Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study.

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margo Gardner ◽  
Laurence Steinberg
Author(s):  
Joshua B. Hurwitz

Increased real-time risk-taking under sleep loss could be marked by changes in risk perception or acceptance. Risk-perception processes are those involved in estimating real-time parameters such as the speeds and distances of hazardous objects. Risk-acceptance processes relate to response choices given risk estimates. Risk-taking under fatigue was studied using a simulated intersection-crossing driving task in which subjects decided when it was safe to cross an intersection as an oncoming car approached from the cross street. The subjects performed this task at 3-hour intervals over a 36-hour period without sleep. Results were modeled using a model of real-time risky decision making that has perceptual components that process speed, time and distance information, and a decisional component for accepting risk. Results showed that varying a parameter for the decisional component across sessions best accounted for variations in performance relating to time of day.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy T. Do ◽  
Paul B. Sharp ◽  
Eva H. Telzer

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the expected-value-of-control computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision-making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to—rather than a failure of—effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself, as opposed to arising from differences in what adolescents value relative to adults. It can also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control toward adaptive outcomes in adolescence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy N. Defoe ◽  
Judith Semon Dubas ◽  
Daniel Romer

Surveys concur that adolescents disproportionately engage in many real-world risk behaviors, compared with children and adults. Recently researchers have employed laboratory risky decision-making tasks to replicate this apparent heightened adolescent risk-taking. This review builds on the main findings of the first meta-analysis of such age differences in risky decision-making in the laboratory. Overall, although adolescents engage in more risky decision-making than adults, adolescents engage in risky decision-making equal to children. However, adolescents take fewer risks than children on tasks that allow the option of opting out of taking a risk. To reconcile findings on age differences in risk-taking in the real-world versus the laboratory, an integrative framework merges theories on neuropsychological development with ecological models that emphasize the importance of risk exposure in explaining age differences in risk-taking. Policy insights and recent developments are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (6) ◽  
pp. 941-956
Author(s):  
Wijnand AP van Tilburg ◽  
Nikhila Mahadevan

We examined the impact of viewing exemplars on people’s behaviour in risky decision-making environments. Specifically, we tested if people disproportionally choose to view and then imitate the behaviour of successful (vs. unsuccessful) others, which in the case of risky decision-making increases risk-taking and can hamper performance. In doing so, our research tested how a fundamental social psychological process (social influence) interacts with a fundamental statistical phenomenon (regression to the mean) to produce biases in decision-making. Experiment 1 ( N = 96) showed that people indeed model their own behaviour after that of a successful exemplar, resulting in more risky behaviour and poorer outcomes. Experiment 2 ( N = 208) indicated that people disproportionately choose to examine and then imitate most successful versus least successful exemplars. Experiment 3 ( N = 381) replicated Experiment 2 in a context where participants were offered the freedom to examine any possible exemplar, or no exemplar whatsoever, and across different incentive conditions. The results have implications for decision-making in a broad range of social contexts, such as education, health, and finances where risk-taking can have detrimental outcomes, and they may be particularly helpful to understand the role of social influence in gambling behaviour.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karita E. Ojala ◽  
Lieneke K. Janssen ◽  
Mahur M. Hashemi ◽  
Monique H. M. Timmer ◽  
Dirk E. M. Geurts ◽  
...  

AbstractDopamine has been associated with risky decision-making, as well as with pathological gambling, a behavioural addiction characterized by excessive risk-taking behaviour. However, the specific mechanisms through which dopamine might act to foster risk-taking and pathological gambling remain elusive. Here we test the hypothesis that this might be achieved, in part, via modulation of subjective probability weighing during decision-making. Healthy controls (n = 21) and pathological gamblers (n = 16) played a decision-making task involving choices between sure monetary options and risky gambles both in the gain and loss domains. Each participant played the task twice, either under placebo or the dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonist sulpiride, in a double-blind, counter-balanced, design. A prospect theory modelling approach was used to estimate subjective probability weighting and sensitivity to monetary outcomes. Consistent with prospect theory, we found that participants presented a distortion in the subjective weighting of probabilities, i.e. they overweighted low probabilities and underweighted moderate to high probabilities, both in the gain and loss domains. Compared with placebo, sulpiride attenuated this distortion in the gain domain. Across drugs, the groups did not differ in their probability weighting, although in the placebo condition, gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities. Overall, our results reveal that dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonism modulates the subjective weighting of probabilities in the gain domain, in the direction of more objective, economically rational decision-making.Significance statementDopamine has been implicated in risky decision-making and gambling addiction, but the exact mechanisms underlying this influence remain partly elusive. Here we tested the hypothesis that dopamine modulates subjective probability weighting, by examining the effect of a dopaminergic drug on risk-taking behaviour, both in healthy individuals and pathological gamblers. We found that selectively blocking dopamine D2/D3 receptors diminished the typically observed distortion of winning probabilities, characterized by an overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities. This made participants more linear in their subjective estimation of probabilities, and thus more rational in their decision-making behaviour. Healthy participants and pathological gamblers did not differ in their risk-taking behaviour, except in the placebo condition in which gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities.


