scholarly journals Government Supervision on Explosive Enterprises’ Immoral Behaviors in E-Commerce Enterprises: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Liang Shen ◽  
Yuanyuan Chen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Yuyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Essential Factor ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Traditional Markets ◽  
Immoral Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

Explosive enterprises’ immoral behaviors in the online shopping market are widespread and have not been effectively solved. Especially in developing countries, there is a direct relationship between massive immoral behaviors and the inefficiency of government supervision. Using an evolutionary game, this paper finds that immoral behavior is more likely to spread in online markets than in traditional markets. Only when government supervision and punishment are large enough and government’s punishment for the illegal enterprise exceeds extra supervision costs that government pays, explosive immoral behaviors can be curbed. Additionally, consumer support is an essential factor in improving the efficiency of government supervision. This study sorts out the interactions between e-commerce market participants and the government, obtains a path to achieve efficient government regulation, and offers management insights. The findings can serve as a reference for ensuring order in the emerging online shopping market and can also provide theoretical references for future related research.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game between Government and Ride-Hailing Platform: Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qipeng Sun ◽  
Yuqi He ◽  
Yongjie Wang ◽  
Fei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Parameter Analysis ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
New Business ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

The ride-hailing industry is a new business form that combines traditional taxi services with Internet technology and a sharing economy. However, after its emergence, countries have focused on finding ways to regulate this industry. The regulation of ride-hailing has gone through three stages: from denial of negation to laissez-faire and prudential supervision. This study focuses on the market regulation of the ride-hailing industry, discusses whether ride-hailing platforms require strict regulation under the current Internet setting, and provides evidence for this problem from the perspective of evolutionary game theory between the behavior of the government and the platforms. This study argues that both ride-hailing platforms and the government are evolutionary game players with bounded rationality, constantly adjusting their strategies through confrontation, dependence, and restriction. Therefore, this study constructs a two-dimensional game model between the government and ride-hailing platforms and analyzes the stability strategies of the two participants in different scenarios, to clarify the game behavior and the game return matrix. Assuming that loose government regulation and the standard operation of the ride-hailing platforms are the optimal Pareto equilibrium of the game system, the study concludes that this optimal equilibrium cannot be achieved under the current conditions. Through parameter analysis and sample simulation calculations, the system can be directed toward this equilibrium by reducing government supervision cost and increasing government punishment. This provides a theoretical basis for the government to regulate the ride-hailing industry from the perspective of quantitative analysis. Related implications are finally proposed, which can help the decision-makers better understand the regulation countermeasures of the government and ride-hailing platforms.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

scholarly journals The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (18) ◽  
pp. 3351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingxin Chen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Pandu R. Tadikamalla ◽  
Xutong Gao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Wastes ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Positive Effect

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

scholarly journals MODEL KEBIJAKAN K3 BERBASIS PP NOMOR 11 TAHUN 1979

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-138
Author(s):  
Amiroel Oemara Syarief ◽  
Wahyu Ramadhani
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Occupational Safety ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

ABSTRAKKecelakaan kerja terjadi bukan hanya karena workplace risk dan masalah manusia (human) tetapi disebabkan oleh pengawasan pemerintah yang masih lemah mengenai penerapan Peraturan Pemerintah mengenai K3. Pemerintah hanya menganggap semuanya akan berjalan lancar apabila sudah memiliki hukum yang tegas. Padahal dalam kenyataannya, penerapan K3 masih sangat kurang meskipun telah memiliki Undang-Undang yang kuat. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menghasilkan model kebijakan k3 berbasis PP No. 11 Tahun 1979. Penelitian ini berjenis hukum normatif. Hasil yang diperoleh dari penelitian ini adalah dengan adanya model kebijakan berbasis Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 11 Tahun 1979 Tentang keselamatan kerja pada pemurnian dan pengolahan minyak bumi dan gas pemerintah dapat mengawasi perusahan yang belum membudayakan K3 di perusahaannya sehingga setiap perusahaan lebih mengutamakan kesehatan dan keselamatan kerja bagi setiap karyawan.Kata kunci: model; kebijakan K3; PP Nomor 11 Tahun 1979ABSTRACTAccidents work occurs not only because of workplace risk and human problems but caused by government supervision is still weak regarding the use of government regulation on K3. The Government only considers it all going smoothly when it already has strict laws. The application of K3 is still very lacking despite having a strong constitution. The purpose of this research resulted in a model-based K3 policy No. 11 year 1979. This research is a normative law. The results derived from this research are with the model of government regulation-based policy number 11 year 1979 about occupational safety on the purification and processing of petroleum, and government gases can supervise companies that have not Cultivate K3 in his company so that every company prioritizes health and safety for every employee.Keywords: model policy OSH; PP Number 11 The Year 1979

