, and all acquisitions use some of these resources, whether they be space, money, staff time or materials. When museums purchase collections objects, some “costs” are evident up front, and there are frequently mechanisms in place at a high level to monitor that use of museum resources. For example, in art museums this is often a committee of the board of directors empowered to approve or deny curatorial proposals for major (i.e., expensive) acquisitions. However when the object is “free,” as in most invertebrate paleontology collections where material is either donated or collected in the field by museum staff, the cost of acquiring the object is essentially hidden. Some acquisition costs may be fixed regardless of the size or nature of the acquisition, and some vary depending the amount of space the material will require, or the amount of cleaning or conservation needed.

After a long discussion on the advantages and drawbacks of each method (production or capital), it was decided that the decision would be made during the next meeting. On March 16, 1832, the Board opted for the capital method. However, the debate was re­ vived less than a year later when at the August 20, 1833 meeting the chief accountant was instructed to compare Saint-Gobain’s and Chauny's respective efficiencies. . . . we shall probably be told, with good reason, that if cost prices are charged with the mostly arbitrary distribu­ tion of overheads, those cost prices are an unreliable means of comparing the economical efficiency of differ­ ent methods of manufacturing. That is why we wish to propose a third way in which overhead expenses of the Headquarters are not charged to any production. For the last four months, Saint-Gobain has been costed at OF79 per square foot. At Chauny, both raw materials and labor are worked out at OF51 per square foot. If you add the depreciation of the building and the machinery of that factory, the cost rises to OF71, and if we wish to have figures that could be compared to those of Saint-Gobain, repair expenses for the machinery, the cost for slack peri­ ods or flawed glass must be added. The records in our accounts are not yet accurate enough and moreover too recent to allow us to give precise figures for these kinds of expenses. But no doubt they will go over OF80; conse­ quently, the question of economical efficiency is settled. The overhead expenses to be shared included traveling ex­ penses, tokens, salaries of administrators, a hypothetical rent for the Paris building, and operating expenses, but the fate of divi­ dends paid to shareholders was not sealed. It was raised on Sep­ tember 4, 1834 by the chief accountant: It has often been said that we should not include divi­ dends in the cost prices: this is a big mistake; a Limited Company must always be considered as a business which, thanks to its repute, can borrow funds for its ac­ tivity: those funds produce interests, which amount must be deducted from the profit ... if the interests were not included in the cost prices, we could not know the real profit of the soda factory. The Continuity of accounting methods. The Board of Directors of Saint-Gobain was also concerned about comparability of ac­ counting data over periods of time and under different variation methods. The following quotation may seem somewhat difficult to

2014 ◽  
pp. 261-261
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Third Way ◽  
The Real ◽  
Economical Efficiency ◽  
Counting Data ◽  
Limited Company ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Cost

there are remarks about the cost per unit of raw soda. The direc­ tors were well aware that production level and cost per unit were in inverse ratio: . . . this year we produced 448 000 d: more than the pre­ ceding year; therefore, the overheads for salaries and in­ terests contribute to the cost per unit proportionately less. Allocation of overhead. The allocation of overhead costs was discussed during four meetings of the Board of Directors: March 7 and 13, 1832; August 20, 1833; September 4, 1834.10 The members of the Board discussed the allocation of overheads between glass and chemical products. At the first meeting, on March 7, 1832, it was reported: The Administration (of the Company) has decided that the overheads accounts of every branch will be divided in accordance with the production as shown on the books; each product {produits speciaux) will be charged with its own direct expenses (frais speciaux). At the meeting the next week (March 13, 1832), the record indi­ cates that overhead cost allocation was again discussed: It has been pointed out to the Board of Directors by one of the members that the preceding decree, dividing over­ head expenses in accordance with each factory's produc­ tion stated by its books, could entail serious drawbacks; for example, in a year of very low sales, it we stop the production and only sell glass in stock, we should be obliged to make the chemical products bear all the over­ head expenses, which means a considerable increase in their cost prices and gives us a wrong image of them. He (the member of the B. of D.) thinks it much more conve­ nient to divide the overhead expenses in accordance with the fixed capital involved in each one of the two factories, as shown by the general inventory, capital to which we add the required working capital; with such a manner of distribution, each factory would bear its own part of overheads required by the supervision and administration of its capital. In the above-mentioned case of a factory's producing next to nothing, we would have to state a loss for that factory, which is quite normal.

