Explosion risk on offshore and onshore facilities—is there an explosion risk problem or an explosion modelling problem?
Management of the risk related to the loss of containment of flammable fluid is paramount to ensure safe operations at facilities processing or storing flammable fluids. According to best industry practice, an extensive set of safety functions—including measures that reduce the frequency of initiating events (e.g. leaks) and measures that mitigate consequences in case of ignition—are implemented in design to control the risk. Adopting the risk-based design principles that are commonly enforced in the oil and gas industry, the performance of implemented safety barriers are assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively using different methodologies such as hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), and quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The ultimate outcome from the QRA methodology is used to assess the overall risk level as well as to assess dimensioning accidental loads (DALs) for equipment and structures that will ensure a design that is within the tolerable risk level set for the facility. An accurate assessment of DALs resulting from fires and explosion is crucial to manage both the risk and corresponding cost driving factors. The most critical safety barrier in this regard is to minimise leaks and thereafter to prevent ignition of the dispersed flammable fluid. A fundamental safety design principle is to find ways to avoid the occurrence of incidents rather than implement measures that mitigate consequences. This peer-reviewed paper demonstrates the significance of modelling the safety functions that are in place to ensure that the initial leak does not ignite by presenting a case example for different layouts of a conventional jacket installation with gas turbines. It is concluded that the difference between various available ignition models can be more prominent than the uncertainty related to any other model element in the QRA. To uncover potential hazards not reflected by the model and identify optimal control measures, the effect of the ignition model applied should be investigated in detail for installations where the QRA displays a prominent fire and explosion frequency.