5 India: From Positivism to Structuralism

Author(s):  
Sathe S P

The constitution of India is not merely a law prescribing a division of power and limits to power, but contains a bill of rights and positive directions to the State to establish a just social order. It incorporates the essential aspects of parliamentary democracy, federalism, provisions regarding inter-state trade, and commerce, among other features. This chapter discusses the salient features of the Indian constitution, directive principles, separation of powers, constitutional amendment, judicial review, problems and methods of constitutional interpretation, positivist and structuralist interpretation, constituent assembly and the role of the judiciary, legal positivism of the early years, external aids to interpretation, resolution of conflicts between constitutional provisions, freedom of religion, powers and privileges of legislatures, affirmative action for the weaker sections of society, freedom of speech, property rights, post-emergency judicial activism, independence of the judiciary, the court as a political institution, and institutional and cultural factors underlying constitutional interpretation.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (101) ◽  
pp. 819
Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

Resumen:La presente contribución adopta como hipótesis de partida la relativa influencia de los estándares internacionales en la redacción de la Constitución de 1978 y la absoluta necesidad de adaptación a la realidad del Estado supranacional e internacionalmente integrado. En este sentido, un primer enfoque permite comprobar que, a pesar del juego potencial de las disposiciones constitucionales de apertura internacional, y tras cuatro décadas de vigencia de la Carta Magna Española de 1978, la justicia constitucional y la doctrina constitucionalista no han mostrado una actitud clara y abierta hacia las exigencias jurídicas internacionales, con la excepción de un relativo entusiasmo hacia los parámetros europeos. En efecto, en la parte central del artículo, el análisis de los cuarenta años constitucionalismo democrático bajo la Constitución de 1978 revela, primeramente, un déficit de interpretación basado en soluciones internacionales más favorables, así como una incorrecta e inexplorada concepción del impacto de los tratados internacionales en el sistema constitucional de fuentes.En segundo término, se examina la proyección positiva de los estándares internacionales tanto en la «parte dogmática» (valores, principios y derechos constitucionales) como en la «parte orgánica» de la Constitución (separación de poderes y organización territorial del poder), sin olvidar el peso de los instrumentos internacionales en la defensa del orden constitucional (mecanismos ordinario —tribunal constitucional— y extraordinario —reforma constitucional—). En tercer lugar, se somete a escrutinio la responsabilidad social de la Universidad en sus tareas de enseñanza y de investigación (especialmente en situaciones domésticas conflictivas), con objeto de transferir un conocimiento avanzado a la sociedad sin banalizar o trivializar la importancia del Derecho internacional y del Derecho constitucional en la defensa democrática del orden constitucional. Por último, se completa el análisis propuesto a través de la toma en consideración del lugar que también ocupan las normas constitucionales en los tratados internacionales y el impacto de nociones como margen de apreciación nacional, identidad constitucional y otras.La conclusión principal del trabajo consiste en sostener la necesaria retroalimentación de los estándares internacionales y constitucionales, puesto que esas sinergias positivas (incluido un diálogo judicial global) seguirán propiciando el fortalecimiento del sentimiento constitucional bajo una Carta Magna Española de 1978 inserta en un contexto cada vez más globalizado.Abstract:This papers adopts as a starting hypothesis the relative degree of influence of international standards in the drafting of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the absolute need to accommodate to the reality of an integrated State at supranational and international levels. In this sense, a first approach shows that, despite the potential role of constitutional clauses opening to international standards, and after four decades since the entry into force of the Spanish Magna Carta of 1978, constitutional justice and constitutional doctrine have not shown clear nor open behaviour towards international legal requirements, with the exception of its relative enthusiasm towards European parameters.Indeed, in the main part of this paper, the analysis of the past forty yearsof democratic constitutionalism under the 1978 Constitution reveals, first and foremost, an interpretative deficit based on more favourable international solutions, as well as an incorrect and unexplored view of the impact of international treaties within the constitutional system of sources of law.Secondly, the positive impact of international standards is examined in  connection with both the «dogmatic part» (constitutional values, principlesand rights) and the «organic part» of the Constitution (separation of powers and territorial organization of the State), without forgetting the weight of international instruments in defending the constitutional order (ordinary —constitutional court— and extraordinary —constitutional amendment— mechanisms). Thirdly, the social responsibility of Universities in their teaching and research (especially in conflicting domestic situations) is submitted to scrutiny, in order to show its key role in transferring advanced knowledge to society without trivializing the importance of both international law and constitutional law in the democratic defense of the constitutional order. Finally, the place that constitutional norms occupy in international treaties, as well as the impact of notions such as (national) margin of appreciation, constitutional identity and others, are proposed so as to complete the analysis.The main conclusion of this paper holds the necessary feedback of internationaland constitutional standards, since these positive synergies (including a global judicial dialogue) will continue to promote the strengthening of a «constitutional feeling» under the 1978 Spanish Magna Carta, which is inserted in an increasingly globalized context.Summary:1. Preliminary issues: the influence of international standards in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution and the need for consistency with the reality of an integrated State at supranational and international levels. 2. Subsequent issues: the weight of constitutional jurisdiction confinement in light of international parameters. 3. Further questions: the presence of a self-absorbed constitutionalism with respect to international sources in general and relatively enthusiastic about European sources in particular. 4. Constitutional clauses on the open acceptance of international standards: particular focus on human rights instruments. 5. The constitutional approach international treaties and the so-called control of conventionality. 6. The favourable impact of international standards on the set of constitutional values, principles and rights. 7. The impact of international standards on the organization of powers. 8. The positive role of international instruments in defending the constitutional order: 8.1. Internationalization of the constituent function and the weighting of constitutional amendments. 8.2. International standards and constitutional jurisdiction. 8.3. The inadmissible trivialization of both International and Constitutional Law. 9. International instruments’s regard for constitutional norms: the margin of (national) appreciation, the counter-limits and related notions doctrine. 10. Final remarks: the feedback between international andconstitutional standards  