SLEEP ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (Supplement_2) ◽  
pp. A35-A36
Author(s):  
Garrett Hisler ◽  
David Dickinson ◽  
Brant Hasler

Abstract Introduction Cognitive performance and decision making have been shown to suffer under conditions of misalignment between circadian preference and time-of-assessment; however, little is known about how misalignment between the timing of sleep and circadian rhythm impacts decision making. To this end, this study captured naturally occurring degrees of alignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm (i.e., alignment of sleep-wake timing with circadian phase) to examine if greater misalignment predicts worse behavioral decision making. Methods Over the course of two weeks, 32 participants (18–22 years of age; 61% female; 69% White) continuously wore actigraphs and completed two overnight in-lab visits (Thursday and Sunday) in which both dim light melatonin onset (DLMO) and behavioral decision-making (risk taking, framing, and strategic reasoning tasks) were assessed. Sleep-wake timing was assessed by actigraphic midsleep from the two nights prior to each in-lab visit. Alignment was operationalized as the interval between DLMO and average midsleep. Multilevel modeling was used to predict performance on decision making tasks from circadian alignment during each in-lab visit; nonlinear associations were also examined. Results Misalignment characterized by shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted decision-making in a curvilinear fashion (i.e., squared misalignment term predicted performance). Specifically, shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted greater risk-taking under conditions of potential loss (B = .10, p = .04), but less risk-taking under conditions of potential reward (B = -.14, p = .04) in a curvilinear fashion. Misalignment did not predict decision-making in the framing and strategic reasoning tasks. Conclusion Findings suggest that naturally occurring degrees of misalignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm may impact risky decision-making, further extending accumulating evidence that sleep/circadian factors are tied to risk-taking preferences. Future studies will need to replicate findings and experimentally probe whether manipulating alignment influences risky decision making. Support (if any) R21AA023209; R01DA044143


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy G. Freels ◽  
Anna E. Liley ◽  
Daniel B. K. Gabriel ◽  
Nicholas W. Simon

ABSTRACTRecent changes in policy regarding cannabis in the U.S. have been accompanied by an increase in the prevalence of cannabis use and a reduction in the perceived harms associated with consumption. However, little is understood regarding the effects of cannabinoids on cognitive processes. Given that deficient risk-taking is commonly observed in individuals suffering from substance use disorders (SUDs), we assessed the impact of manipulating cannabinoid type 1 receptors (CB1Rs; the primary target for Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol in the brain) on punishment-based risk-taking using the risky decision-making task (RDT) in male Long-Evans rats. The RDT measures preference for small, safe rewards over large, risky rewards associated with an escalating chance of foot shock. Systemic bidirectional CB1R manipulation with a CB1R agonist, CB1R antagonist, and FAAH inhibitor (which increases overall endocannabinoid tone) did not alter overt risk-taking in the RDT. Interestingly, direct CB1R agonism, but not indirect CB1R stimulation or CB1R blockade, resulted in reduction in latency to make risky choices while not altering safe choice latency. Our findings suggest that CB1R activation expedites engagement in punishment based risk-taking without affecting overall preference for risky vs. safe options. This indicates that risk preference and rate of deliberation for risk-taking are influenced by distinct neural substrates, an important consideration for development of precise treatments targeting the aberrant risk-taking typical of SUD symptomology.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 432-443
Author(s):  
Dominik K. E. Beyer ◽  
Lisa Horn ◽  
Nadine Klinker ◽  
Nadja Freund

Abstract The prefrontal dopamine D1 receptor (D1R) is involved in cognitive processes. Viral overexpression of this receptor in rats further increases the reward-related behaviors and even its termination induces anhedonia and helplessness. In this study, we investigated the risky decision-making during D1R overexpression and its termination. Rats conducted the rodent version of the Iowa gambling task daily. In addition, the methyl CpG–binding protein-2 (MeCP2), one regulator connecting the dopaminergic system, cognitive processes, and mood-related behavior, was investigated after completion of the behavioral tasks. D1R overexpressing subjects exhibited maladaptive risky decision-making and risky decisions returned to control levels following termination of D1R overexpression; however, after termination, animals earned less reward compared to control subjects. In this phase, MeCP2-positive cells were elevated in the right amygdala. Our results extend the previously reported behavioral changes in the D1R-manipulated animal model to increased risk-taking and revealed differential MeCP2 expression adding further evidence for a bipolar disorder-like phenotype of this model.


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