THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOOD GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 1450015
Author(s):  
MARCO A. JANSSEN ◽  
MILES MANNING ◽  
OYITA UDIANI
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Strategy Model ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Other Regarding

Human societies are unique in the level of cooperation among non-kin. Evolutionary models explaining this behavior typically assume pure strategies of cooperation and defection. Behavioral experiments, however, demonstrate that humans are typically conditional co-operators who have other-regarding preferences. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and costly punishment, we use a utilitarian formulation of agent decision making to explore conditions that support the emergence of cooperative behavior. Our results indicate that cooperation levels are significantly lower for larger groups in contrast to the original pure strategy model. Here, defection behavior not only diminishes the public good, but also affects the expectations of group members leading conditional co-operators to change their strategies. Hence defection has a more damaging effect when decisions are based on expectations and not only pure strategies.

The Evolution of Cooperation in an Ecological Context : An Agent-Based Model

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Pepper ◽  
Barbara B. Smuts
Keyword(s):  
Group Selection ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Alarm Call ◽  
Relative Magnitude ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Conditions ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Trait Groups ◽  
Trait Group

The social and behavioral sciences have a long-standing interest in the factors that foster selfish (or individualistic) versus altruistic (or cooperative) behavior. Since the 1960s, evolutionary biologists have also devoted considerable attention to this issue. In the last 25 years, mathematical models (reviewed in Wilson and Sober 1994) have shown that, under particular demographic conditions, natural selection can favor traits that benefit group members as a whole, even when the bearers of those traits experience reduced reproductive success relative to other members of their group. This process, often referred to as "trait group selection" (D. S. Wilson 1975) can occur when the population consists of numerous, relatively small "trait groups," defined as collections of individuals who influence one another's fitness as a result of the trait in question. For example, consider a cooperative trait such as alarm calling, which benefits only individuals near the alarm caller. A trait group would include all individuals whose fitness depends on whether or not a given individual gives an alarm call. If the cooperative trait confers sufficiently large reproductive benefits on the average group member, it can spread. This is because trait groups that happen to include a large proportion of cooperators will send out many more offspring into the population as a whole than will groups containing few, or no cooperators. Thus, even though noncooperators out reproduce cooperators within trait groups (because they experience the benefits of the presence of cooperators without incurring the costs), this advantage can be offset by differences in rates of reproduction between trait groups. Numerous models of group selection (Wilson and Sober 1994) show that whether cooperative traits can spread depends on the relative magnitude of fitness effects at these two levels of selection (within and between trait groups). In addition, there is a growing body of empirical evidence for the operation of group selection in nature (e.g., Colwell 1981; Breden and Wade 1989; Bourke and Pranks 1995; Stevens et al. 1995; Seeley 1996; Miralles et al. 1997; Brookfield 1998) and under experimental conditions (reviewed in Goodnight and Stevens 1997).

scholarly journals Common Knowledge Promotes Cooperation in the Threshold Public Goods Game by Reducing Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Deutchman ◽  
Dorsa Amir ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Matthew Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge—a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others’ cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution—a threshold—is required. Across two preregistered studies (N = 4,111), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Using structural equation modeling, we found that the predicted number of group members contributing to the public good and certainty about the predicted number of contributors mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people’s cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.

Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan E. Carlin ◽  
Gregory J. Love
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Interpersonal Trust ◽  
The United States ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Minimal Group ◽  
System A ◽  
The Social ◽  
Osama Bin Laden

How does democratic politics inform the interdisciplinary debate on the evolution of human co-operation and the social preferences (for example, trust, altruism and reciprocity) that support it? This article advances a theory of partisan trust discrimination in electoral democracies based on social identity, cognitive heuristics and interparty competition. Evidence from behavioral experiments in eight democracies show ‘trust gaps’ between co- and rival partisans are ubiquitous, and larger than trust gaps based on the social identities that undergird the party system. A natural experiment found that partisan trust gaps in the United States disappeared immediately following the killing of Osama bin Laden. But observational data indicate that partisan trust gaps track with perceptions of party polarization in all eight cases. Finally, the effects of partisanship on trust outstrip minimal group treatments, yet minimal-group effects are on par with the effects of most treatments for ascriptive characteristics in the literature. In sum, these findings suggest political competition dramatically shapes the salience of partisanship in interpersonal trust, the foundation of co-operation.

scholarly journals On the Stability of Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict: A Lab-in-the-Field Panel Study

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199408
Author(s):  
Robert Böhm ◽  
Jürgen Fleiß ◽  
Robert Rybnicek
Keyword(s):  
Field Study ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Panel Study ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Considerable Heterogeneity ◽  
Specific Preference ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Stability

Despite the omnipresence of inter-group conflicts, little is known about the heterogeneity and stability of individuals’ social preferences toward in-group and out-group members. To identify the prevalence and stability of social preferences in inter-group conflict, we gather quota-representative, incentivized data from a lab-in-the-field study during the heated 2016 Austrian presidential election. We assess social preferences toward in-group and out-group members one week before, one week after, and three months after the election. We find considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ group-(in)dependent social preferences. Utilizing various econometric strategies, we find largely stable social preferences over the course of conflict. Yet, there is some indication of variation, particularly when the conflict becomes less salient. Variation is larger in social preferences toward in-group members and among specific preference types. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings and outline potential avenues for future research.

Going Far by Going Together: James M. Buchanan’s Economics of Shared Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Art Carden ◽  
Gregory W. Caskey ◽  
Zachary B. Kessler
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Capital ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Progress ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Ethical Communication ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.