scholarly journals Towards an Integrated Healthcare System: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Competition and Cooperation between Urban and Rural Medical Institutions in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinglong Xu ◽  
Jiajie Liu ◽  
Sabina Ampon-Wireko ◽  
Henry Asante Antwi ◽  
Lulin Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Medical Institutions ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Health Institutions ◽  
Cooperative Competition ◽  
And Control

Abstract Background The game of interest is the root cause of the non-cooperative competition between urban and rural medical and health institutions. The study investigates competition and cooperation among urban and rural medical institutions using the evolutionary game analysis. Methods With the evolutionary game model, analysis of the stable evolutionary strategies between the urban and rural medical and health facilities is carried out. A numerical simulation is performed to demonstrate the influence of various values. Results The result shows that the cooperation mechanism between urban and rural medical Institutions is relevant to the efficiency of rural medical institutions, government supervision, reward, and punishment mechanism. Conclusions Suggestions for utilizing the government's macro regulation and control capabilities, resolving conflicts of interest between urban and rural medical and health institutions is recommended. In addition, the study again advocates mobilizing the internal power of medical institutions' cooperation to promote collaboration between urban and rural medical and health institutions.

scholarly journals Government Supervision Mode Selection in the Promotion Period of Prefabricated Construction Using Evolutionary Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Shuwei Jing ◽  
Zhuangyi Zhang ◽  
Junai Yan
Keyword(s):  
Behavior Pattern ◽  
Mode Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mode ◽  
Minimum Probability ◽  
The Government ◽  
Speculative Behavior

Aiming at the speculative behavior of some developers who seek private interests in the promotion period of prefabricated construction, this research combines the actual situation, objectively and reasonably determines the parameters in the model, and builds an evolutionary game model to study the choice of government supervision mode in different situations, from the perspective of government supervision. The results showed that the choice of government supervision mode has great connection with the probability of identifying developers’ speculative behavior when the government adopts node supervision. When the probability is greater than the developers’ speculative value, the government will choose node supervision, while the developers will not adopt speculative behavior. Conversely, there will be a periodic behavior pattern in the evolutionary system, and the choice of government supervision mode is related to the value of each parameter. At the same time, the minimum probability of identifying speculative behavior that keeps the optimal situation stable is obtained. On this basis, the paper takes a practical case to discuss the influence of different parameter variations on the choice of government supervision mode and makes numerical simulations; then it puts forward some specific suggestions for government to restrain the speculative behavior of developer.

Efficient supervision strategy for illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste: A networked game theory decision-making model

2021 ◽  
pp. 0734242X2110320
Author(s):  
Chenyu Liu ◽  
Chunxiang Hua ◽  
Jianguo Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Forest Fires ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Small World ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Construction And Demolition Waste ◽  
Demolition Waste ◽  
Illegal Dumping ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

While the construction industry has brought substantial economic benefits to society, it has also generated substantial construction and demolition waste (CDW). Illegal dumping, which refers to dumping CDW in an unauthorized non-filling location, has become widespread in many countries and regions. Illegally dumping CDW destroys the environment, causing groundwater pollution and forest fires and causing significant economic impacts. However, there is a lack of research on the decision-making behaviours and logical rules of the main participants, construction contractors and the government in the illegal CDW dumping process. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model on a small-world network considering government supervision to portray the decision-making behaviours of illegal dumping participants and conducts a numerical simulation based on empirical equations to propose an effective supervision strategy for the government to manage illegal CDW dumping efficiently. It is found that the illegal dumping behaviours of contractors are mainly affected by the intensity of government supervision, the cost of fines and the income of illegal dumping; while for government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and a supervision intensity of approximately 0.7 is the optimal supervision probability given supervision efficiency. Notably, under a low-level supervision probability, increasing the penalty alone does not curb illegal dumping, and a certain degree of supervision must be maintained. The results show that in addition to setting fines for illegal dumping, the government must enforce a certain level of supervision and purify the market environment to steadily reduce illegal dumping.

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