2014 ◽  
pp. 260-260
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Considerable Increase ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Fixed Capital ◽  
Production Level ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Overhead Cost ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Chemical Products ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance, Reputasi Underwriter Dan Roa Terhadap Underpricing Tahun 2016-2019

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Jazzlin Marvella Gunawan ◽  
Kazia Laturette
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
High Level

One of the phenomena that occur in Indonesia capital market is underpricing. The underpricing phenomenon occurs when IPO shares are priced lower in the primary market than the closing price on the secondary market. The high level of underpricing can be detrimental to the company because the additional capital obtained through the IPO is not optimal, while the beneficiaries are investors because they get the initial return. This study purpose was to examine the influence of the components of Good Corporate Governance which include the board of commissioners, the independent board of commissioners, the board of directors and ownership concentration, non-financial variables, namely underwriter reputation and financial variables, namely Return On Assets (ROA) on underpricing. Samples were taken using the purposive sampling method. The number of samples finally used was 123 companies from all company sectors that conducted IPOs on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2016-2019 period and experienced underpricing. This study used secondary data obtained from the prospectus, annual report, e-bursa and IDX Factbook in 2016-2019. The results of the multiple linear regression test show that variables including the board of commissioners, independent board of commissioners, board of directors and ROA have a significant negative effect on underpricing which means the larger/higher these variables can minimize underpricing. While the concentration of ownership and underwriter’s reputation did not influence underpricing.

scholarly journals Top managers’ compensation and governance in Spanish firms: Evidence and reflections

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-98
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Multiple Roles ◽  
High Concentration ◽  
Strong Stimulus ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Top Managers ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Conflicting Interests ◽  
High Level

In Spanish listed firms, taking into account the predominant modes of ownership structure, which are characterized by a high concentration of shares in the hands of a few shareholders who are strongly represented on the board of directors, it might suppose that there are strong stimulus for a close top managers’ supervision and a straight interest alignment. However, the empirical evidence indicates the opposite, and this paradox needs to be explained within the theoretical framework of institutional theory. The high concentration of ownership and the high level of cross-holdings generate conflicting interests by those who have multiple roles as directors and top managers, suggesting that board’s supervisory effectiveness may be compromised by social pressures in search of legitimacy. These features of Spanish firms are undermining governance mechanisms, and may explain the high pay levels, the low variable packages and, in general, the lack of connection between top managers’ compensation and firm performance in comparison with those in other countries of Continental Europe.

Corporate governance mechanisms and cost of debt

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hafiza Aishah Hashim ◽  
Muneer Amrah
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Composite Measure ◽  
Sultanate Of Oman ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Cost

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to determine whether there is any difference in the association among the board of directors, audit committee effectiveness and the cost of debt between the family- and non-family-owned companies in the Sultanate of Oman. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a panel data set that has multiple observations on the same economic units. Each element has two subscripts: the group identifier, i (68 companies listed on the Muscat Securities Market), and within the group index denoted by t, which identifies time (2005-2011). The regression model of this study is based on the random effects model, which, according to the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan (LM) (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) tests, is an appropriate model. Findings – This study finds that the association between a board of directors’ effectiveness and cost of debt is negative and significant for the full sample and non-family firms. This relationship, however, is weak and not significant for family firms. Additionally, this study indicates that audit committee effectiveness has a significant effect on the cost of debt based on the full sample and family firms, but is not significant for non-family firms. Originality/value – This study examines firms in the Sultanate of Oman, where family ownership control is common. Based on a framework conceptualized according to the agency theory, using data from Oman enables a comparison between family and non-family firms with respect to the effect of the board of directors’ and audit committee’s characteristics as a composite measure. This composite measure captures their combined effect on the propensity of the cost of debt.

scholarly journals Board of Directors’ Remuneration, Employee Costs, and Layoffs: Evidence from Spain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 7518
Author(s):  
Mariano González-Sánchez ◽  
Eva M. Ibáñez Jiménez ◽  
Ana I. Segovia San Juan
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Social Aspect ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Employee Relationships ◽  
The Cost

