Justifying economic coercion: the discourse of victimhood in China’s unilateral sanctions policy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Enrico V. Gloria
Keyword(s):  
Economic Coercion

Development and Validation of the Economic Coercion Scale 36 (ECS-36) in Rural Bangladesh

2021 ◽  
pp. 088626052098781
Author(s):  
Kathryn M. Yount ◽  
Yuk Fai Cheong ◽  
Stephanie Miedema ◽  
Ruchira T. Naved
Keyword(s):  
Factor Analysis ◽  
Partner Violence ◽  
Short Form ◽  
Latent Trait ◽  
Married Women ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Group Factor ◽  
Rural Bangladesh ◽  
Multiple Group ◽  
Economic Coercion

Assessing progress toward Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5, to achieve gender equality and to empower women, requires monitoring trends in intimate partner violence (IPV). Current measures of IPV may miss women’s experiences of economic coercion, or interference with the acquisition, use, and maintenance of financial resources. This sequential, mixed-methods study developed and validated a scale for economic coercion in married women in rural Bangladesh, where women’s expanding economic opportunities may elevate the risks of economic coercion and other IPV. Forty items capturing lifetime and prior-year economic coercion were adapted from formative qualitative research and prior scales and administered to a probability sample of 930 married women 16–49 years. An economic coercion scale (ECS) was validated using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with primary data from random-split samples ( N1 = 310; N2 = 620). Item response theory (IRT) methods gauged the measurement precision of items and scales over the range of the economic-coercion latent trait. Multiple-group factor analysis assessed measurement invariance of the economic-coercion construct. Two-thirds (62.26%) of women reported any lifetime economic coercion. EFA suggested a 36-item, two-factor model capturing barriers to acquire and to use or maintain economic resources. CFA, multiple group factor analysis, and multidimensional IRT methods confirmed that this model provided a reasonable fit to the data. IRT analysis showed that each dimension provided most precision over the higher range of the economic coercion trait. The Economic Coercion Scale 36 (ECS-36) should be validated elsewhere and over time. It may be added to violence-specific surveys and evaluations of violence-prevention and economic-empowerment programs that have a primary interest measuring economic coercion. Short-form versions of the ECS may be developed for multipurpose surveys and program monitoring.

More than carrots and sticks: Economic statecraft and coercion in China–Taiwan relations from 2000 to 2019

Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572096265
Author(s):  
Christina Lai
Keyword(s):  
Public Awareness ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Economic Statecraft ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Chinese Group ◽  
Level Analysis

China has become one of the most important trading partners for many Asian countries, and Taiwan is at the forefront of China’s economic coercion. It also leads to the following empirical puzzle: When can Beijing’s economic sanctions and incentives achieve their desired outcomes? Why and how do they often fail? Given the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan, how Taiwan resists China’s coercive measures contributes significantly to theoretical development in international relations. Taiwan has responded to Chinese economic pressure by diversifying its trade with and investment in Southeast Asian and South Asian countries to lessen dependence on China. It also securitizes China–Taiwan relations by raising public awareness about over-reliance on China’s market. Taiwan is not only a target of China’s coercion, but an active actor in its own right as well. This article re-evaluates the literature on East Asian politics and economic statecraft. First, it highlights the salience of power asymmetry to the field of economic statecraft. Second, it offers a three-level analysis of when and how China exercised economic coercion and incentives towards Taiwan. Third, it examines how Taiwan addressed Beijing’s sanctions on Chinese group tourists starting in 2016. The final section discusses some conclusions that can be drawn and suggests some avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Liberal world order and economic coercion in modern foreign policy of the U.S.

2021 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
Oğuz Alperen Turhan
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
World Order ◽  
Single System ◽  
Global System ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
The U.S

The article studies the evolution of liberal world order within the framework of conventional directions of the U.S.’ foreign policy. The purpose of this work is to reveal the peculiarities of development of the U.S.’ foreign policy in terms of liberal world order. For this purpose, the U.S.’ foreign policy is considered through the prism of Walter Russel Mead’s “four schools of American foreign policy”. The author analyzes the development and transformation of liberalism in the context of using economic coercion in the U.S.’ foreign policy. The article also considers the topical problems of development of the liberal world order faced by the realist and liberal paradigms. Representatives of both groups realize the failure of the liberal world order, but offer different strategies of defining the U.S.’ foreign policy course. Representatives of the liberal paradigm believe that the liberal world order entered a phase of self-destruction because of accelerated integration of unequal states in a single system. Realists, in their turn, claim that transformations in the structure of the global system determine the functionality of the liberal world order. Specifically, the revisionist position of Russia and China is a reaction to the imposed principles, and serves as a basis for the transition to the multipolar system. Thus, conflicts of interest between the parties cause the use of measures of coercion.

scholarly journals Curative protection for the satisfaction of the weaker party in contractual relations: الحماية العلاجية لرضا الطرف الضعيف في العلاقات التعاقدية

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiba Mehdi Adnan Al-Fahham, Ammar Kereem Al-Fetlawy
Keyword(s):  
Legal Protection ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Contractual Relations ◽  
Weak Party

