Some epistemological reflections on phenomenological research in nursing

Pflege ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 361-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Schoppmann ◽  
Martin Pohlmann

Der vorliegende Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche philosophischen Traditionen der phänomenologischen Perspektive in der Pflegeforschung zugrunde liegen. Der Begriff «Phänomenologie» wird häufig sowohl auf wissenschaftstheoretischer als auch auf methodischer Ebene synonym verwendet. Neben dieser Namensgleichheit der Phänomenologie als philosophische Tradition und als Forschungsansatz finden sich in der pflegewissenschaftlichen Literatur weitere Benennungen wie beispielsweise hermeneutische, interpretive oder auch interpretative Phänomenologie. Es fällt damit zunächst schwer, diese unterschiedlichen Ansätze zu differenzieren und so für eine konkrete pflegewissenschaftliche Fragestellung zu nutzen. Die Unterschiede und die daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen für phänomenologische Forschungsansätze in der Pflegewissenschaft sollen hier beschrieben werden, wobei Gedanken von Edmund Husserl und Martin Heidegger besondere Berücksichtigung finden.

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (142) ◽  
pp. 229
Author(s):  
Jorge Augusto Da Silva Santos

Resumo: O artigo trata da confrontação crítico-positiva de Martin Heidegger com Edmund Husserl com base em dois momentos importantes de seu Denkweg ao longo da atividade docente nas Universidades de Freiburg e Marburg. O primeiro emerge no curso friburguense de 1919 intitulado “A ideia da filosofia e o problema da visão de mundo” (GA 56/57), onde Heidegger esboça sua con­cepção hermenêutica da fenomenologia com a introdução da expressão “intuição hermenêutica” no final da preleção acadêmica. O segundo momento selecionado da confrontação se dá no curso do semestre de inverno de 1923-1924 intitulado “Introdução à investigação fenomenológica” (GA 17), onde não somente critica diretamente as obras de seu mestre, mas também através da “destruição” tanto do “ponto de partida” quanto do “escopo” da fenomenologia, a saber: a apro­priação husserliana de R. Descartes. Nesse sentido, trata-se de uma “polêmica contra Husserl disfarçada de crítica a Descartes”. Do syn-philosophein inicial com Husserl (“A fenomenologia somos eu [Husserl] e Heidegger, de resto mais ninguém”), mesmo dentro de uma contínua tensão, Heidegger passa a uma ruptura cada vez mais radical até se consumar no parricídio completo ora nas preleções do semestre de verão de Marburg intituladas “Prolegômenos para a história do conceito de tempo” (GA20), ora na tentativa fracassada da elaboração a duas mãos do artigo “Fenomenologia” para a Encyclopaedia Britannica em 1927.Abstract: The article deals with the critical - positive confrontation of Martin Heidegger with Edmund Husserl, based on two important moments of Heidegger’s Denkweg, throughout his teaching activity in the universities of Freiburg and Marburg. It is first in his 1919 Freiburg course, entitled “The idea of philoso­phy and the problem of world view” (GA 56/57), that Heidegger outlines his hermeneutic conception of phenomenology, with the introduction of the term “hermeneutic intuition”, at the end of his academic lectures. The second mo­ment of confrontation takes place in the winter semester of 1923-1924 and is entitled “Introduction to phenomenological research” (GA 17). There, Heidegger criticizes his master’s works, both directly and through the “destruction” of the “starting point” and “scope” of phenomenology, namely Husserl’s appropria­tion of R. Descartes. In this sense, it is a “polemic against Husserl disguised as criticism against Descartes.” In a context of continuous tension, Heidegger moves away from the early syn-philosophein with Husserl - “Phenomenology is myself [Husserl] and Heidegger, nobody else”. The philosopher makes an increasingly radical break until the parricide is consummated with both his Marburg summer lectures, entitled “Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time” (GA20) and the failed attempt to prepare, together with Husserl, the article “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1927


2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 (1) ◽  
pp. 207-244
Author(s):  
Ralf Becker ◽  
Egbert Witte ◽  
Meike Siegfried ◽  
Ernst Wolfgang Orth ◽  
Annette Hilt ◽  
...  

Edmund Husserl: Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893-1912); Martin Heidegger: Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant; Thomas Bedorf, Kurt Röttgers (Hg.): Die französische Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein Autorenhandbuch; Günter Figal: Verstehensfragen. Studien zur phänomenologisch-hermeneutischen Philosophie; Guy van Kerckhoven: Epiphanie. Reine Erscheinung und Ethos ohne Kategorie; Christian Lotz: From Affectivity to Subjectivity. Husserl’s phenomenology revisited; Claus Stieve: Von den Dingen lernen. Die Gegenstände unserer Kindheit


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-302
Author(s):  
Nelly Motroschilowa

Abstract This archival feature serves to present the personality and philosophy of Elena Oznobkina (1959–2010), a key figure of late-Soviet and, later, Russian philosophy. Oznobkina pioneered the present-day reception of Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl in Russia, but also made substantial contributions to Nietzsche studies and political philosophy, which are detailed in Nelly Motrozhilova’s introduction. Her philosophical work was inseparable from her personal political engagement, to which the featured archival text (“Prison or Gulag?”, 2000) testifies. It gives a poignant and concise characterisation of the prison as an object of philosophical theory, while asking the question of where Soviet prison camps and the prisons of post-Soviet Russia are to be located within this field of thought.


