This chapter examines the question of whether the law should prohibit or prevent jobs that are robotic in the nature of their performance against two normative frameworks: first, the framework of human rights and, secondly, the framework of human capabilities. These two frameworks justify controls, albeit not necessarily the same, over the sorts of jobs that are available on the labour market. The chapter finds that both frameworks recognize the value of work as an important interest and an element of human flourishing, and both frameworks impose duties as to the content of work. The duties that human rights impose include the creation of work opportunities and the prohibition of exploitation at work, rather than the creation of meaningful work. Working like a robot, or like a cog in a machine, is not necessarily incompatible with human rights. However, it appears to be incompatible with Nussbaum’s account of human capabilities. It undermines both architectonic capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, the exercise of which affects all other capabilities. Even though boring and monotonous work is incompatible with this approach, it is less clear whether there should be a state duty to prohibit it, according to the theory of human capabilities. This is because work, even if boring and monotonous, may still be conducive to human flourishing for it is good for the enjoyment of several human capabilities. This lack of clarity as to the duties imposed in this area is a weakness of the capabilities approach.
Reconceiving Judicial Office Through a Labour Law Lens
