scholarly journals Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

2017 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuelong Li ◽  
Marko Jusup ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Huijia Li ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Social Contacts ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Strict Condition ◽  
Theory And Experiments

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.

scholarly journals Do Economists Punish Less?

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Jonas Kaiser ◽  
Kasper Pedersen ◽  
Alexander Koch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Public ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economics Students

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

Punishment Leads to Cooperative Behavior in Structured Societies

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shade T. Shutters
Keyword(s):  
Social Structure ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Degree Distribution ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Structured Population ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Scale Free Networks

Altruistic punishment occurs when an agent incurs a cost to punish another but receives no material benefit for doing so. Despite the seeming irrationality of such behavior, humans in laboratory settings routinely pay to punish others even in anonymous, one-shot settings. Costly punishment is ubiquitous among social organisms in general and is increasingly accepted as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Yet if it is true that punishment explains cooperation, the evolution of altruistic punishment remains a mystery. In a series of computer simulations I give agents the ability to punish one another while playing a continuous prisoner's dilemma. In simulations without social structure, expected behavior evolves—agents do not punish and consequently no cooperation evolves. Likewise, in simulations with social structure but no ability to punish, no cooperation evolves. However, in simulations where agents are both embedded in a social structure and have the option to inflict costly punishment, cooperation evolves quite readily. This suggests a simple and broadly applicable explanation of cooperation for social organisms that have nonrandom social structure and a predisposition to punish one another. Results with scale-free networks further suggest that nodal degree distribution plays an important role in determining whether cooperation will evolve in a structured population.

A Preliminary Account of the Clinical Effects of Polarizing the Brain in Certain Psychiatric Disorders

1964 ◽  
Vol 110 (469) ◽  
pp. 773-785 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. W. T. Redfearn ◽  
O. C. J. Lippold ◽  
R. Costain
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cellular Level ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Clinical Effects ◽  
Preliminary Account ◽  
After Effect ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Cortical Polarization ◽  
Effect Of Surface

A previous paper (Lippold and Redfearn, 1964) described the mental changes that can be produced by the passage of small polarizing currents through the brain in human subjects. It became apparent during the course of these experiments that some of the effects persisted for hours or days after the current had been turned off. A persistent excitatory after-effect of surface-positive cortical polarization has recently been demonstrated in the rat (Bindman, Lippold and Redfearn, 1962). It is possible that a similar phenomenon, at the cellular level, is responsible for the long-lasting psychological effects of polarization.

scholarly journals A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Complete Solution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Social ◽  
Look Back

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.

Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elinor Ostrom
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Robust Solutions ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Graduated Sanctions ◽  
Over Time

AbstractGuala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.

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