Virtue and Self-Love in Aristotle's Ethics

1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia L. Homiak

We are often told that there is a striking and important difference between ancient Greek moral philosophy and modern moral philosophy. Whereas the moderns emphasize principles of right action and what a person is obligated to do, ancient moral philosophy is concerned with character and what it is to be a good, that is, a virtuous human being. For the Greeks, virtue was not a matter of making our actions conform to a specific code of conduct or to the moral law. Instead, it was a matter of being in the right psychological state. This idea is explicit in Socrates’ famous claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue: once we know that virtue is an indispensable means to the final good of eudaimonia, we will choose virtue.

Labyrinth ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Kathi Beier

In modern moral philosophy, virtue ethics has developed into one of the major approaches to ethical inquiry. As it seems, however, it is faced with a kind of perplexity similar to the one that Elisabeth Anscombe has described in Modern moral philosophy with regard to ethics in general. For if we assume that Anscombe is right in claiming that virtue ethics ought to be grounded in a sound philosophy of psychology, modern virtue ethics seems to be baseless since it lacks or even avoids reflections on the human soul. To overcome this difficulty, the paper explores the conceptual connections between virtue and soul in Aristotle's ethics. It claims that the human soul is the principle of virtue since reflections on the soul help us to define the nature of virtue, to understand the different kinds of virtues, and to answer the question why human beings need the virtues at all. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-214
Author(s):  
Sophia Connell

Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle's ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe's 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The mainstream response has been to design a normative theory of ‘virtue ethics’ to rival deontology and consequentialism. This essay argues that that response is inadequate; it misses Anscombe's point and obscures various aspects of Aristotle's ethics, in particular his emphasis on friendship and human interconnectedness. This element of Aristotelianism was favoured by Midgley. By returning to Midgley, with the support of Aristotle, it is possible to find an alternative modern Aristotelianism in ethics.


Author(s):  
Sylvia Berryman

Beginning from a short history of ethics offered in Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, this chapter notes the practice—dating back to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’—of offering narratives about the history of modern ethics in order to unsettle the metaphysical picture underlying the rise of non-cognitivism or subjectivism in ethics. These narratives often feature Aristotelian virtue ethics as a potential alternative, and have shaped the reading of Aristotle’s ethics. The supposed ‘gap’ separating ancient and modern ethics is questioned, and with it the claim that Aristotle was unreflective about the grounding of his ethics; the supposition is also disputed that he regarded human nature as an ‘Archimedean Point’ to ground the demands of ethics, as the work of Williams and Foot might suggest. From a survey of modern appropriations of his ideas, two research questions are isolated: was Aristotle an Archimedean naturalist, and was he metaethically naive?


Dialogue ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marceline Morais

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to discuss the transcendental status of Kant's moral philosophy. Despite what is usually thought among scholars, we intend to demonstrate that morality for Kant is not part of transcendental philosophy. We shall at first recall the reasons that have driven Kant to separate morality from the transcendental philosophy. Kant's position seems both firm and clear: morality, although involving a priori concepts such as the moral law, is not a transcendantal knowledge because its major concept, the will, is not pure enough; it refers somehow to experience. On the other hand, after considering the positions of renowned scholars such as Gueroult, Delbos, and Höffe, who claim that Kant's morality became partially or totally transcendantal since the writing of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, we suggest that Kant had then found the right way to establish on a critical basis a future metaphysics of morals.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (SPL1) ◽  
pp. 1099-1104
Author(s):  
Priti Desai ◽  
Anita Wanjari ◽  
Deepali Giri

The COVID 19 pandemic had disrupted the lives of all socio-economic groups of the global population. The lockdowns, social distancing, financial adversities, continuous fear of being a victim to the virus had left every individual desperate with a feeling of vulnerability. Irrespective of all possible efforts at the global level, no ultimate solution to get rid of this virus is available till date except for the preventive measures. Various medicines and formulations are into practice, which may boost one’s immunity to fight against the virus. This catastrophic scenario had resulted in an impact on the human being in all aspects, physical, mental, emotional, social and behavioural. Ayurveda, the science of life has encompassed all these aspects through its preventive and curative principles. Aacharrasayana, code of conduct or behavioural discipline is one such modality that entails perfect mental, physical, social and spiritual health of the human being. The execution of Aacharrasayana in this situation can immensely contribute in restoring mental, spiritual and social health. This review aims to interpret the implementation of various aspects of Aacharrasayanain context of COVID 19 and its utility in combatting the dreadful crisis.


