Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dangerous-Waste Disposal of Major Engineering Enterprises and Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoran Xu ◽  
Yulong Li ◽  
Xiangyu Hou ◽  
Saixing Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Waste Disposal ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision

scholarly journals Towards an Integrated Healthcare System: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Competition and Cooperation between Urban and Rural Medical Institutions in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinglong Xu ◽  
Jiajie Liu ◽  
Sabina Ampon-Wireko ◽  
Henry Asante Antwi ◽  
Lulin Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Medical Institutions ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Health Institutions ◽  
Cooperative Competition ◽  
And Control

Abstract Background The game of interest is the root cause of the non-cooperative competition between urban and rural medical and health institutions. The study investigates competition and cooperation among urban and rural medical institutions using the evolutionary game analysis. Methods With the evolutionary game model, analysis of the stable evolutionary strategies between the urban and rural medical and health facilities is carried out. A numerical simulation is performed to demonstrate the influence of various values. Results The result shows that the cooperation mechanism between urban and rural medical Institutions is relevant to the efficiency of rural medical institutions, government supervision, reward, and punishment mechanism. Conclusions Suggestions for utilizing the government's macro regulation and control capabilities, resolving conflicts of interest between urban and rural medical and health institutions is recommended. In addition, the study again advocates mobilizing the internal power of medical institutions' cooperation to promote collaboration between urban and rural medical and health institutions.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

scholarly journals Government Supervision on Explosive Enterprises’ Immoral Behaviors in E-Commerce Enterprises: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Liang Shen ◽  
Yuanyuan Chen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Yuyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Essential Factor ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Traditional Markets ◽  
Immoral Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

Explosive enterprises’ immoral behaviors in the online shopping market are widespread and have not been effectively solved. Especially in developing countries, there is a direct relationship between massive immoral behaviors and the inefficiency of government supervision. Using an evolutionary game, this paper finds that immoral behavior is more likely to spread in online markets than in traditional markets. Only when government supervision and punishment are large enough and government’s punishment for the illegal enterprise exceeds extra supervision costs that government pays, explosive immoral behaviors can be curbed. Additionally, consumer support is an essential factor in improving the efficiency of government supervision. This study sorts out the interactions between e-commerce market participants and the government, obtains a path to achieve efficient government regulation, and offers management insights. The findings can serve as a reference for ensuring order in the emerging online shopping market and can also provide theoretical references for future related research.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

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