Most of the empirical studies on board remuneration have focused on finding explanatory performance measures. There are studies that analyze if the compensation contracts of directors reward managers in such a way that they strive to maximize firm performance and shareholders’ wealth; however, there are few studies on the social aspect of corporate governance, or agent–employee and principal–employee relationships. Thus, in this study, our aim is to test whether there is a causal relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors of listed companies and the personnel policies of the companies, expressed through the cost of personnel and layoffs. For that, we used a sample of Spanish listed companies, and we found that two performance measures (return on equity and earnings per share on market price) have a greater effect on the growth rate of board remuneration when layoffs occur. Additionally, we found that the sales revenue and cash flow on total assets subsequently influenced personnel management.

scholarly journals The Board of Directors and International Decision-making

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leticia Pérez-Calero Sánchez ◽  
Mª del Mar Villegas Periñán ◽  
Carmen Barroso Castro
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Capital ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Capital Social ◽  
Active Participant ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
High Level ◽  
Human And Social Capital

This paper develops a view of how specific elements of the directors' human and social capital can enhance a company's international performance. We have taken the view that the board is an active participant in the firm’s management, and we have therefore set out and tested a number of arguments related to the board’s role in the adoption of international decisions. Specifically, our results point to the need to incorporate board members with high levels of education and international background with ability to learn and process information and to help international decision-making. As shown by our results, a high level of external connectivity of directors could have negative repercussions for internationalization since they limit the time spent on the board and therefore reduces the cohesion and trust inside the board. The implications of this research, therefore, are important for both executives and academics, as it helps to know what attributes contribute to the board’s effectiveness in such a way as to positively affect the internationalization of the firm. Keywords: Board of directors, human capital, social capital, firm´s internationalization.

scholarly journals Does the competency attributes of board members’ enhance the monitoring of earning management? Evidence from a developing country

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anas Najeeb Mosa Ghazalat ◽  
Md.Aminul Islam ◽  
Idris Bin Mohd Noor ◽  
Ayman Ahmad Abu Haija
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

The monitoring role of the board of directors has been extensively slammed as being ineffective since it depends on several factors. This study sheds light on some of the directors’ attributes and the impact on mitigating the opportunistic behaviour. By adopting different perspectives, we argued whether the directors with more expertise, tenure, outside directorships become more effective in mitigating the opportunistic behaviour. These attributes could have a curvilinear effect since such optimal attributes could improve the competency level of the directors. Hence, the board becomes more effective. Meanwhile, its effect could turn inversely to make the directors ineffective. This study adopted discretionary accruals as an indicator for earnings management. A sample of 114 service and industrial firms listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2009-2015 were chosen for this study. Pooled OLS regression model is enlisted to avoid the inconsistently of the slope across individual units and time period. Results show that the directors with financial expertise are more effective to minimise the level of earnings management practices. Conversely, the independent directors with high tenure besides the higher directors with outside directorships are engaged with a high level of earnings management practices. This implies the existence of each of the friendliness hypothesis and the busyness hypothesis in the Jordanian market. Similarly, this also explains the weakness of the board of directors in complying to their monitoring role in the emerging markets in general.

scholarly journals The effect of the board of directors’ characteristics on the cost of capital of the French companies

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 250-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Zéghal ◽  
Raef Gouiaa
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Average Cost ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Business Organization ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Cost

The board of directors and the cost of capital play fundamental roles in the profitability and the perennity of any business organization. The objective of this research is to try to evaluate the effect of the board of directors’ characteristics on the cost of capital of the French companies. The results of this study, based on a sample of 87 French companies belonging to the French index SBF120 during 2005, show that the majority of the board of directors’ characteristics have an important and significant effect on the cost of equity capital, on the cost of debt and on the balanced average cost of capital of the French companies

scholarly journals The importance of diversity on boards of directors’ effectiveness and its impact on innovativeness in the bioeconomy

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Hakovirta ◽  
Navodya Denuwara ◽  
Sivashankari Bharathi ◽  
Peter Topping ◽  
Jorma Eloranta
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Paper Industry ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Company Culture ◽  
High Level

Abstract A company’s board of directors plays a critical role in making decisions relating to strategy, high-level structure, and the appointment of the CEO. The role of the board and its impact on corporate performance has been well studied; however, the diversity of the board of directors and the corresponding correlation to the level of corporate innovativeness has not been previously investigated. Here, we provide a critical analysis of board members’ diversity as it relates to innovative corporations in what is considered a mature industry in transition to a bioeconomy: the pulp and paper industry. Our findings contribute to the body of knowledge on the role of board member diversity in shaping company culture and how that drives, shapes, and sustains innovation.

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