Author(s):  
Lynn D. Wardle

The question of when a legal right to life first arises in the course of a human being’s development is pertinent to a variety of contexts, including protection of prenatal life from injury by persons other than the gestational mother, what to do with frozen embryos when the couple who created them divorces, and how to treat children born with severe disabilities, as well as the more familiar context of state regulation, restriction, or prohibition of abortion. This chapter first summarizes social and biological science findings relevant to this question, then details development of legal rules and constitutional doctrine pertaining to abortion regulation before contrasting that with protections for prenatal life in other contexts. It concludes that the most coherent answer to the question when a right to life arises is that the right to life is coextensive with the biological life of the human being, and that a legal right to remain alive arises when a human being comes into existence and continues until it ceases to be a human being—that is, when its life has ended. This might provide justification for greater restrictions on abortion, but that could depend on additional considerations.


1995 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 621-625
Author(s):  
Vernon Reynolds

The ancient Greek roots of two traditions in science are traced. The first, derived from Pythagoras, emphasises continuity of life-forms and respect for animals. The second, derived from Aristotle, divides humans from animals because humans possess reason whereas animals lack it. This gives humans the right to use animals for their own purposes. Primate field workers are closer to the former tradition than the latter, but rarely involve themselves in detailed consideration of animal experiments. With the post-Darwinian awareness of the continuity of all life-forms, it is now known that chimpanzees, in particular, are very close to humans in most respects, and it is argued that their use in invasive experiments is no longer morally defensible.


Author(s):  
Mariane Farias de Oliveira

Tradução do artigo "Eudemian Ethical Method", de Lawrence Jost, publicado originalmente em Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV: Aristotle's Ethics edited by John P. Anton and Anthony Preus, the State University of New York Press ©1991, State University of New York. A tradução foi feita sob supervisão do orientador prof. Dr. José Lourenço Pereira da Silva (UFSM).


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Jafar Aghazadeh ◽  
Hasan Mohammadi

<p>In the thoughts and beliefs of Iranians, kingdom has had a history of the creation of human beings on the earth. Accordingly, Iranians believe that the first creature and human being on the earth was the first king of Iran. Iranians connects the history of their mythical royal dynasties to the creation of humanity. For Iranians, the mythical kings of Iran are the creators of the royal institution and the functions and duties of the royal institution have been established, developed and transferred to next generations by the measures of these kings. The objective of the present study is to investigate the establishment of the royal institution and the development of royal institution in ancient Iran by a descriptive-analytical method. The findings indicate that Iranians had specific sacredness for their kings and called the first creature of Ahura Mazda as the King. In addition, they believed that kings should perform particular tasks whose formation was attributed to the mythical kings of Iran. Further, they believed that only those persons had the right of being a king who were from the race of kings and were approved by Ahura Mazda. to examine Lessing’s elucidation of authentic knowledge in <em>Shikasta</em>. The methodology appropriated in the paper entails depiction of visible world as an illusion of the Real pointed in Plato’s allegory of Cave and Nagarjuna’s Mundane Truth. We clarify emotion as the main motivator of such illusionary status stressed in both Plato and Nagarjuna’s thoughts. We argue that while the importance of reason and eradicating emotion cannot be ignored, what adjoins people to Truth is mindfulness and intuitive knowledge which is close to Nagarjuna’s non-dual patterns. By examining ordinary life as the illusion of Real, and emotion as the main obstacle to achieve the Truth emphasized in both Nagarjuna and Plato’s trends, we depart from other critics who undermine the eminence of essentialist trace in Lessing’s works and examine her approach towards Truth merely under postmodern lens. This departure is significant since we clarify while essentialism has been abandoned to a large extent and supporters of Plato have become scarce, amalgamation of his thoughts with spiritual trends opens a fresh way to earn authenticity in Lessing’s novel. </p><p> </p>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document