Special and Not Special: The Holy See, the 1991 Iraq War,and the United Nations Conferences of 1994 and 1995

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-533
Author(s):  
Luke Cahill
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Maulana Hasymi

<p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Isu-isu terkait budaya, ekonomi, dan nilai seringkali menghasilkan konflik. Tak terkecuali dengan isu perebutan wilayah. Salahsatu perang terbesar yang terkait dengan isu sengketa wilayah adalah perang Iran-Irak 1988. Perang Iran-Irak 1988 membawa sejarah besar dari kedua negara yang saling berhubungan dengan isu perebutan wilayah, perebutan pengaruh ideologi, dan isu ekonomi. Perang yang berlangsung cukup lama ini membuat Iran dan Irak menyadari akan kerugian jangka panjang yang dialami. Pada akhirnya, kedua negara sepakat untuk berdamai dalam sebuah proses yang melibatkan pihak ketiga. Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa mengambil peran sebagai pihak ketiga yang membantu penyelesaian perang antara Iran dan Irak. Resolusi no.598 yang disusun oleh Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa mengarisbawahi akan pentingnya gencatan senjata dengan banyaknya kerugian dan korban jiwa yang muncul. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa upaya Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa menyusun resolusi no.598 dalam menyelesaikan perang Iran-Irak adalah penerapan dari mekanisme compliance bargaining pada proses resolusi konflik.</p><p><strong>Kata kunci:</strong> compliance bargaining, resolusi konflik, rezim, gencatan senjata</p><p> </p><p align="center"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>Conflictual issues can be about economy, culture and values, or even a border dispute. The class cannot be avoided because of several issues triggering the conflict and also several interests. One of the bigger wars that can be was the Iran-Iraq War at 1980-1988. This war brought the long history between both of those countries, which were related with border disputes, ideological influences, and economic war. Those of both countries is thinking that if the war is still being run, it is not giving any good advantage. The damage was so big. So, it required a process to bring the two states involved war into one meeting to talk about peace or end the war. The process is called a peace process. In this case, the peace process arranged by the involvement of third party. The United Nations take a role as the third party in Iran-Iraq War by formed a Resolution no 598. In the resolution the council expressed its concern that, despite its calls for ceasefire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq continued with heavy loss of life and material destruction. The Iran-Iraq war was ended through the resolution no 598 that was produced by the United Nations. Furthermore, this paper argue that the way of the United Nations ended the Iran-Iraq war through Resolution no 598 is implementing the theory of compliance bargaining in conflict resolution.</p><p><strong>Keywords</strong>: compliance bargaining, conflict resolution, regime, ceasefire</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.


2019 ◽  
pp. 126-161
Author(s):  
William vanden Heuvel

This chapter begins by detailing Ambassador vanden Heuvel's role as co-chair of Jimmy Carter's New York state presidential campaign. An early supporter of Carter, vanden Heuvel helped in Carter's transformation from a little-known Georgia governor to the Democratic nominee. After Carter's election, he was appointed Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva. He became Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in New York in late 1979. His tenure in New York coincided with the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increasing tensions in the Middle East. He discusses the marginalisation of the UN in the approach to the 2003 Iraq War, as well as his work with Senator Ted Kennedy and President Bill Clinton on UN issues. The accompanying speech argues for the importance of the UN in the international order and America's responsibility to support it, despite hostility from Congress and neo-conservatives.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-42
Author(s):  
U. Imobersteg

AbstractThis report from a member of the United Nations (UN) team of experts describes the investigations of the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. The UN-sponsored team of experts discovered evidence that clearly showed the use of three chemical weapon substances during that conflict—Yperite (Mustard Gas), Tabun (nerve gas), and Phosgene (respiratory irritant). The effects of these chemical agents and some means of treatment for victims are described.


Author(s):  
Poorvi Chitalkar ◽  
David M. Malone

This chapter examines the lingering effects of the United Nations Security Council's engagement with Iraq over four decades. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council responded by imposing mandatory sanctions against Iraq and later that year authorized a United States-led military intervention. The Council then mandated weapons inspections and eventually a complex humanitarian program to mitigate the deleterious effects of the sanctions imposed against Iraq. In the next round of events in 2002–2003 it proved an ultimately unsuccessful political broker. Finally, the Council resorted to a marginal peacebuilding role after 2003. This chapter first retraces the Security Council's engagement with Iraq from 1980 onwards before discussing the Bush administration's unilateralism in the Iraq War. It also considers the Council's decision making on Iraq from 2002 to 2014 and how this engagement has both reflected and defined wider patterns of international relations, and how learning from Iraq has changed the Council's approach to promoting international security.


Author(s):  
de Guttry Andrea

This contribution discusses the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. After presenting the facts and context of the crisis (on which the parties strongly disagreed), this chapter examines the legal positions of the main actors involved in the war (Iran and Iraq), and discusses the reaction, or lack thereof, of the international community, and specifically of the United Nations. The legality of the military operations carried out by both parties is then investigated. The final section analyses if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development and evolution of the concepts of self-defence and of preventive self-defence and comments on the limited role played by the United Nations during most part of the war.


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