Author(s):  
Espinosa Manuel José Cepeda ◽  
Landau David

Just as the Colombian president has historically been very strong, the Colombian Congress has historically played a relatively minor role in the conduct of national policy. The 1991 Constituent Assembly sought to rationalize congressional behavior and give it a more substantial role. However, problems of legislative corruption and dysfunctionality have persisted. This chapter reviews the Court’s attempts to police the scope of congressional inviolability, limit congressional delegation to the executive, and incentivize and ensure adequate legislative deliberation in the lawmaking process. This jurisprudence has sought to alter legislative behavior and ensure that laws are a product of adequate social deliberation, thus improving the role of the Colombian Congress in public life.


Author(s):  
Isabella Karla Lima dos Santos

Resumo: Este trabalho busca analisar o instituto da Interpretação Constitucional no direito americano e brasileiro, de maneira comparada. Nosso objetivo é demonstrar as semelhanças e diferenças entre os dois países, no que diz respeito ao âmbito de incidência da interpretação constitucional e ao espaço de liberdade conferido ao intérprete judicial, bem como demonstrar a influência do modelo de controle de constitucionalidade norte-americano (difuso) sobre o brasileiro (misto). Para tanto, iremos fazer uma breve análise conceitual sobre aspectos fundamentais ao entendimento do tema deste trabalho e, em seguida, estudaremos os modelos de controle de constitucionalidade dos dois países de modo comparado, com ênfase no papel do intérprete constitucional e o seu âmbito de atuação dentro de cada modelo. Buscamos demonstrar que o fundamental não é o modo como se interpreta a Constituição, mas o resultado obtido, que deve ser sempre a efetivação dos direitos fundamentais. Tanto o Judiciário americano quanto o brasileiro recebem críticas quanto ao caráter contramajoritário de suas decisões, contudo, deixamos claro que um Estado Democrático de Direito se faz não só através do respeito à vontade da maioria, mas também quando há a concretização dos direitos fundamentais dos cidadãos por meio das decisões das Cortes Constitucionais. Palavras-chave: Direito Comparado; Jurisdição Constitucional; Judicial Review of Legislation; Interpretação Constitucional; Direitos Fundamentais. Abstract: This paper seeks to analyse the Constitutional Interpretation Institute in American and Brazilian Law, comparative way. Our goal is to demonstrate the similarities and differences between the two countries, with regard to the scope of constitutional interpretation and impact to the area of freedom conferred upon the court interpreter, as well as demonstrate the influence of constitutionality control model (diffuse) on the Brazilian (mixed). To this end, we will do a brief conceptual analysis on key aspects to understanding of the topic of this work and then we will study the models of judicial review of the two countries so compared with emphasis on the role of constitutional interpreter and its scope of action within each model. We seek to demonstrate that the key is not how to interpret the Constitution, but the results obtained, which should always be the practice of fundamental rights. Both the American and Brazilian Courts receive criticism about the against majority character of their decisions, however, we are clear that a democratic State of law is made not only by respecting the will of the majority, but also when there is the realization of the fundamental rights of citizens by means of decisions of Constitutional Courts. Keywords: Comparative Law; Constitutional Jurisdiction; Judicial Review of Legislation; Constitutional Interpretation; Fundamental Rights.