Baumard et al.'s moral markets lack market dynamics

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Colin Holbrook
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Market Dynamics ◽  
Market Models

AbstractMarket models are indeed indispensable to understanding the evolution of cooperation and its emotional substrates. Unfortunately, Baumard et al. eschew market thinking in stressing the supposed invariance of moral/cooperative behavior across circumstances. To the contrary, humans display contingent morality/cooperation, and these shifts are best accounted for by market models of partner choice for mutually beneficial collaboration.

scholarly journals Pathogen Threat and In-group Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hirotaka Imada ◽  
Nobuhiro Mifune
Keyword(s):  
Selection Pressure ◽  
Potential Role ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Behavioral Immune System ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Intergroup Behavior

Disease-causing parasites and pathogens play a pivotal role in intergroup behavior. Previous studies have suggested that the selection pressure posed by pathogen threat has resulted in in-group assortative sociality, including xenophobia and in-group favoritism. While the current literature has collated numerous studies on the former, strikingly, there has not been much research on the relationship between pathogen threat and in-group cooperation. Drawing upon prior studies on the function of the behavioral immune system (BIS), we argued that the BIS might facilitate cooperation with in-group members as a reactive behavioral immune response to pathogen threat. More specifically, we held that individuals might utilize cooperative behavior to ensure that they can receive social support when they have contracted an infectious disease. We reviewed existing findings pertaining to the potential role of the BIS in in-group cooperation and discussed directions for future studies.

scholarly journals Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. e0242607
Author(s):  
Yutaka Horita
Keyword(s):  
Multilevel Models ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Behavioral Strategy ◽  
Behavioral Models ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Shift Strategy ◽  
Better Than

Reciprocity toward a partner’s cooperation is a fundamental behavioral strategy underlying human cooperation not only in interactions with familiar persons but also with strangers. However, a strategy that takes into account not only one’s partner’s previous action but also one’s own previous action—such as a win-stay lose-shift strategy or variants of reinforcement learning—has also been considered an advantageous strategy. This study investigated empirically how behavioral models can be used to explain the variances in cooperative behavior among people. To do this, we considered games involving either direct reciprocity (an iterated prisoner’s dilemma) or generalized reciprocity (a gift-giving game). Multilevel models incorporating inter-individual behavioral differences were fitted to experimental data using Bayesian inference. The results indicate that for these two types of games, a model that considers both one’s own and one’s partner’s previous actions fits the empirical data better than the other models. In the direct reciprocity game, mutual cooperation or defection—rather than relying solely on one’s partner’s previous actions—affected the increase or decrease, respectively, in subsequent cooperation. Whereas in the generalized reciprocity game, a weaker effect of mutual cooperation or defection on subsequent cooperation was observed.

Punishment Leads to Cooperative Behavior in Structured Societies

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shade T. Shutters
Keyword(s):  
Social Structure ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Degree Distribution ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Structured Population ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Scale Free Networks

Altruistic punishment occurs when an agent incurs a cost to punish another but receives no material benefit for doing so. Despite the seeming irrationality of such behavior, humans in laboratory settings routinely pay to punish others even in anonymous, one-shot settings. Costly punishment is ubiquitous among social organisms in general and is increasingly accepted as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Yet if it is true that punishment explains cooperation, the evolution of altruistic punishment remains a mystery. In a series of computer simulations I give agents the ability to punish one another while playing a continuous prisoner's dilemma. In simulations without social structure, expected behavior evolves—agents do not punish and consequently no cooperation evolves. Likewise, in simulations with social structure but no ability to punish, no cooperation evolves. However, in simulations where agents are both embedded in a social structure and have the option to inflict costly punishment, cooperation evolves quite readily. This suggests a simple and broadly applicable explanation of cooperation for social organisms that have nonrandom social structure and a predisposition to punish one another. Results with scale-free networks further suggest that nodal degree distribution plays an important role in determining whether cooperation will evolve in a structured population.

scholarly journals Drought decreases cooperative sentinel behavior and affects vocal coordination in meerkats

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1558-1566 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramona Rauber ◽  
Tim H Clutton-Brock ◽  
Marta B Manser
Keyword(s):  
Small Groups ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Drought Condition ◽  
Drought Period ◽  
Suricata Suricatta ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Dry Conditions ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Fitness Benefits ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Abstract Cooperative breeding often evolved in harsh and arid habitats characterized by high levels of environmental uncertainty. Most forms of cooperative behavior have energetic costs and previous studies have shown that the contributions of individuals to alloparental provisioning are conditional on their food intake. However, the effect of naturally occurring, extreme environmental conditions on the persistence of costly forms of cooperative behaviors and their coordination by communication remain unknown. Here, we show that in meerkats (Suricata suricatta) the probability to act as sentinel, a cooperative vigilance behavior, was the same for typically occurring dry and wet conditions, but significantly reduced during a drought condition with almost no rain, especially in young individuals, members of small groups and groups with pups. The duration an individual stayed on sentinel guard, however, was most reduced during dry conditions. Besides reductions in sentinel behavior, the vocal coordination of foraging meerkats differed when comparing drought and wet conditions. Individuals responded more strongly to playbacks of sentinel “all-clear” calls and close calls, resulting in less vigilance and more foraging behavior during the drought condition. We conclude that while meerkats are adapted to commonly occurring dry periods with low rainfall, the extreme drought period with almost no rain, led to a decrease of the frequency of costly forms of cooperative behaviors in favor of behaviors that maximize direct fitness benefits and also affected the vocal coordination among group members.

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