Sapere Aude ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (13) ◽  
pp. 301
Author(s):  
Paul Gilbert

<p>La cultura filosofica e scientifica accede ai media solo nelle ore più buie della notte. Sarà quindi da abbandonare ai nottambuli? Husserl si chiedeva se la filosofia potesse essere una “scienza rigorosa”. Questa domanda avrà ancora un interesse? Non dovremmo però contestare l’unilateralità della deriva culturale dei nostri tempi e rivendicare per la riflessione fondamentale nuovi spazi d’interrogazione? Le scienze sono credibili soltanto perché offrono la possibilità di alimentare la potenza della tecnica? Non dobbiamo porre invece la domanda sul loro fondamento razionale; criticare la mentalità che si accontenta del loro successo tecnico? Tenteremo di rispondere a queste domande leggendo alcuni testi di Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger e Michel Henry. Il nostro intento è di capire il significato del termine “riduzione” in fenomenologia. Questo termine ha conosciuto alcune avventure. Indica, infatti, per un fenomenologo il metodo più radicale per fondare il senso delle attività umane, comprese quelle scientifiche.</p><div><br clear="all" /><div> </div></div>


Author(s):  
Julio Quesada

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter examines the philosophical reflections of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger regarding the link between phenomenology and history. The philosophies of historicity developed in the climate of relativism that marked the failure of Hegelianism announce a new confrontation with G. W. F. Hegel and a new perspective on the relation of truth and history, which must not be confused with mere anthropocentrism. It is this new perspective on history that we see unfolding in the horizon opened by Husserl's phenomenology and prepared by certain aspects of “life- philosophy.” The chapter first considers Dilthey's concept of “historicity” before discussing the similarities of the Hegelian and Husserlian manners of thinking the subject of history. It also analyzes Heidegger's claim that finitude and historicity are essentially interconnected, with mortality constituting the hidden ground of the historicity of existence.


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.


Author(s):  
Baylee Brits

Mathesis universalis is perhaps the ultimate formal system. The fact that the concept ties together truth, possibility, and formalism marks it as one of the most important concepts in Western modernity. “Mathesis” is Greek (μάθησις) for “learning” or “science.” The term is sometimes used to simply mean “mathematics”; the planet Mathesis, for instance, is named after the discipline of mathematics. It is philosophically significant when rendered as “mathesis universalis,” combining a Latinized version of the Greek μάθησις (learning) with the Latin universalis (universal). The most significant modern philosophers to develop the term were René Descartes (1596–1650) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), who used it to name a formal system that could support a project of scientia generalis (Descartes) or the ars combinatoria (Leibniz). In each case, mathesis universalis is a universal method. In this sense it does not constitute the content of the sciences but provides the formal system that undergirds no less than the acquisition and veracity of knowledge itself. Although mathesis universalis is only rarely mentioned in the literature of Descartes and Leibniz, philosophers including Edmund Husserl, Ernst Cassirer, and Martin Heidegger considered it one of the key traits of modernity, breaking with the era of substance (Rabouin) or resemblance (Foucault) to signal a new period defined by formalism and quantification. Thus, in the 20th century, the scant and often contradictory literature on mathesis actually produced by the great philosophers of the Enlightenment comes to take on an importance that far exceeds the term’s original level of systematic elaboration. The term mathesis universalis was rarely used by either Descartes or Leibniz, and the latter used many different terms to refer to the same concept. The complexity and subtlety of the term, combined with difficulties in establishing a rigorous systematic interpretation, has meant that mathesis universalis is often used vaguely or to encompass all scientific method. It is a difficult concept to account for, because although many philosophers and literary theorists will casually refer to it, often in its abbreviated form (Lacan references mathesis in opposition to poesis to contrast the procedures of the sciences and the arts, for instance), there is not a great deal of consistent theoretical elaboration of the term in literary and cultural theory. Although mathesis universalis is not simply an avatar of mathematics, it is difficult to establish exactly where maths ends and mathesis begins, so to speak. The distinction is murky in both Descartes’s and Leibniz’s work, and this ambiguity would become a key controversy surrounding the term in the 20th century, with Bertrand Russell arguing that the significance of symbolic logic to mathesis universalis prevented it from being a “premier” science. Along with Russell, Ernst Cassirer and Louis Couturat would contest the relation between symbolic logic and the symbolic algebra of mathesis universalis, providing the terms of the debate for 20th-century philosophical work on ontology. Mathesis universalis was also a source of debate and controversy in the 20th century because it provided a node from which to examine the status of scientific truth. It is the work of 20th-century philosophers that expanded the significance of the term, using it to exemplify aspects of Enlightenment thought that many philosophers wished to react against, namely the aspiration to a universal science and the privileging of formal systems as avenues to truth. In this respect, the term is associated with Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and especially Michel Foucault, whose extensive work on the “classical episteme” provided a popular method of characterizing the development and enduring features of Enlightenment science. Although Foucault’s rendering of mathesis universalis as a “science of calculation” in The Order of Things (1970) is the most commonly used definition in literary and cultural studies, debates centering on Leibniz’s work in the early 20th century suggest that critics still took divergent approaches to the definition and significance of the term. It is Foucault who has popularized the contraction of the term to “mathesis.”


Author(s):  
Jim Garrison

Derrida’s deconstruction and rejection of the metaphysics of presence is examined along with Ferdinand de Saussure’s influence on Derrida’s trace of différance. The influence of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger is considered regarding Derrida’s commitment to a priori transcendentalism along with his strident anti-empiricism. Derrida’s approach to educational issues is surveyed with emphasis on his deconstruction of rationality and construction of a series of educational aporias providing occasion for novel topoi. It is shown that Dewey too rejects the metaphysics of presence in ways integral to his philosophy of education. Dewey and Derrida agree on the inevitable openness to otherness and difference. Dewey’s empirical pluralism and perspectivism is discussed as an alternative to Derrida’s quasi-transcendental apriorism. The conclusion proposes that Derrida’s putatively a priori quasi-transcendental deconstructive trace of différance is an a posteriori consequence within the trace of genetic inquiry; specifically, it is, a reified hypostatic abstraction.


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