Yuridika ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Radian Salman ◽  
Sukardi Sukardi ◽  
Mohammad Syaiful Aris

The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia is centralized judicial review institution which implements a posteriori and abstract control. Constitutional court decision often politically sensitive and involve important issues. On the one hand handing down strong decisions that uphold important constitutional principles can bring great benefits to citizens and can strengthen support for democracy but on the other hand, strong role of the court in judicial review tends to encroach increasingly on the territory of the law making institution. This article examines the decision of constitutional court in the framework of a tension between constitutionalism and democracy, especially from theoretical or conceptual approach. As result of examining its decisions, Indonesian Constitutional Court may reflect two characters; judicial activism as characterized by acting as law-maker and using policy in judicial decisions and/ or judicial self-restraint.  Recent  Indonesian experience shows that judicial review of legislation is not a simply of judicial control over law-making institution, as it brings  tension in the context of power relations in the scheme of separation of power. Relationship between the court and legislature, in respective of judicial review, will culminate in the philosophy of the judiciary. However, as constitutionalism and democracy are virtue, decisions of the Constitutional Court in judicial review should create mode of self-limitation within the framework of the principle of separation of powers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Zia Akhtar

The Chinese state implemented a conscious transfer to a market economy after 1977 when the Four Modernisations were inaugurated and the new Constitution promulgated in 1982 raised the possibility for the separation of powers. The new framework introduced judicial review into the structure of the legal system that was to provide redress of grievances from mal administration. The transition to a new leadership in 2011 allowed the National Peoples Congress to enact administrative reforms, and further amendments to the Chinese Constitution in 2018 have promulgated the Judges Law. The judicial reforms promote the values of an independent judiciary and there is an effective machinery of justice which promotes judicial review. This paper argues that the centralisation of power by the Communist Party does not preclude the functioning of judicial administration that conforms to rule of law and an emerging trend of public interest litigation and participatory justice.