The subject of curative protection to the satisfaction of the weak party in contractual relations is one of the issues that have taken on the opinion of legal jurisprudence, it had to be addressed by research and study, especially in the current situation because of this prominent issue in the relations of people in the field of concluding contracts, despite the importance of this The topic, however, we find that he did not receive a share of the legislative organization commensurate with that importance, because the legislator did not put clear or direct texts through which the weak party’s satisfaction could be protected, but rather different theories scattered in various laws that did not reach the level of familiarity with this issue in all its aspects. Therefore, it is necessary to search for solutions through which we can protect the consent of the weak party ... all that and more that we covered in this study by following both the inductive approach and the comparative approach and the analytical approach, where we extrapolated the most important jurisprudence opinions that were said in this regard, as well as the analysis of legal texts and that Within the scope of Iraqi law and French law, and then we extrapolated the most important doctrinal opinions to the most important results and proposals we have reached to protect the consent of the weak party in contractual relations. The study reached a set of results, among which the researcher reached a set of results, including the creation of the French legislator a new defect in his legislation, which the judiciary had the largest role in alerting to the existence of this defect, its purpose is to protect the consent of the weak party in economic relations, by setting the dependency criterion as the origin of the contractor the weak victim of this kind of coercion. Secondly, the grace period despite thinking is a modern idea, but the French legislator clarified the mechanisms that contractors can follow in their contractual relations and impose a penalty in the event that the weak contracting professional is deprived of it, as it is a right granted to the weak party according to clear and explicit legislative texts. The researcher reached a set of recommendations, among which we recommend the legislator to introduce the defect of economic coercion to address cases of imbalance in the contractual balance that he seeks to achieve in all contractual relationships. We suggest that the Iraqi legislator stipulates the deadline for thinking about its legislation, because the protection that is granted to the weak party is only subsequent protection, at a time when the weak party needs legal protection prior to concluding the contract.

Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menevis Cilizoglu ◽  
Navin A Bapat
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Economic Costs ◽  
High Interest ◽  
International Credit ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Target States ◽  
Borrowing Cost ◽  
Do So

Although sanctions generate economic costs, target states may “sanctions-proof” their regime by borrowing capital from abroad. While some targets obtain interest-free capital from black knight states, others may need to borrow with interest from international credit markets. These interest rates may sometimes make borrowing cost-prohibitive, giving targets no choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the sender. However, since senders cannot observe if black knight states are assisting target states, targets have an incentive to misrepresent their source of external capital. In an effort to deter sanctions, targets that must borrow at high interest rates may signal that they have black knight support and are sanctions-proofed. We formally and empirically demonstrate that in this uncertain environment, senders are more likely to impose sanctions on targets with low credit ratings, but only do so if the target places a relatively low value on uninterrupted economic transactions with the sender.

The Justification and Critique of Coercion as World Order Politics

2021 ◽  
pp. 489-500
Author(s):  
Christopher Daase ◽  
Nicole Deitelhoff
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
World Order ◽  
International Order ◽  
Physical Force ◽  
Coercive Measures ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Normative Expectations

The present chapter turns from the justification of war (the use of force) to the justification of coercion. It proceeds on the assumption that to stabilize the current international order requires less ‘legitimate force’ and more ‘legitimate coercion’ since in most institutions the enforcement of norms—as the very basis of order—does not only or even primarily rely on physical force but on various forms of political and economic coercion. The chapter distinguishes various forms of coercion and reconstructs debates in International Law and International Relations with regard to their legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Doing so, Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff intend to broaden the debate on world order by redirecting the focus from the use of force to the use of less violent coercive measures. Specifically, the chapter introduces a concept of sanction as a means of communicating normative expectations to the normative community rather than executing punishments.

Economic Coercion

2019 ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Isabela Mares ◽  
Lauren E. Young
Keyword(s):  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Urban Settings ◽  
Rural Settings ◽  
Economic Exchanges ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Economic Influence ◽  
Qualitative Analyses

Chapter 6 turns to the analysis of clientelistic strategies premised on economic coercion. In urban settings, the main brokers involved in coercive strategies are employers who threaten employees with a reduction in their wages or with economic layoffs. In rural settings, the main economic brokers are moneylenders, who threaten voters with the worsening of their ongoing economic exchanges. The chapter documents the existence of these coercive strategies using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. The variation across localities in the incidence of such strategies is likely to be affected by economic conditions that increase the capacity of brokers to withstand efforts of some candidates to reduce their economic influence.

The Impact of Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (9) ◽  
pp. 1555-1583
Author(s):  
Dimitar Gueorguiev ◽  
Daniel McDowell ◽  
David A. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
External Threats ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
The Impact

In recent years, the United States has increasingly tried to change other governments’ economic policies by threatening to punish those countries if they do not change course. To better understand the political consequences of these tactics, this paper examines how external threats influence public support for policy change in targeted states. We consider three mechanisms through which economic coercion might alter public opinion: by changing individuals’ interests, by activating their national identities, and by providing them with new information about a policy’s distributive effects. To test these rival explanations, we focus on the case of China–US currency relations. Using data from a survey experiment of Chinese internet users, we find strong support for the informational updating theory. Our evidence suggests that economic coercion can reduce support for policy change because it leads individuals to update their beliefs about who wins and loses from economic policy changes.

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