On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Kane
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.


2021 ◽  
Vol 163 (5) ◽  
pp. 1229-1237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rickard L Sjöberg

Abstract Background Research suggests that unconscious activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA) precedes not only certain simple motor actions but also the point at which we become aware of our intention to perform such actions. The extent to which these findings have implications for our understanding of the concepts of free will and personal responsibility has been subject of intense debate during the latest four decades. Methods This research is discussed in relation to effects of neurosurgical removal of the SMA in a narrative review. Results Removal of the SMA typically causes a transient inability to perform non-stimulus-driven, voluntary actions. This condition, known as the SMA syndrome, does not appear to be associated with a loss of sense of volition but with a profound disruption of executive function/cognitive control. Conclusions The role of the SMA may be to serve as a gateway between the corticospinal tract and systems for executive function. Such systems are typically seen as tools for conscious decisions. What is known about effects of SMA resections would thus seem to suggest a view that is compatible with concepts of personal responsibility. However, the philosophical question whether free will exists cannot be definitely resolved on the basis of these observations.


Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.


Augustinus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-142
Author(s):  
Mathijs Lamberigts ◽  

During the Pelagian controversy, the precise relation between grace and free will was an important issue. Augustine emphasized the priority of grace over human beings’ free will after the Fall. Pelagians such as Julian of Aeclanum were of the opinion that such view annihilated human beings’ free will. Throughout history, time and again, scholars belonging to different schools and denomina­tions have discussed this issue at length. In this article, we concentrate on Augustine’s view on love as grace during his debate with Julian. We argue that one should broaden the scope of this question and pay attention to the role of divine love as an important and decisive factor with regard to the proper activity of grace in the redemption and liberation of human beings. Thinking the relation between human beings and God in terms of love is a help in order to overcome the unfruitful grace-freewill antinomy. In fact, such approach does justice to both the Scriptural sources of Augustine’s position and the bishop’s spiritual view on the topic under consideration.


2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-29
Author(s):  
Andrea Berber

The purpose of this paper is to give an answer to the question of the extent to which Libet?s experiments are helping to solve the problem of free will. Relevance of Libet?s experimental results for the problem of free will is contested by the multitude of complaints. These complaints can be divided into three categories: methodological objections, conceptual objections and complaints regarding the interpretation of the role of readiness potential. I am trying to show that only objections that belong to the last group have a real effect. I conclude that Libet?s experiments while providing significant incentives and suggestions for further research did not contribute to solving the problem of free will.


Analysis ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Widerker

Author(s):  
Frederick C. Beiser

This chapter examines the so-called “materialism controversy,” one of the most important intellectual disputes of the second half of the nineteenth century. The dispute began in the 1850s, and its shock waves reverberated until the end of the century. The main question posed by the materialism controversy was whether modern natural science, whose authority and prestige were now beyond question, necessarily leads to materialism. Materialism was generally understood to be the doctrine that only matter exists and that everything in nature obeys only mechanical laws. If such a doctrine were true, it seemed there could be no God, no free will, no soul, and hence no immortality. These beliefs, however, seemed vital to morality and religion. So the controversy posed a drastic dilemma: either a scientific materialism or a moral and religious “leap of faith.” It was the latest version of the old conflict between reason and faith, where now the role of reason was played by natural science.


Author(s):  
Maximiliano Emanuel Korstanje

The discourse of the Matrix not only wakes up philosophy from the slumber they are, but reflects the rise of fears which are proper of a culture, that manipulates anxieties to fix policies otherwise would be rejected. Basically, Neo is subject to an ethical dilemma which means that we are free to make the decision to live in a fake without suffering or in “the real of the dessert” as Morpheus put it. At this extent, if technology is used to protect humankind, Matrix evinces under some circumstances, it can oppress human beings when they renounce to their “free-will”. This chapter not only explored the limitations of the society of risks within liberal thought but taking into consideration the role of authenticity serves ideologically to legitimate suffering. Indeed, accepting to live as Neo did, may lead to oppression or liberation.


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