Author(s):  
Bruno Denis Vale Castro ◽  
Paulo Roberto Barbosa Ramos

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar a deliberação interna e legitimidade das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de Controle de Constitucionalidade, observada uma conjuntura de revisão da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes e necessidade de criação de novos arranjos institucionais. Neste aspecto, tem-se como objetivo geral repensar o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal em um modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como sua legitimidade, justificação de suas decisões e deliberação interna, superando a dicotomia ativismo judicial/ deferência ao legislativo, tendo em vista a necessidade de readequação da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes, de modo que se leve a Constituição a sério e se responda ao anseio de desenvolvimento democrático-social brasileiro.Por fim, considera-se que a necessidade de que algum órgão delibere em sede de controle de constitucionalidade não significa que esta deva ser permanente ou que não possa haver alguma espécie de diálogo entre os poderes, concebendo assim, que Supremo Tribunal Federal não detém o monopólio da guarda da Constituição, havendo a possibilidade de um papel mais protagonista do legislativo, a partir da utilização dos mecanismos já existentes ou mesmo da criação de novos dispositivos que permitam diálogos institucionais.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial. Diálogos institucionais. Controle de constitucionalidadeBETWEEN THE ACTIVISM AND LEGISLATIVE (IN) EFFICIENY: DELIBERATION AND LEGITIMACY OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN OFFICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERSABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze the internal deliberation and legitimacy of decisions of the Supreme Court in place of Judicial Review, observed a conjuncture Revision Theory of Separation of Powers and the need to create new institutional arrangements. In this respect, it has the general objective to rethink the role of the Supreme Court in a model of judicial review, as well as its legitimacy, justification of their decisions and internal deliberation, overcoming the dichotomy judicial activism /deference to the legislature, with a view the need to readjust the Theory of Separation of Powers, so that light the Constitution seriously and respond to the yearning of Brazilian democratic and social de-velopment. Finally, it is considered that the need for some body deliberates on seat of judicial review does not mean that it must be permanent or may not be some sort of dialogue between the powers, conceived so that the Supreme Court does not hold monopoly of safeguarding the Constitution , with the possibility of a more protagonist role of the legislature, from the use of existing or even the creation of new devices that allow institutional dialogue mechanisms.KEYWORDS: Judicial activism. Institutional dialogues. Judicial review.ENTRE EL ACTIVISMO Y LA (IN) OPERANCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERACIÓN Y LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS DECISIONES DE LA CORTE SUPREMA EN LA SEDE DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD, EN UN CONTEXTO DE NUEVOS ARREGLOS INSTITUCIONALES Y LA REVISIÓN DE LA TEORÍA DE LA SEPARACIÓN DE PODERESRESUMEN: El articulo intenta analizar la deliberación interna y la legitimidad de las decisiones del Supremo Tribunal Federal en sede de Control de Constitucionalidad, observada una coyuntura de revisión de la Teoría de la Separa-ción de los Poderes y la necesidad de creación de nuevas relaciones institucionales. En ese aspecto, tiene como objetivo general pensar de otra forma el papel del Supremo Tribunal Federal en un modelo de control de constitu-cionalidad, y también su legitimidad, justificación de sus decisiones y deliberación interna, con la superación de la dicotomía activismo judicial/deferencia al legislativo, teniendo en vista la necesidad de readecuación de la Teoría de la Separación de los Poderes, de forma que se lleve a Constitución en serio y se presenta una respuesta a los deseos de desarrollo democrático-social brasileño. Al final, tiene en consideración la necesidad de que algún órgano delibere en sede de control de constitucionalidad no significa que este debe ser permanente o que no pueda haber alguna suerte de dialogo entre los poderes, concibiendo así, que el Supremo Tribunal Federal no detiene el mono-polio de la guardia de la constitución, habiendo la posibilidad de un papel más protagonista do legislativo, a partir de la utilización de los mecanismos ya existentes o mismo de la creación de nuevos dispositivos que vengan a permitir diálogos institucionales.PALABRAS CLAVE: Activismo judicial. Diálogos institucionales. Control de constitucionalidad


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bellamy

The relationship between liberalism and democracy is notoriously paradoxical. On the one hand, the justification for democratic procedures most commonly rests on liberal assumptions. Standard liberal arguments for democracy range from the importance of consent due to the moral primacy of the individual, to the role of critical argument and the diversity of opinion for the discovery of truth. On the other hand, liberal institutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law, have frequently been interpreted as constraints upon democracy, albeit necessary ones if democracy is not to undermine itself. The paradox arises from the fact that liberalism provides a philosophical basis for regarding democracy as the only valid source of law whilst apparently appealing to some higher law in order to limit democracy itself. This paradox is embodied in the constitutions of most liberal democratic states. For generally these documents contain provisions – such as a bill of rights guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, assembly and association – designed to secure popular participation in the democratic process, alongside others – such as rights not obviously intrinsic to democratic decision making and mechanisms for judicial review – which seek to limit the power of democratic assemblies.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter traces the development of judicial review in Australia, which was modeled on the U.S. system of judicial review. Australian judicial review evolved out of a need for an umpiring body in federalism and separation of powers cases. Indeed, the original purpose of the Australian High Court under the Australian Constitution was to umpire federalism disputes between the Commonwealth and the six Australian states, which predated the federal government of Australia; and to ensure that the traditionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of British subjects under the common law and responsible parliamentary government were respected regarding Australia’s citizens. The Australian Constitution does not have a Bill of Rights or an enumerated Judicial Review clause, but it does limit and enumerate the broad powers of the Australian federal government. The Framers of the Australian Constitution, like the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, assumed that the courts would have the power of judicial review. As a result, there is, in Australia, judicial review in federalism and separation of powers umpiring cases but not in Bill of Rights cases since there is essentially no Australian Bill of Rights.


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